Incentives in Government Contracting:
Could the existing level of government services by provided at a lower cost? This study presents a convincing argument for incentive contracts as a means to this end. In a typical market economy, payments from the government to firms account for about one-half of government spending (excluding trans...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Toronto
University of Toronto Press
[2019]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Heritage
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FAW01 FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UPA01 UBG01 FAB01 FCO01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Could the existing level of government services by provided at a lower cost? This study presents a convincing argument for incentive contracts as a means to this end. In a typical market economy, payments from the government to firms account for about one-half of government spending (excluding transfer payments). By changing the way in which a government pays the firms from which it procures goods and services, it would be possible to maintain the existing array of government programs at a lower price. The major finding of this study is that governments could significantly reduce their expenditures by making extensive use of incentive contracts where they currently use either fixed-price contracts or cost-plus contracts. An incentive contract shares cost overruns and cost underruns between the government and the contractor according to a predetermined ratio. An incentive contract stimulates competition among the firms bidding for the contract and shares the project's risk between the government and the selected firm, while giving the contractor incentives to keep incurred costs low. In addition to advocating the use of incentive contracts, the study analyses the consequences of preferential treatment for domestic content over foreign content in government procurement, discusses the choice for a government agency between producing a commodity or service in-house and contracting for its provision with a private firm, and examines the experience with contracting of both the Ontario government and the United States Department of Defense in order to draw lessons for government contracting in general |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 25. Sep 2019) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource |
| ISBN: | 9781487582685 |
| DOI: | 10.3138/9781487582685 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | McAfee, R. Preston McMillan, John |
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| spelling | McAfee, R. Preston Verfasser aut Incentives in Government Contracting R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan Toronto University of Toronto Press [2019] © 1988 1 online resource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Heritage Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 25. Sep 2019) Could the existing level of government services by provided at a lower cost? This study presents a convincing argument for incentive contracts as a means to this end. In a typical market economy, payments from the government to firms account for about one-half of government spending (excluding transfer payments). By changing the way in which a government pays the firms from which it procures goods and services, it would be possible to maintain the existing array of government programs at a lower price. The major finding of this study is that governments could significantly reduce their expenditures by making extensive use of incentive contracts where they currently use either fixed-price contracts or cost-plus contracts. An incentive contract shares cost overruns and cost underruns between the government and the contractor according to a predetermined ratio. An incentive contract stimulates competition among the firms bidding for the contract and shares the project's risk between the government and the selected firm, while giving the contractor incentives to keep incurred costs low. In addition to advocating the use of incentive contracts, the study analyses the consequences of preferential treatment for domestic content over foreign content in government procurement, discusses the choice for a government agency between producing a commodity or service in-house and contracting for its provision with a private firm, and examines the experience with contracting of both the Ontario government and the United States Department of Defense in order to draw lessons for government contracting in general In English BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business bisacsh Öffentlicher Auftrag (DE-588)4043164-2 gnd rswk-swf Ontario (DE-588)4102089-3 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Ontario (DE-588)4102089-3 g Öffentlicher Auftrag (DE-588)4043164-2 s 1\p DE-604 USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g 2\p DE-604 McMillan, John aut https://doi.org/10.3138/9781487582685 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | McAfee, R. Preston McMillan, John Incentives in Government Contracting BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business bisacsh Öffentlicher Auftrag (DE-588)4043164-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4043164-2 (DE-588)4102089-3 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Incentives in Government Contracting |
| title_auth | Incentives in Government Contracting |
| title_exact_search | Incentives in Government Contracting |
| title_full | Incentives in Government Contracting R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan |
| title_fullStr | Incentives in Government Contracting R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan |
| title_full_unstemmed | Incentives in Government Contracting R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan |
| title_short | Incentives in Government Contracting |
| title_sort | incentives in government contracting |
| topic | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business bisacsh Öffentlicher Auftrag (DE-588)4043164-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business Öffentlicher Auftrag Ontario USA |
| url | https://doi.org/10.3138/9781487582685 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mcafeerpreston incentivesingovernmentcontracting AT mcmillanjohn incentivesingovernmentcontracting |