The obligation dilemma:
Can you be morally obligated to do something? To renowned philosopher Ishtiyaque Haji, the answer is guardedly no. Regardless of whether determinism is true, he argues, there is a prima facie plausibility that there are no moral obligations. Powerfully and efficiently, Haji develops a conclusion tha...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Oxford University Press
[2019]
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | Can you be morally obligated to do something? To renowned philosopher Ishtiyaque Haji, the answer is guardedly no. Regardless of whether determinism is true, he argues, there is a prima facie plausibility that there are no moral obligations. Powerfully and efficiently, Haji develops a conclusion that has major implications for how we conceive issues in moral responsibility and free will. The book develops the obligation dilemma as clearly as0possible. The next step will be for further sustained philosophical work to solve it, assuming it can be resolved, inspired by Haji. 0In many respects, the obligation dilemma mirrors the well-known responsibility dilemma, where no one is morally responsible for anything. When suitably amended, the strongest recommendations in favor of, or in response to, the responsibility dilemma neither fully support nor undermine the obligation dilemma. Exposing the obligation dilemma's implications for responsibility, and its ramifications for forgiveness (something central to interpersonal relationships), underscores its urgency |
| Beschreibung: | 1908 |
| Beschreibung: | xiii, 301 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780190050856 0190050853 |
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| id | DE-604.BV046152197 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:36:40Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780190050856 0190050853 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031532300 |
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| physical | xiii, 301 Seiten |
| publishDate | 2019 |
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| spelling | Haji, Ishtiyaque Verfasser (DE-588)1047696118 aut The obligation dilemma Ishtiyaque Haji New York Oxford University Press [2019] © 2019 xiii, 301 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier 1908 Can you be morally obligated to do something? To renowned philosopher Ishtiyaque Haji, the answer is guardedly no. Regardless of whether determinism is true, he argues, there is a prima facie plausibility that there are no moral obligations. Powerfully and efficiently, Haji develops a conclusion that has major implications for how we conceive issues in moral responsibility and free will. The book develops the obligation dilemma as clearly as0possible. The next step will be for further sustained philosophical work to solve it, assuming it can be resolved, inspired by Haji. 0In many respects, the obligation dilemma mirrors the well-known responsibility dilemma, where no one is morally responsible for anything. When suitably amended, the strongest recommendations in favor of, or in response to, the responsibility dilemma neither fully support nor undermine the obligation dilemma. Exposing the obligation dilemma's implications for responsibility, and its ramifications for forgiveness (something central to interpersonal relationships), underscores its urgency Pflicht (DE-588)4140391-5 gnd rswk-swf Deontologie (DE-588)4365723-0 gnd rswk-swf Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd rswk-swf Duty Responsibility Pflicht (DE-588)4140391-5 s Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 s DE-604 Deontologie (DE-588)4365723-0 s Online version Haji, Ishtiyaque, author Obligation dilemma New York : Oxford University Press, 2019 9780190050887 |
| spellingShingle | Haji, Ishtiyaque The obligation dilemma Pflicht (DE-588)4140391-5 gnd Deontologie (DE-588)4365723-0 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4140391-5 (DE-588)4365723-0 (DE-588)4015602-3 |
| title | The obligation dilemma |
| title_auth | The obligation dilemma |
| title_exact_search | The obligation dilemma |
| title_full | The obligation dilemma Ishtiyaque Haji |
| title_fullStr | The obligation dilemma Ishtiyaque Haji |
| title_full_unstemmed | The obligation dilemma Ishtiyaque Haji |
| title_short | The obligation dilemma |
| title_sort | the obligation dilemma |
| topic | Pflicht (DE-588)4140391-5 gnd Deontologie (DE-588)4365723-0 gnd Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Pflicht Deontologie Ethik |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hajiishtiyaque theobligationdilemma |