Against knowledge closure:
Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-leng...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Singapore
Cambridge University Press
2019
|
| Ausgabe: | First published 2019. First papperback edition 2021. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects |
| Beschreibung: | viii, 246 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9781108474023 1108474020 9781108463294 1108463290 |
Internformat
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| 505 | 8 | |a 1 Motivation, strategy, and definition : Closure as axiom -- Why care? -- Strategy -- Defining closure -- KC -- Transmission and warrant -- The problem with KC -- Transmission versus penetration. 2 Counterexamples : Zebra -- basis fallibilism -- Dretske cases -- Vogel against the counterexamples -- A plethora of inclinations -- The argument by counterexample -- The chapters to follow. 3 Denying premise I: skepticism : Why skepticism? -- Downgrading -- Piecemeal and wholesale skeptical hypotheses -- The skeptical closure argument -- Front-loading -- Underdetermination -- Conclusion. 4 Denying premise 2: warrant transmission : Warrant transmission and Williamson's insight -- No inevitable false negatives -- NIFN, fallibilism, and insensitivity -- Method individuation -- Method externalism -- NIFN and other Dretske cases. 5 Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant : Transmission and skepticism -- Transmission and conditions of warrant -- Transmission and safety -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Transmission and reliabilism -- Transmission and evidentialism -- Summary of the last two chapters. 6 Front-loading : Warrant preservation without transmission -- Front-loading -- The front-loading strategy -- The buck-passing argument -- And not just front-loading -- A safe way out? -- Explaining transmission failure -- The closure advocate's dilemma. 7 Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q : Setting aside buck-passing -- Putting inference out of a job -- THe irrelevance of B to Q. 8 Denying premise 4: warrant by background information : Outline of the chapter -- Background information and wholesale skeptical hypothesis -- Background information and piecemeal skeptical hypothesis -- Explaining the lottery intuition -- Warrant infallibilism and the lottery intuition -- Merricks' arguments for warrant infallibilism -- Summary. 9 Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement : Warrants by entitlement -- Entitlement and skepticism -- The meaning of "warrant" -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Strategic entitlement -- Entitlement of cognitive project -- Conclusion. 10 Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem : Arguing against closure denial -- Abominable conjunctions -- Abominable conjunctions and contextualism -- Contextualism and anti-skeptical sources of warrant -- Abominable conjunctions and interest-relative invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and classical moderate invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and the knowledge rule -- Assumptions and skepticism -- The spreading problem. 11 Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure : Bootstrapping -- Bootstrapping and NIFN -- Bootstrapping and epistemic circularity -- More easy knowledge -- Justification closure -- Justification, skepticism, and assumptions. References -- Index | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804180590976565248 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Alspector-Kelly, Marc |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1190657163 |
| author_facet | Alspector-Kelly, Marc |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Alspector-Kelly, Marc |
| author_variant | m a k mak |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV046205246 |
| contents | 1 Motivation, strategy, and definition : Closure as axiom -- Why care? -- Strategy -- Defining closure -- KC -- Transmission and warrant -- The problem with KC -- Transmission versus penetration. 2 Counterexamples : Zebra -- basis fallibilism -- Dretske cases -- Vogel against the counterexamples -- A plethora of inclinations -- The argument by counterexample -- The chapters to follow. 3 Denying premise I: skepticism : Why skepticism? -- Downgrading -- Piecemeal and wholesale skeptical hypotheses -- The skeptical closure argument -- Front-loading -- Underdetermination -- Conclusion. 4 Denying premise 2: warrant transmission : Warrant transmission and Williamson's insight -- No inevitable false negatives -- NIFN, fallibilism, and insensitivity -- Method individuation -- Method externalism -- NIFN and other Dretske cases. 5 Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant : Transmission and skepticism -- Transmission and conditions of warrant -- Transmission and safety -- Transmission and reliabilism -- Transmission and evidentialism -- Summary of the last two chapters. 6 Front-loading : Warrant preservation without transmission -- Front-loading -- The front-loading strategy -- The buck-passing argument -- And not just front-loading -- A safe way out? -- Explaining transmission failure -- The closure advocate's dilemma. 7 Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q : Setting aside buck-passing -- Putting inference out of a job -- THe irrelevance of B to Q. 8 Denying premise 4: warrant by background information : Outline of the chapter -- Background information and wholesale skeptical hypothesis -- Background information and piecemeal skeptical hypothesis -- Explaining the lottery intuition -- Warrant infallibilism and the lottery intuition -- Merricks' arguments for warrant infallibilism -- Summary. 9 Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement : Warrants by entitlement -- Entitlement and skepticism -- The meaning of "warrant" -- Strategic entitlement -- Entitlement of cognitive project -- Conclusion. 10 Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem : Arguing against closure denial -- Abominable conjunctions -- Abominable conjunctions and contextualism -- Contextualism and anti-skeptical sources of warrant -- Abominable conjunctions and interest-relative invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and classical moderate invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and the knowledge rule -- Assumptions and skepticism -- The spreading problem. 11 Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure : Bootstrapping -- Bootstrapping and NIFN -- Bootstrapping and epistemic circularity -- More easy knowledge -- Justification closure -- Justification, skepticism, and assumptions. References -- Index |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1126551546 (DE-599)BVBBV046205246 |
| edition | First published 2019. First papperback edition 2021. |
| format | Book |
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First papperback edition 2021.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Singapore</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">viii, 246 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="c">24 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Motivation, strategy, and definition : Closure as axiom -- Why care? -- Strategy -- Defining closure -- KC -- Transmission and warrant -- The problem with KC -- Transmission versus penetration. 2 Counterexamples : Zebra -- basis fallibilism -- Dretske cases -- Vogel against the counterexamples -- A plethora of inclinations -- The argument by counterexample -- The chapters to follow. 3 Denying premise I: skepticism : Why skepticism? -- Downgrading -- Piecemeal and wholesale skeptical hypotheses -- The skeptical closure argument -- Front-loading -- Underdetermination -- Conclusion. 4 Denying premise 2: warrant transmission : Warrant transmission and Williamson's insight -- No inevitable false negatives -- NIFN, fallibilism, and insensitivity -- Method individuation -- Method externalism -- NIFN and other Dretske cases. 5 Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant : Transmission and skepticism -- Transmission and conditions of warrant -- Transmission and safety -- </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Transmission and reliabilism -- Transmission and evidentialism -- Summary of the last two chapters. 6 Front-loading : Warrant preservation without transmission -- Front-loading -- The front-loading strategy -- The buck-passing argument -- And not just front-loading -- A safe way out? -- Explaining transmission failure -- The closure advocate's dilemma. 7 Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q : Setting aside buck-passing -- Putting inference out of a job -- THe irrelevance of B to Q. 8 Denying premise 4: warrant by background information : Outline of the chapter -- Background information and wholesale skeptical hypothesis -- Background information and piecemeal skeptical hypothesis -- Explaining the lottery intuition -- Warrant infallibilism and the lottery intuition -- Merricks' arguments for warrant infallibilism -- Summary. 9 Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement : Warrants by entitlement -- Entitlement and skepticism -- The meaning of "warrant" -- </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Strategic entitlement -- Entitlement of cognitive project -- Conclusion. 10 Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem : Arguing against closure denial -- Abominable conjunctions -- Abominable conjunctions and contextualism -- Contextualism and anti-skeptical sources of warrant -- Abominable conjunctions and interest-relative invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and classical moderate invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and the knowledge rule -- Assumptions and skepticism -- The spreading problem. 11 Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure : Bootstrapping -- Bootstrapping and NIFN -- Bootstrapping and epistemic circularity -- More easy knowledge -- Justification closure -- Justification, skepticism, and assumptions. 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| id | DE-604.BV046205246 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:38:11Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781108474023 1108474020 9781108463294 1108463290 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031584261 |
| oclc_num | 1126551546 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
| physical | viii, 246 Seiten 24 cm |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateSearch | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Alspector-Kelly, Marc Verfasser (DE-588)1190657163 aut Against knowledge closure Marc Alspector-Kelly (Western Michigan University) First published 2019. First papperback edition 2021. Cambridge ; New York ; Port Melbourne ; New Delhi ; Singapore Cambridge University Press 2019 viii, 246 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier 1 Motivation, strategy, and definition : Closure as axiom -- Why care? -- Strategy -- Defining closure -- KC -- Transmission and warrant -- The problem with KC -- Transmission versus penetration. 2 Counterexamples : Zebra -- basis fallibilism -- Dretske cases -- Vogel against the counterexamples -- A plethora of inclinations -- The argument by counterexample -- The chapters to follow. 3 Denying premise I: skepticism : Why skepticism? -- Downgrading -- Piecemeal and wholesale skeptical hypotheses -- The skeptical closure argument -- Front-loading -- Underdetermination -- Conclusion. 4 Denying premise 2: warrant transmission : Warrant transmission and Williamson's insight -- No inevitable false negatives -- NIFN, fallibilism, and insensitivity -- Method individuation -- Method externalism -- NIFN and other Dretske cases. 5 Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant : Transmission and skepticism -- Transmission and conditions of warrant -- Transmission and safety -- Transmission and reliabilism -- Transmission and evidentialism -- Summary of the last two chapters. 6 Front-loading : Warrant preservation without transmission -- Front-loading -- The front-loading strategy -- The buck-passing argument -- And not just front-loading -- A safe way out? -- Explaining transmission failure -- The closure advocate's dilemma. 7 Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q : Setting aside buck-passing -- Putting inference out of a job -- THe irrelevance of B to Q. 8 Denying premise 4: warrant by background information : Outline of the chapter -- Background information and wholesale skeptical hypothesis -- Background information and piecemeal skeptical hypothesis -- Explaining the lottery intuition -- Warrant infallibilism and the lottery intuition -- Merricks' arguments for warrant infallibilism -- Summary. 9 Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement : Warrants by entitlement -- Entitlement and skepticism -- The meaning of "warrant" -- Strategic entitlement -- Entitlement of cognitive project -- Conclusion. 10 Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem : Arguing against closure denial -- Abominable conjunctions -- Abominable conjunctions and contextualism -- Contextualism and anti-skeptical sources of warrant -- Abominable conjunctions and interest-relative invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and classical moderate invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and the knowledge rule -- Assumptions and skepticism -- The spreading problem. 11 Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure : Bootstrapping -- Bootstrapping and NIFN -- Bootstrapping and epistemic circularity -- More easy knowledge -- Justification closure -- Justification, skepticism, and assumptions. References -- Index Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Knowledge, Theory of Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-108-57805-9 (DE-604)BV046029192 |
| spellingShingle | Alspector-Kelly, Marc Against knowledge closure 1 Motivation, strategy, and definition : Closure as axiom -- Why care? -- Strategy -- Defining closure -- KC -- Transmission and warrant -- The problem with KC -- Transmission versus penetration. 2 Counterexamples : Zebra -- basis fallibilism -- Dretske cases -- Vogel against the counterexamples -- A plethora of inclinations -- The argument by counterexample -- The chapters to follow. 3 Denying premise I: skepticism : Why skepticism? -- Downgrading -- Piecemeal and wholesale skeptical hypotheses -- The skeptical closure argument -- Front-loading -- Underdetermination -- Conclusion. 4 Denying premise 2: warrant transmission : Warrant transmission and Williamson's insight -- No inevitable false negatives -- NIFN, fallibilism, and insensitivity -- Method individuation -- Method externalism -- NIFN and other Dretske cases. 5 Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant : Transmission and skepticism -- Transmission and conditions of warrant -- Transmission and safety -- Transmission and reliabilism -- Transmission and evidentialism -- Summary of the last two chapters. 6 Front-loading : Warrant preservation without transmission -- Front-loading -- The front-loading strategy -- The buck-passing argument -- And not just front-loading -- A safe way out? -- Explaining transmission failure -- The closure advocate's dilemma. 7 Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q : Setting aside buck-passing -- Putting inference out of a job -- THe irrelevance of B to Q. 8 Denying premise 4: warrant by background information : Outline of the chapter -- Background information and wholesale skeptical hypothesis -- Background information and piecemeal skeptical hypothesis -- Explaining the lottery intuition -- Warrant infallibilism and the lottery intuition -- Merricks' arguments for warrant infallibilism -- Summary. 9 Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement : Warrants by entitlement -- Entitlement and skepticism -- The meaning of "warrant" -- Strategic entitlement -- Entitlement of cognitive project -- Conclusion. 10 Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem : Arguing against closure denial -- Abominable conjunctions -- Abominable conjunctions and contextualism -- Contextualism and anti-skeptical sources of warrant -- Abominable conjunctions and interest-relative invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and classical moderate invariantism -- Abominable conjunctions and the knowledge rule -- Assumptions and skepticism -- The spreading problem. 11 Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure : Bootstrapping -- Bootstrapping and NIFN -- Bootstrapping and epistemic circularity -- More easy knowledge -- Justification closure -- Justification, skepticism, and assumptions. References -- Index Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4070914-0 |
| title | Against knowledge closure |
| title_auth | Against knowledge closure |
| title_exact_search | Against knowledge closure |
| title_full | Against knowledge closure Marc Alspector-Kelly (Western Michigan University) |
| title_fullStr | Against knowledge closure Marc Alspector-Kelly (Western Michigan University) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Against knowledge closure Marc Alspector-Kelly (Western Michigan University) |
| title_short | Against knowledge closure |
| title_sort | against knowledge closure |
| topic | Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Erkenntnistheorie |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alspectorkellymarc againstknowledgeclosure |