Firm Interests: How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade
Firms are central to trade policy-making. Some analysts even suggest that they dictate policy on the basis of their material interests. Cornelia Woll counters these assumptions, arguing that firms do not always know what they want. To be sure, firms lobby hard to attain a desired policy once they ha...
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Ithaca, NY
Cornell University Press
[2018]
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Schriftenreihe: | Cornell Studies in Political Economy
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | FHA01 FKE01 FLA01 UPA01 UBG01 FAW01 FAB01 FCO01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Firms are central to trade policy-making. Some analysts even suggest that they dictate policy on the basis of their material interests. Cornelia Woll counters these assumptions, arguing that firms do not always know what they want. To be sure, firms lobby hard to attain a desired policy once they have defined their goals. Yet material factors are insufficient to account for these preferences. The ways in which firms are embedded in political settings are much more decisive. Woll demonstrates her case by analyzing the surprising evolution of support from large firms for liberalization in telecommunications and international air transport in the United States and Europe. Within less than a decade, former monopolies with important home markets abandoned their earlier calls for subsidies and protectionism and joined competitive multinationals in the demand for global markets. By comparing the complex evolution of firm preferences across sectors and countries, Woll shows that firms may influence policy outcomes, but policies and politics in turn influence business demands. This is particularly true in the European Union, where the constraints of multilevel decision-making encourage firms to pay lip service to liberalization if they want to maintain good working relations with supranational officials. In the United States, firms adjust their sectoral demands to fit the government's agenda. In both contexts, the interaction between government and firm representatives affects not only the strategy but also the content of business lobbying on global trade |
Beschreibung: | Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Jan 2019) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource 7 line drawings |
ISBN: | 9781501711497 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Woll, Cornelia |
author_facet | Woll, Cornelia |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Woll, Cornelia |
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dewey-search | 382/.3 |
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dewey-tens | 380 - Commerce, communications, transportation |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Electronic eBook |
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spelling | Woll, Cornelia Verfasser aut Firm Interests How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade Cornelia Woll Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press [2018] © 2008 1 online resource 7 line drawings txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cornell Studies in Political Economy Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 23. Jan 2019) Firms are central to trade policy-making. Some analysts even suggest that they dictate policy on the basis of their material interests. Cornelia Woll counters these assumptions, arguing that firms do not always know what they want. To be sure, firms lobby hard to attain a desired policy once they have defined their goals. Yet material factors are insufficient to account for these preferences. The ways in which firms are embedded in political settings are much more decisive. Woll demonstrates her case by analyzing the surprising evolution of support from large firms for liberalization in telecommunications and international air transport in the United States and Europe. Within less than a decade, former monopolies with important home markets abandoned their earlier calls for subsidies and protectionism and joined competitive multinationals in the demand for global markets. By comparing the complex evolution of firm preferences across sectors and countries, Woll shows that firms may influence policy outcomes, but policies and politics in turn influence business demands. This is particularly true in the European Union, where the constraints of multilevel decision-making encourage firms to pay lip service to liberalization if they want to maintain good working relations with supranational officials. In the United States, firms adjust their sectoral demands to fit the government's agenda. In both contexts, the interaction between government and firm representatives affects not only the strategy but also the content of business lobbying on global trade In English Corporations Political activity Free trade International trade Trade regulation Außenhandelspolitik (DE-588)4003841-5 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd rswk-swf Lobbyismus (DE-588)4036097-0 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 s Lobbyismus (DE-588)4036097-0 s Außenhandelspolitik (DE-588)4003841-5 s 1\p DE-604 https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501711497 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Woll, Cornelia Firm Interests How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade Corporations Political activity Free trade International trade Trade regulation Außenhandelspolitik (DE-588)4003841-5 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Lobbyismus (DE-588)4036097-0 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4003841-5 (DE-588)4061963-1 (DE-588)4036097-0 |
title | Firm Interests How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade |
title_auth | Firm Interests How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade |
title_exact_search | Firm Interests How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade |
title_full | Firm Interests How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade Cornelia Woll |
title_fullStr | Firm Interests How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade Cornelia Woll |
title_full_unstemmed | Firm Interests How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade Cornelia Woll |
title_short | Firm Interests |
title_sort | firm interests how governments shape business lobbying on global trade |
title_sub | How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade |
topic | Corporations Political activity Free trade International trade Trade regulation Außenhandelspolitik (DE-588)4003841-5 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Lobbyismus (DE-588)4036097-0 gnd |
topic_facet | Corporations Political activity Free trade International trade Trade regulation Außenhandelspolitik Unternehmen Lobbyismus |
url | https://www.degruyter.com/doi/book/10.7591/9781501711497 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT wollcornelia firminterestshowgovernmentsshapebusinesslobbyingonglobaltrade |