Normative externalism:
Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the cor...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2019
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these0problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to0regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles |
| Beschreibung: | xiii, 245 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780199696536 |
Internformat
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| 520 | 3 | |a Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these0problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to0regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.10 To Thine Own Self Be True Four Questions Normative ExtemaLism Defined Guidance Symmetry Regress Two Recent Debates Elizabeth and Descartes Why Call This Extemalism? Plan of Book 1 1 2 8 9 10 13 17 18 20 22 Part I. Ethics 2. All About Internalism 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 Some Distinctions Two Ways of Maximizing Expected Goodness Varieties of Internalism An Initial Constraint Motivation One: Guidance Motivation Two: Recklessness Motivation Three: Symmetry 3. Against Symmetry 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 Guilt and Shame Jackson Cases Motivation Welfare and Motivation Motivation, Virtues, and Vices The Weak Motivation Principle (WMP) The Strong Motivation Principle (SMP) Motivation Through Thick and Thin Moller’s Example 4. A Dilemma for Internalism 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 Six Forms of Internalism Two Difficult Cases Inadvertent Virtue and Misguided Conscience Ethics and Epistemology Rationality and Symmetry Conclusion 27 27 31 32 34 36 37 39 41 41 42 45 48 50 52 57 61 65 68 68 70 72 74 78 80
xii CONTENTS 5. Blame and Moral Ignorance 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 Does Moral Ignorance Excuse? Why Believe MIE? Chapter Plan Blame and Desire Blame, Agents, and Time Acting in Ignorance Is No Excuse Against Counterfactual Interpretations of Acting from Ignorance Against Motivational Interpretations of Actingfrom Ignorance Adopting a Decision Procedure and Acting on It Calhoun on Blame and Blameworthiness Moral Mistakes and Moral Strangers Two Approaches to Blame 6. Double Standards 6.1 Hypocrites 6.2 Value Comparisons 6.3 The Externalist’s Commitments 84 84 86 87 88 90 91 92 94 97 98 103 106 109 109 112 114 Part II. Epistemology 7. Level-Crossing Principles 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 First-Order and Second-Order Epistemology Change Evidentialism Motivations for Level-Crossing The Plan for the Rest of the Book Evidence, Rationality, and Wisdom Evidence, Thought, and Mathematics 8. Higher-Order Evidence 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 Varieties of Higher-Order Examples Diagnoses and Alternatives Tiredness and Abduction Explaining All Four Cases Against Bracketing 9. Circles, Epistemic and Benign 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 Normative Extemalism and Circularity Inference, Implication, and Transmission Liberalism, Defeaters, and Circles Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Normative Extemalism Easy Knowledge What’s Wrong with Easy Knowledge? Coda: Testing 119 119 120 121 123 124 125 130 130 133 135 138 143 146 146 148 150 156 157 160 165
CONTENTS xiii 10. Akrasia 170 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 171 172 174 178 181 182 The Possibility of Akrasia Three Level-Crossing Principles Why Not Be Akratic? Self-Awareness and Rational Reflection Akrasia and Odd Statements Desire as Belief (Reprise) 11. Screening and Regresses 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 Screening The Counting Problem JSE in Epistemology JSE and Higher-Order Evidence The Regress Objection Laundering Agents, States, and Actions 12. Disagreement 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 12.7 12.8 Introducing the Issues Two Concepts of Peerhood Evidence, Public and Private Independence and Conciliationism Circularity and Conciliationism Six Examples Equal Weight and the Cases The Evidence Aggregation Approach 13. Epilogue List of Examples References Index 186 186 187 189 192 193 197 199 203 203 205 207 209 211 212 214 220 224 226 231 241 |
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| author | Weatherson, Brian |
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| discipline | Philosophie |
| edition | First edition |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV045922402 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-09-23T16:15:31Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780199696536 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031304860 |
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| physical | xiii, 245 Seiten 24 cm |
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| spelling | Weatherson, Brian Verfasser (DE-588)1184820198 aut Normative externalism Brian Weatherson First edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2019 xiii, 245 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct principles: that they do the right thing, and that they believe rationally. This stance, that what matters are the correct principles, not one's own principles, has implications across ethics and epistemology. In ethics, it undermines the ideas that moral uncertainty should be treated just like factual uncertainty, that moral ignorance frequently excuses moral wrongdoing, and that hypocrisy is a vice. In epistemology, it suggests we need new treatments of higher-order evidence, and of peer disagreement, and of circular reasoning, and the book suggests new approaches to each of these0problems. Although the debates in ethics and in epistemology are often conducted separately, putting them in one place helps bring out their common themes. One common theme is that the view that one should live up to one's own principles looks less attractive when people have terrible principles, or when following their own principles would lead to riskier or more aggressive action than the correct principles. Another common theme is that asking people to live up to their principles leads to0regresses. It can be hard to know what action or belief complies with one's principles. And now we can ask, in such a case should a person do what they think their principles require, or what their principles actually require? Both answers lead to problems, and the best way to avoid these problems is to simply say people should follow the correct principles Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 gnd rswk-swf Externalismus (DE-588)4700094-6 gnd rswk-swf Normativity (Ethics) Externalism (Philosophy of mind) Externalismus (DE-588)4700094-6 s Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 s DE-604 Electronic version Weatherson, Brian Normative externalism First edition Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2019 9780192576880 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031304860&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Weatherson, Brian Normative externalism Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 gnd Externalismus (DE-588)4700094-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4538417-4 (DE-588)4700094-6 |
| title | Normative externalism |
| title_auth | Normative externalism |
| title_exact_search | Normative externalism |
| title_full | Normative externalism Brian Weatherson |
| title_fullStr | Normative externalism Brian Weatherson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Normative externalism Brian Weatherson |
| title_short | Normative externalism |
| title_sort | normative externalism |
| topic | Normative Ethik (DE-588)4538417-4 gnd Externalismus (DE-588)4700094-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Normative Ethik Externalismus |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=031304860&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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