Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning:
"The problem of philosophical scepticism is not so much what to say about the view itself (there being a consensus that it should be rejected), but rather what to say about the arguments that purport to yield it. And since these arguments involve claims and principles concerning notions like kn...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ithaca, NY
Cornell University Press
[2018]
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UPA01 UBG01 FAW01 FAB01 FCO01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "The problem of philosophical scepticism is not so much what to say about the view itself (there being a consensus that it should be rejected), but rather what to say about the arguments that purport to yield it. And since these arguments involve claims and principles concerning notions like knowledge and possibility, it is difficult to see how to explore the arguments without exploring these notions too."-from the IntroductionHow do we address philosophical arguments whose conclusions contradict our commonsense knowledge? For example: a logically impeccable argument that concludes that you cannot know that you are at this very moment reading a description of a book of philosophy. That is the problem of philosophical scepticism. Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning is an attempt to resolve how best to respond to such vexing arguments, a matter on which there is no consensus among contemporary philosophers. Rather than denying the premises of such arguments or simply declaring them invalid, John Koethe delves into what such arguments reveal about the nature of reasoning itself. He suggests that there is nothing straightforwardly wrong with sceptical arguments, and that in recognizing this while at the same time honoring our commonsense convictions about knowledge, we confront profound questions about the very nature of reasoning |
| Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Jan 2019) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource |
| ISBN: | 9781501731730 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV045916626 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 190606s2018 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781501731730 |9 978-1-5017-3173-0 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.7591/9781501731730 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-23-DGG)9781501731730 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1104929998 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV045916626 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-739 |a DE-860 |a DE-859 |a DE-Aug4 |a DE-473 |a DE-1046 |a DE-1043 |a DE-858 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 121 |2 22 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Koethe, John |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning |c John Koethe |
| 264 | 1 | |a Ithaca, NY |b Cornell University Press |c [2018] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c © 2005 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Jan 2019) | ||
| 520 | |a "The problem of philosophical scepticism is not so much what to say about the view itself (there being a consensus that it should be rejected), but rather what to say about the arguments that purport to yield it. And since these arguments involve claims and principles concerning notions like knowledge and possibility, it is difficult to see how to explore the arguments without exploring these notions too."-from the IntroductionHow do we address philosophical arguments whose conclusions contradict our commonsense knowledge? For example: a logically impeccable argument that concludes that you cannot know that you are at this very moment reading a description of a book of philosophy. That is the problem of philosophical scepticism. Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning is an attempt to resolve how best to respond to such vexing arguments, a matter on which there is no consensus among contemporary philosophers. Rather than denying the premises of such arguments or simply declaring them invalid, John Koethe delves into what such arguments reveal about the nature of reasoning itself. He suggests that there is nothing straightforwardly wrong with sceptical arguments, and that in recognizing this while at the same time honoring our commonsense convictions about knowledge, we confront profound questions about the very nature of reasoning | ||
| 546 | |a In English | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Epistemics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Knowledge, Theory of | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Reasoning | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Skepticism | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Argumentation |0 (DE-588)4002899-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Skepsis |0 (DE-588)4055222-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wissen |0 (DE-588)4066559-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Skepsis |0 (DE-588)4055222-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Wissen |0 (DE-588)4066559-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Argumentation |0 (DE-588)4002899-9 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-23-DGG | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031299132 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |l FHA01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FHA_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |l FKE01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FKE_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |l FLA01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FLA_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |l UPA01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q UPA_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |l UBG01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q UBG_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |l FAW01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FAW_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |l FAB01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FAB_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |l FCO01 |p ZDB-23-DGG |q FCO_PDA_DGG |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804180093470244864 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Koethe, John |
| author_facet | Koethe, John |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Koethe, John |
| author_variant | j k jk |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV045916626 |
| collection | ZDB-23-DGG |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-23-DGG)9781501731730 (OCoLC)1104929998 (DE-599)BVBBV045916626 |
| dewey-full | 121 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121 |
| dewey-search | 121 |
| dewey-sort | 3121 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>04139nmm a2200601zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV045916626</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">190606s2018 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-5017-3173-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-23-DGG)9781501731730</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1104929998</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV045916626</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-739</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-860</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-859</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Aug4</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1046</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-1043</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-858</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">121</subfield><subfield code="2">22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Koethe, John</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning</subfield><subfield code="c">John Koethe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Ithaca, NY</subfield><subfield code="b">Cornell University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">[2018]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">© 2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Jan 2019)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"The problem of philosophical scepticism is not so much what to say about the view itself (there being a consensus that it should be rejected), but rather what to say about the arguments that purport to yield it. And since these arguments involve claims and principles concerning notions like knowledge and possibility, it is difficult to see how to explore the arguments without exploring these notions too."-from the IntroductionHow do we address philosophical arguments whose conclusions contradict our commonsense knowledge? For example: a logically impeccable argument that concludes that you cannot know that you are at this very moment reading a description of a book of philosophy. That is the problem of philosophical scepticism. Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning is an attempt to resolve how best to respond to such vexing arguments, a matter on which there is no consensus among contemporary philosophers. Rather than denying the premises of such arguments or simply declaring them invalid, John Koethe delves into what such arguments reveal about the nature of reasoning itself. He suggests that there is nothing straightforwardly wrong with sceptical arguments, and that in recognizing this while at the same time honoring our commonsense convictions about knowledge, we confront profound questions about the very nature of reasoning</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="546" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In English</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Epistemics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Knowledge, Theory of</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Reasoning</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Skepticism</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Argumentation</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4002899-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Skepsis</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4055222-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wissen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066559-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Skepsis</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4055222-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Wissen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066559-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Argumentation</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4002899-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031299132</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="l">FHA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FHA_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="l">FKE01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FKE_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="l">FLA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FLA_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="l">UPA01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">UPA_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="l">UBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="l">FAW01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FAW_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="l">FAB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FAB_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730</subfield><subfield code="l">FCO01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-23-DGG</subfield><subfield code="q">FCO_PDA_DGG</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV045916626 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:30:17Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781501731730 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031299132 |
| oclc_num | 1104929998 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-739 DE-860 DE-859 DE-Aug4 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 |
| owner_facet | DE-739 DE-860 DE-859 DE-Aug4 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-1046 DE-1043 DE-858 |
| physical | 1 online resource |
| psigel | ZDB-23-DGG ZDB-23-DGG FHA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FKE_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FLA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG UPA_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG UBG_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FAW_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FAB_PDA_DGG ZDB-23-DGG FCO_PDA_DGG |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publishDateSearch | 2018 |
| publishDateSort | 2018 |
| publisher | Cornell University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Koethe, John Verfasser aut Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning John Koethe Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press [2018] © 2005 1 online resource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Jan 2019) "The problem of philosophical scepticism is not so much what to say about the view itself (there being a consensus that it should be rejected), but rather what to say about the arguments that purport to yield it. And since these arguments involve claims and principles concerning notions like knowledge and possibility, it is difficult to see how to explore the arguments without exploring these notions too."-from the IntroductionHow do we address philosophical arguments whose conclusions contradict our commonsense knowledge? For example: a logically impeccable argument that concludes that you cannot know that you are at this very moment reading a description of a book of philosophy. That is the problem of philosophical scepticism. Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning is an attempt to resolve how best to respond to such vexing arguments, a matter on which there is no consensus among contemporary philosophers. Rather than denying the premises of such arguments or simply declaring them invalid, John Koethe delves into what such arguments reveal about the nature of reasoning itself. He suggests that there is nothing straightforwardly wrong with sceptical arguments, and that in recognizing this while at the same time honoring our commonsense convictions about knowledge, we confront profound questions about the very nature of reasoning In English Epistemics Knowledge, Theory of Reasoning Skepticism Argumentation (DE-588)4002899-9 gnd rswk-swf Skepsis (DE-588)4055222-6 gnd rswk-swf Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd rswk-swf Skepsis (DE-588)4055222-6 s Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 s Argumentation (DE-588)4002899-9 s 1\p DE-604 https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Koethe, John Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning Epistemics Knowledge, Theory of Reasoning Skepticism Argumentation (DE-588)4002899-9 gnd Skepsis (DE-588)4055222-6 gnd Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4002899-9 (DE-588)4055222-6 (DE-588)4066559-8 |
| title | Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning |
| title_auth | Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning |
| title_exact_search | Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning |
| title_full | Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning John Koethe |
| title_fullStr | Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning John Koethe |
| title_full_unstemmed | Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning John Koethe |
| title_short | Scepticism, Knowledge, and Forms of Reasoning |
| title_sort | scepticism knowledge and forms of reasoning |
| topic | Epistemics Knowledge, Theory of Reasoning Skepticism Argumentation (DE-588)4002899-9 gnd Skepsis (DE-588)4055222-6 gnd Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Epistemics Knowledge, Theory of Reasoning Skepticism Argumentation Skepsis Wissen |
| url | https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501731730 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT koethejohn scepticismknowledgeandformsofreasoning |