Normative externalism:
Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the cor...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2019
|
Ausgabe: | First edition |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
Zusammenfassung: | Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these0problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to0regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles |
Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
ISBN: | 9780199696536 |
DOI: | 10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000 c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV046158770 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 190913s2019 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
020 | |a 9780199696536 |9 978-0-19-969653-6 | ||
024 | 7 | |a 10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 |2 doi | |
035 | |a (ZDB-28-OSP)EDZ0002051153 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)1120139692 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV046158770 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
084 | |a CC 7200 |0 (DE-625)17672: |2 rvk | ||
100 | 1 | |a Weatherson, Brian |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1184820198 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Normative externalism |c Brian Weatherson |
250 | |a First edition | ||
264 | 1 | |a Oxford, United Kingdom |b Oxford University Press |c 2019 | |
300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | 3 | |a Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these0problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to0regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles | |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Normative Ethik |0 (DE-588)4538417-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Externalismus |0 (DE-588)4700094-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
653 | 0 | |a Normativity (Ethics) | |
653 | 0 | |a Externalism (Philosophy of mind) | |
653 | 0 | |a Normativity (Ethics) | |
689 | 0 | 0 | |a Externalismus |0 (DE-588)4700094-6 |D s |
689 | 0 | 1 | |a Normative Ethik |0 (DE-588)4538417-4 |D s |
689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Electronic version |a Weatherson, Brian |t Normative externalism |b First edition |d Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2019 |z 9780192576880 |
776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe |z 978-0-19-969653-6 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
912 | |a ZDB-28-OSP | ||
943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031538731 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1811004139170168832 |
---|---|
adam_text | |
any_adam_object | |
author | Weatherson, Brian |
author_GND | (DE-588)1184820198 |
author_facet | Weatherson, Brian |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Weatherson, Brian |
author_variant | b w bw |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV046158770 |
classification_rvk | CC 7200 |
collection | ZDB-28-OSP |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-28-OSP)EDZ0002051153 (OCoLC)1120139692 (DE-599)BVBBV046158770 |
discipline | Philosophie |
doi_str_mv | 10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 |
edition | First edition |
format | Electronic eBook |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a2200000 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV046158770</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">190913s2019 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780199696536</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-19-969653-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-28-OSP)EDZ0002051153</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1120139692</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV046158770</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CC 7200</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)17672:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Weatherson, Brian</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1184820198</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Normative externalism</subfield><subfield code="c">Brian Weatherson</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">First edition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Oxford, United Kingdom</subfield><subfield code="b">Oxford University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these0problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to0regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Normative Ethik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4538417-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Externalismus</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4700094-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Normativity (Ethics)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Externalism (Philosophy of mind)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Normativity (Ethics)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Externalismus</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4700094-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Normative Ethik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4538417-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Electronic version</subfield><subfield code="a">Weatherson, Brian</subfield><subfield code="t">Normative externalism</subfield><subfield code="b">First edition</subfield><subfield code="d">Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2019</subfield><subfield code="z">9780192576880</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-19-969653-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-28-OSP</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031538731</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
id | DE-604.BV046158770 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-09-23T16:15:33Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780199696536 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031538731 |
oclc_num | 1120139692 |
open_access_boolean | |
physical | 1 Online-Ressource |
psigel | ZDB-28-OSP |
publishDate | 2019 |
publishDateSearch | 2019 |
publishDateSort | 2019 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Weatherson, Brian Verfasser (DE-588)1184820198 aut Normative externalism Brian Weatherson First edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2019 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these0problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to0regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 gnd rswk-swf Externalismus (DE-588)4700094-6 gnd rswk-swf Normativity (Ethics) Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Externalismus (DE-588)4700094-6 s Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 s DE-604 Electronic version Weatherson, Brian Normative externalism First edition Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2019 9780192576880 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-0-19-969653-6 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Weatherson, Brian Normative externalism Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 gnd Externalismus (DE-588)4700094-6 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4538417-4 (DE-588)4700094-6 |
title | Normative externalism |
title_auth | Normative externalism |
title_exact_search | Normative externalism |
title_full | Normative externalism Brian Weatherson |
title_fullStr | Normative externalism Brian Weatherson |
title_full_unstemmed | Normative externalism Brian Weatherson |
title_short | Normative externalism |
title_sort | normative externalism |
topic | Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 gnd Externalismus (DE-588)4700094-6 gnd |
topic_facet | Normative Ethik Externalismus |
url | https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696536.001.0001 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT weathersonbrian normativeexternalism |