Knowing by perceiving:
Epistemological discussions of perception usually focus on something other than knowledge. They consider how beliefs arising from perception can be justified. With the retreat from knowledge to justified belief there is also a retreat from perception to the sensory experiences implicated by percepti...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
[2019]
|
| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | Epistemological discussions of perception usually focus on something other than knowledge. They consider how beliefs arising from perception can be justified. With the retreat from knowledge to justified belief there is also a retreat from perception to the sensory experiences implicated by perception. On the most widely held approach, perception drops out of the picture other than as the usual means by which we are furnished with the experiences that are supposed to be the real source of justification - experiences that are conceived to be no different in kind from those we could have had if we had been perfectly hallucinating. In this book a radically different perspective is developed, one that explicated perceptual knowledge in terms of recognitional abilities and perceptual justification in terms of perceptually known truths as to what we perceive to be so. Contrary to mainstream epistemological tradition, justified belief is regarded as belief founded on known truths. The treatment of perceptual knowledge is situated within a broader conception of epistemology and philosophical method. Attention is paid to contested conceptions of perceptual experience, to knowledge from perceived indicators, and to the standing of background presuppositions that inform our thinking. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to ways in which key concepts figure in ordinary thinking while remaining resolutely focused on what knowledge is, and not just on how we think of it |
| Beschreibung: | xiii, 222 Seiten 25 cm |
| ISBN: | 9780198755692 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV045883471 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20190611 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 190517s2019 b||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9780198755692 |c hbk. |9 978-0-19-875569-2 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1104914329 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV045883471 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Millar, Alan |d 1947- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1187262560 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Knowing by perceiving |c Alan Millar |
| 250 | |a First edition | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford |b Oxford University Press |c [2019] | |
| 300 | |a xiii, 222 Seiten |c 25 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Preface. 1 Epistemology and philosophical method : Our familiarity with knowledge -- Perceptual knowledge -- Why is it that enquiry aims at knowledge rather than mere true belief? -- Scepticism about conceptual inquiry -- Philosophy's interest in concepts. 2 Justified belief, reasons, and evidence : Justified belief -- "Justified" belief in Gettier cases and well-founded belief -- Knowledge based on evidence -- Standing knowledge of facts -- Clinching evidence -- Summary. 3 Perception, experience, and direct realism : Perceiving things directly -- A non-relationalist perspective -- The relationalist challenge -- Experiential orientation -- Perception, consciousness, and sensations -- Non-committal descriptions of experience. 4 Perceptual knowledge and recognitional abilities : Experiential awareness and appearances -- Perceiving, thinking, and recognizing -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities and the theory of knowledge -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Perceiving-that and representational content. 5 Perception and the justification of belief : Perception and experience -- Do experiences justify by being evidence? -- Immediate justification -- Perceptual knowledge, well-foundedness, and rational constraint -- Access to reasons constituted by truths as to what we perceive to be so -- The justification for belief that perception can yield -- McDowell on boundaries -- McDowell on intuitional content. 6 Abilities, competences, and fallibility : Introduction -- Some ordinary abilities -- Having an ability and being reliably successful -- Performances: hard and completable -- Mental acts -- Sosa and competence. 7 Abilities: Further issues : Cognitive contact and the reach of reason -- Abilities in virtue epistemology -- More basic abilities? -- Retreating to dispositions plain and simple -- Individuating recognitional abilities: some complexities. 8 Knowledge from perceived indicators and background knowledge : Introduction -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a Indicators and evidence -- The covering generalization model -- How indicators can provide clinching evidence -- A puzzle about generalizations -- More on background beliefs -- Moore's truisms -- Reason's work again. 9 Going by what we know : Relying on what we know about knowledge -- How can we gain so much from so little? -- Self-understanding and the engaged standpoint -- Not so radical scepticism -- Radical scepticism and responsible judgement. References -- Index | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Epistemological discussions of perception usually focus on something other than knowledge. They consider how beliefs arising from perception can be justified. With the retreat from knowledge to justified belief there is also a retreat from perception to the sensory experiences implicated by perception. On the most widely held approach, perception drops out of the picture other than as the usual means by which we are furnished with the experiences that are supposed to be the real source of justification - experiences that are conceived to be no different in kind from those we could have had if we had been perfectly hallucinating. In this book a radically different perspective is developed, one that explicated perceptual knowledge in terms of recognitional abilities and perceptual justification in terms of perceptually known truths as to what we perceive to be so. Contrary to mainstream epistemological tradition, justified belief is regarded as belief founded on known truths. The treatment of perceptual knowledge is situated within a broader conception of epistemology and philosophical method. Attention is paid to contested conceptions of perceptual experience, to knowledge from perceived indicators, and to the standing of background presuppositions that inform our thinking. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to ways in which key concepts figure in ordinary thinking while remaining resolutely focused on what knowledge is, and not just on how we think of it | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wahrnehmung |0 (DE-588)4064317-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Erkenntnistheorie |0 (DE-588)4070914-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wissen |0 (DE-588)4066559-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 653 | 0 | |a Perception | |
| 653 | 0 | |a Perception | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Wahrnehmung |0 (DE-588)4064317-7 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Wissen |0 (DE-588)4066559-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Erkenntnistheorie |0 (DE-588)4070914-0 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031266592 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804180034395570176 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Millar, Alan 1947- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1187262560 |
| author_facet | Millar, Alan 1947- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Millar, Alan 1947- |
| author_variant | a m am |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV045883471 |
| contents | Preface. 1 Epistemology and philosophical method : Our familiarity with knowledge -- Perceptual knowledge -- Why is it that enquiry aims at knowledge rather than mere true belief? -- Scepticism about conceptual inquiry -- Philosophy's interest in concepts. 2 Justified belief, reasons, and evidence : Justified belief -- "Justified" belief in Gettier cases and well-founded belief -- Knowledge based on evidence -- Standing knowledge of facts -- Clinching evidence -- Summary. 3 Perception, experience, and direct realism : Perceiving things directly -- A non-relationalist perspective -- The relationalist challenge -- Experiential orientation -- Perception, consciousness, and sensations -- Non-committal descriptions of experience. 4 Perceptual knowledge and recognitional abilities : Experiential awareness and appearances -- Perceiving, thinking, and recognizing -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities and the theory of knowledge -- Perceiving-that and representational content. 5 Perception and the justification of belief : Perception and experience -- Do experiences justify by being evidence? -- Immediate justification -- Perceptual knowledge, well-foundedness, and rational constraint -- Access to reasons constituted by truths as to what we perceive to be so -- The justification for belief that perception can yield -- McDowell on boundaries -- McDowell on intuitional content. 6 Abilities, competences, and fallibility : Introduction -- Some ordinary abilities -- Having an ability and being reliably successful -- Performances: hard and completable -- Mental acts -- Sosa and competence. 7 Abilities: Further issues : Cognitive contact and the reach of reason -- Abilities in virtue epistemology -- More basic abilities? -- Retreating to dispositions plain and simple -- Individuating recognitional abilities: some complexities. 8 Knowledge from perceived indicators and background knowledge : Introduction -- Indicators and evidence -- The covering generalization model -- How indicators can provide clinching evidence -- A puzzle about generalizations -- More on background beliefs -- Moore's truisms -- Reason's work again. 9 Going by what we know : Relying on what we know about knowledge -- How can we gain so much from so little? -- Self-understanding and the engaged standpoint -- Not so radical scepticism -- Radical scepticism and responsible judgement. References -- Index |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1104914329 (DE-599)BVBBV045883471 |
| edition | First edition |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>05161nam a2200421 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV045883471</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20190611 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">190517s2019 b||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780198755692</subfield><subfield code="c">hbk.</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-19-875569-2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1104914329</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV045883471</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Millar, Alan</subfield><subfield code="d">1947-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1187262560</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Knowing by perceiving</subfield><subfield code="c">Alan Millar</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">First edition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Oxford</subfield><subfield code="b">Oxford University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">[2019]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xiii, 222 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="c">25 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Preface. 1 Epistemology and philosophical method : Our familiarity with knowledge -- Perceptual knowledge -- Why is it that enquiry aims at knowledge rather than mere true belief? -- Scepticism about conceptual inquiry -- Philosophy's interest in concepts. 2 Justified belief, reasons, and evidence : Justified belief -- "Justified" belief in Gettier cases and well-founded belief -- Knowledge based on evidence -- Standing knowledge of facts -- Clinching evidence -- Summary. 3 Perception, experience, and direct realism : Perceiving things directly -- A non-relationalist perspective -- The relationalist challenge -- Experiential orientation -- Perception, consciousness, and sensations -- Non-committal descriptions of experience. 4 Perceptual knowledge and recognitional abilities : Experiential awareness and appearances -- Perceiving, thinking, and recognizing -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities and the theory of knowledge -- </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Perceiving-that and representational content. 5 Perception and the justification of belief : Perception and experience -- Do experiences justify by being evidence? -- Immediate justification -- Perceptual knowledge, well-foundedness, and rational constraint -- Access to reasons constituted by truths as to what we perceive to be so -- The justification for belief that perception can yield -- McDowell on boundaries -- McDowell on intuitional content. 6 Abilities, competences, and fallibility : Introduction -- Some ordinary abilities -- Having an ability and being reliably successful -- Performances: hard and completable -- Mental acts -- Sosa and competence. 7 Abilities: Further issues : Cognitive contact and the reach of reason -- Abilities in virtue epistemology -- More basic abilities? -- Retreating to dispositions plain and simple -- Individuating recognitional abilities: some complexities. 8 Knowledge from perceived indicators and background knowledge : Introduction -- </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Indicators and evidence -- The covering generalization model -- How indicators can provide clinching evidence -- A puzzle about generalizations -- More on background beliefs -- Moore's truisms -- Reason's work again. 9 Going by what we know : Relying on what we know about knowledge -- How can we gain so much from so little? -- Self-understanding and the engaged standpoint -- Not so radical scepticism -- Radical scepticism and responsible judgement. References -- Index</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Epistemological discussions of perception usually focus on something other than knowledge. They consider how beliefs arising from perception can be justified. With the retreat from knowledge to justified belief there is also a retreat from perception to the sensory experiences implicated by perception. On the most widely held approach, perception drops out of the picture other than as the usual means by which we are furnished with the experiences that are supposed to be the real source of justification - experiences that are conceived to be no different in kind from those we could have had if we had been perfectly hallucinating. In this book a radically different perspective is developed, one that explicated perceptual knowledge in terms of recognitional abilities and perceptual justification in terms of perceptually known truths as to what we perceive to be so. Contrary to mainstream epistemological tradition, justified belief is regarded as belief founded on known truths. The treatment of perceptual knowledge is situated within a broader conception of epistemology and philosophical method. Attention is paid to contested conceptions of perceptual experience, to knowledge from perceived indicators, and to the standing of background presuppositions that inform our thinking. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to ways in which key concepts figure in ordinary thinking while remaining resolutely focused on what knowledge is, and not just on how we think of it</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wahrnehmung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4064317-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Erkenntnistheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4070914-0</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wissen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066559-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Perception</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Perception</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Wahrnehmung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4064317-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Wissen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066559-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Erkenntnistheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4070914-0</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031266592</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV045883471 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:29:20Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780198755692 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-031266592 |
| oclc_num | 1104914329 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | xiii, 222 Seiten 25 cm |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateSearch | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Millar, Alan 1947- Verfasser (DE-588)1187262560 aut Knowing by perceiving Alan Millar First edition Oxford Oxford University Press [2019] xiii, 222 Seiten 25 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Preface. 1 Epistemology and philosophical method : Our familiarity with knowledge -- Perceptual knowledge -- Why is it that enquiry aims at knowledge rather than mere true belief? -- Scepticism about conceptual inquiry -- Philosophy's interest in concepts. 2 Justified belief, reasons, and evidence : Justified belief -- "Justified" belief in Gettier cases and well-founded belief -- Knowledge based on evidence -- Standing knowledge of facts -- Clinching evidence -- Summary. 3 Perception, experience, and direct realism : Perceiving things directly -- A non-relationalist perspective -- The relationalist challenge -- Experiential orientation -- Perception, consciousness, and sensations -- Non-committal descriptions of experience. 4 Perceptual knowledge and recognitional abilities : Experiential awareness and appearances -- Perceiving, thinking, and recognizing -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities and the theory of knowledge -- Perceiving-that and representational content. 5 Perception and the justification of belief : Perception and experience -- Do experiences justify by being evidence? -- Immediate justification -- Perceptual knowledge, well-foundedness, and rational constraint -- Access to reasons constituted by truths as to what we perceive to be so -- The justification for belief that perception can yield -- McDowell on boundaries -- McDowell on intuitional content. 6 Abilities, competences, and fallibility : Introduction -- Some ordinary abilities -- Having an ability and being reliably successful -- Performances: hard and completable -- Mental acts -- Sosa and competence. 7 Abilities: Further issues : Cognitive contact and the reach of reason -- Abilities in virtue epistemology -- More basic abilities? -- Retreating to dispositions plain and simple -- Individuating recognitional abilities: some complexities. 8 Knowledge from perceived indicators and background knowledge : Introduction -- Indicators and evidence -- The covering generalization model -- How indicators can provide clinching evidence -- A puzzle about generalizations -- More on background beliefs -- Moore's truisms -- Reason's work again. 9 Going by what we know : Relying on what we know about knowledge -- How can we gain so much from so little? -- Self-understanding and the engaged standpoint -- Not so radical scepticism -- Radical scepticism and responsible judgement. References -- Index Epistemological discussions of perception usually focus on something other than knowledge. They consider how beliefs arising from perception can be justified. With the retreat from knowledge to justified belief there is also a retreat from perception to the sensory experiences implicated by perception. On the most widely held approach, perception drops out of the picture other than as the usual means by which we are furnished with the experiences that are supposed to be the real source of justification - experiences that are conceived to be no different in kind from those we could have had if we had been perfectly hallucinating. In this book a radically different perspective is developed, one that explicated perceptual knowledge in terms of recognitional abilities and perceptual justification in terms of perceptually known truths as to what we perceive to be so. Contrary to mainstream epistemological tradition, justified belief is regarded as belief founded on known truths. The treatment of perceptual knowledge is situated within a broader conception of epistemology and philosophical method. Attention is paid to contested conceptions of perceptual experience, to knowledge from perceived indicators, and to the standing of background presuppositions that inform our thinking. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to ways in which key concepts figure in ordinary thinking while remaining resolutely focused on what knowledge is, and not just on how we think of it Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd rswk-swf Perception Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 s Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Millar, Alan 1947- Knowing by perceiving Preface. 1 Epistemology and philosophical method : Our familiarity with knowledge -- Perceptual knowledge -- Why is it that enquiry aims at knowledge rather than mere true belief? -- Scepticism about conceptual inquiry -- Philosophy's interest in concepts. 2 Justified belief, reasons, and evidence : Justified belief -- "Justified" belief in Gettier cases and well-founded belief -- Knowledge based on evidence -- Standing knowledge of facts -- Clinching evidence -- Summary. 3 Perception, experience, and direct realism : Perceiving things directly -- A non-relationalist perspective -- The relationalist challenge -- Experiential orientation -- Perception, consciousness, and sensations -- Non-committal descriptions of experience. 4 Perceptual knowledge and recognitional abilities : Experiential awareness and appearances -- Perceiving, thinking, and recognizing -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities -- Perceptual-recognitional abilities and the theory of knowledge -- Perceiving-that and representational content. 5 Perception and the justification of belief : Perception and experience -- Do experiences justify by being evidence? -- Immediate justification -- Perceptual knowledge, well-foundedness, and rational constraint -- Access to reasons constituted by truths as to what we perceive to be so -- The justification for belief that perception can yield -- McDowell on boundaries -- McDowell on intuitional content. 6 Abilities, competences, and fallibility : Introduction -- Some ordinary abilities -- Having an ability and being reliably successful -- Performances: hard and completable -- Mental acts -- Sosa and competence. 7 Abilities: Further issues : Cognitive contact and the reach of reason -- Abilities in virtue epistemology -- More basic abilities? -- Retreating to dispositions plain and simple -- Individuating recognitional abilities: some complexities. 8 Knowledge from perceived indicators and background knowledge : Introduction -- Indicators and evidence -- The covering generalization model -- How indicators can provide clinching evidence -- A puzzle about generalizations -- More on background beliefs -- Moore's truisms -- Reason's work again. 9 Going by what we know : Relying on what we know about knowledge -- How can we gain so much from so little? -- Self-understanding and the engaged standpoint -- Not so radical scepticism -- Radical scepticism and responsible judgement. References -- Index Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4064317-7 (DE-588)4070914-0 (DE-588)4066559-8 |
| title | Knowing by perceiving |
| title_auth | Knowing by perceiving |
| title_exact_search | Knowing by perceiving |
| title_full | Knowing by perceiving Alan Millar |
| title_fullStr | Knowing by perceiving Alan Millar |
| title_full_unstemmed | Knowing by perceiving Alan Millar |
| title_short | Knowing by perceiving |
| title_sort | knowing by perceiving |
| topic | Wahrnehmung (DE-588)4064317-7 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd Wissen (DE-588)4066559-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wahrnehmung Erkenntnistheorie Wissen |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT millaralan knowingbyperceiving |