Combining minds: how to think about composite subjectivity
"Roelof's monograph is the first sustained, book-length defense of "constitutive panpsychism," an increasingly prominent theory of consciousness that argues that consciousness is a general feature inherent in matter. Constitutive panpsychism holds that the consciousness of humans...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Oxford University Press
[2019]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Philosophy of mind series
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Roelof's monograph is the first sustained, book-length defense of "constitutive panpsychism," an increasingly prominent theory of consciousness that argues that consciousness is a general feature inherent in matter. Constitutive panpsychism holds that the consciousness of humans and other complex beings are constituted out of this basic consciousness in the same way that human bodies are constituted out of physical matter. Roelofs defends this view against the 'combination problem', which is widely recognised as the most serious objection to it"... |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 336 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780190859053 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface xiii
Acknowledgments xv
DIVISION 1 | INTRODUCING COMBINATIONISM
i. A Universe of Composite Subjectivity 3
1.1. The Anti-Combination Intuition 7
1.1.1. The “Achilles” Argument and Anti-Nesting Principles 8
1.1.2. Consciousness in Social Groups 8
1.1.3. Human Beings with Impaired Unity, and Other Unusual Cases 10
1.1.4. Ordinary Psychological Division 11
1.1.5. Overlapping Parts of a Human Being 13
1.2. Motivating Panpsychism 14
1.2.1. The Explanatory Argument for Panpsychism 14
1.2.2. The Intrinsic Natures Argument for Panpsychism 16
1.2.3. The Causal Exclusion Argument for Panpsychism 17
1.2.4. The Continuity Argument for Panpsychism 18
1.2.5. Varieties of Panpsychism: Constitutive and Emergentist 18
1.2.6. Varieties of Panpsychism: Russellian and Dualistic 19
1.3. Defining Combination 20
1.3.1. What Is “Grounding”? 21
1.3.2. What Is “Explanation”? 22
1-3-3. What Are “Parts”? 24
1.3.4. What Are “Wholes”? 26
1.3.5. What Are “Experiences” and “Subjects of Experience”? 28
1.4. Plan of This Book 31
vii
viii
Contents
2. Conscious Subjects, Conscious Unity, and Five Arguments for Anti-Combination 34
2.x. What Is a Subject of Experience? 36
2.1.1. Two Conceptions of Subjects—Metaphysical and Psychological 36
2.1.2. Intuitive Foundations of the Two Conceptions 39
2.1.3. Functions of the Two Conceptions 40
2.1.4. Combination for Substrates and for Personas 42
2.2. What Is the Unity of Consciousness? 44
2.2.1. Five Sorts of Unity 45
2.2.2. Is Conscious Unity Transitive? 48
2.2.3. Which Sort of Unity Is Most Fundamental? 49
2.2.4. Can Conscious Unity Hold between Distinct Subjects? 50
2.3. Five Arguments against Combinationism 54
2.3.1. The Subject-Summing Argument 54
2.3.2. The Unity Argument 55
2.3.3. die Privacy Argument 56
2.3.4. The Boundary Argument and the Incompatible Contexts Argument 57
2.4. Responses to the Five Arguments 60
2.4.1. Subject-Summing and Privacy 61
2.4.2. Unity, Boundedness, and Incompatible Contexts 65
2.4.3. Two Technical Objections 68
2.5. Conclusions 69
DIVISION 2 I COMBINATIONISM FOR PANPSYCHISTS
3. Composite Subjectivity and Microsubjects 75
3.1. A Sketch of Panpsychist Combinationism 76
3.1.1. Microsubjects and Their Experiences 77
3.1.2. Two Principles for Combining Experiences 79
3.2. Why Are Experiential Properties Inherited? 81
3.2.1. The Substantive Indiscernibility of Parts and Whole 83
3.2.2. Examples of Physical Properties Obeying Substantive
Indiscernibility 85
3.2.3. Why Do Physical Properties Obey Substantive Indiscernibility? 89
3.3. How Do Microexperiences Become Phenomenally Unified? 91
3.3.1. Why Unity Is Probably Everywhere 92
3.3.2. How to Address the Boundary Problem 95
3.3.3. Why Consciousness Seems Bounded 98
3.4. The Subsumption Argument from Micro-Unity to Inheritance 101
3.4.1. The Subsumption Argument Laid Out 101
3.4.2. Is This Phenomenal Bonding? 103
Contents
IX
3.5. Why Do Micro experiential Zombies Seem Conceivable? 105
3.5.1. Confusion about Wholes, and the Apparent Conceivability of
Compositional Nihilism 106
3.5.2. Division-Invariant Phenomenal Consciousness and Division-
Relative Access-Consciousness 109
3.5.3. Intuitive Cases of Mental Combination 110
3.6. What If Experience Inheritance Isn’t A Priori? 113
3.6.1. Trading Experience Inheritance for Proto-Experience Inheritance 114
3.6.2. Treating Experience Inheritance as an A Posteriori Truth 116
3.7. Conclusions 119
4. The Problems of Structural Discrepancy 121
4.1. Enriching Panpsychist Combinationism 123
4.1.1. Phenomenal Contrast and Phenomenal Blending 124
4.1.2. Three More Hypotheses 125
4.2. What Is Confusion? 126
4.2.1. Varieties of Confusion 127
4.2.2. Knowing about and Explaining Our Confusion 129
4.3. Radical Confusion and the Revelation Problem 132
4.3.1. Three Versions of the Revelation Thesis 132
4.3.2. The “No Illusions” Argument 133
4.3.3. The “Revealed Essence” Argument 134
4.3.4. The “Self-Presentation” Argument 136
4.4. Phenomenal Blending and the Palette Problem 137
4.4.1. Is There Such a Thing as “Phenomenal Blending”? 139
4.4.2. Do We Experience Evidently Simple Qualities? 141
4.4.3. Do We Experience Qualities Too Dissimilar to Come from the
Same Ingredients? 141
4.5. Conclusions 144
DIVISION 3 | COMBINATIONISM FOR FUNCTIONALISTS
5. Composite Subjectivity and Intelligent Subjects 14g
5.1. Defining Intelligent Subjects 151
5.1.1. Structured and Coherent Consciousness 152
5.1.2. Defining Intelligent Functioning 154
5.1.3. The Vagueness of Intelligent Functioning 155
5.1.4. Internal and External Functioning, and Blockheads 157
5.2. Explaining Intelligent Subjects 158
X
Contents
5.2.1. Explaining Structure-Specific Wholes in General 159
5.2.2. Explaining Consciousness 161
5.2.3. Explaining Intelligent Functioning—Division Relativity 161
5.2.4. Explaining Intelligent Functioning—Sensitivity, Control, and
Coordination 162
5.2.5. Explaining Structured Consciousness and Coherence 164
5.3. Structured and Unstructured Consciousness 165
5.3.1. Explaining Phenomenal Unity 166
5.3.2. The Canvas Model and the Superimposition Model 166
5.3.3. Phenomenal Blending and Indeterminacy 168
5.3.4. The Role of Phenomenal Binding 170
5.4. What Is Phenomenal Binding? 171
5.4.1. Phenomenal Binding as Integrated Information 172
5.4.2. Phenomenal Binding as Mutual Co-Presentation 176
5.4.3. Phenomenal Binding as Representational Unity 180
5.5. So How Do Intelligent Subjects Combine? 182
5.5.1. Conditional Experience Inheritance 183
5.5.2. The Three Faces of Phenomenal Binding 184
5.5.3. Inclusionary and Exclusionary Approaches 185
6. Composite Subjectivity in Organisms, Organs, and Organizations 189
6.1. Composite Subjectivity in the Nation-Brain 190
6.1.1. Where Does the Extra Consciousness Fit? 193
6.1.2. How Can the Whole Have Unified Experiences? 194
6.1.3. Why Cant the Whole Report Its Parts Experiences? 196
6.1.4. Why Bother with Consciousness in the Whole? 197
6.2. Composite Subjectivity in Social Groups 198
6.2.1. Information Integration in Nation-Brains and Nations 198
6.2.2. What Is It Like to Be a Nation? 200
6.2.3. Collective Intentionality 202
6.2.4. The Instability of Real-World Group Minds 205
6.3. Composite Subjectivity in the Split-Brain Patient 207
6.3.1. A Quick Overview of the Split Brain 209
6.3.2. The Truth in the Two-Subjects View 210
6.3.3. The Truth in the One-Subject View 212
6.3.4. One-Stream, Two-Streams, and Partial-Unity Views 212
6.3.5. the Truth in the Switch View 216
6.4. Composite Subjectivity in the Typical Human Brain 217
6.4.1. Phenomenal Binding between Hemisphere Subjects 218
Contents
xi
64.2. The Representational Structure of Human Experience 220
64.3. Functionalist Combinationism and the Multiple Drafts Model 222
6.5. Conclusions 225
DIVISION 4 | COMBINATIONISM FOR PERSONS
7. Composite Subjectivity and Psychological Subjects 22g
7.1. Psychological Combinationism and the Psychological Conception of
Subjects 230
7.1.1. The Neo-Lockean Account of Personal Identity 231
7.1.2. Identity at a Time and across Time 232
7.1.3. Psychological Combinationism Defended against the Five
Arguments 235
7.14. Addressing the Boundary Argument 237
7.1.5. How Far Do Persona Divisions and Substrate Divisions Line Up? 241
7.1.6. Analogies of Self and Society 243
7.2. Composite Subjectivity and Self-Consciousness 244
7.2.1. An Inapplicable Solution Used by Social Groups 245
7.2.2. The Patterning Principle and the Detection of Harmony 247
7.2.3. The Patterning Principle and Internal Events 250
7.2.4. Harmony and Harmonious Connection 252
7.3. Composite Subjectivity and Agency 253
7.3.1. Agential Competition between a Person and Their States 254
7.3.2. Agential Competition between Discrete Agents 256
7.3.3. Alignment of Wills between Whole and Part 258
74- Composite Subjectivity and Inner Conflict 259
74.1. What Are the Parties to an Inner Conflict? 260
7.4.2. Inner Conflict as Involving Component Subjects 261
74.3. Inner Conflict among Substrates and among Personas 263
744. Inner Conflict and Identity over Time 265
74.5. Inner Conflict and Dissociation 266
7-5- Conclusions 268
8. What It Is Like for Two to Become One 270
8.1. Introducing Mind-Fusion 271
8.1.1. Mars Needs Fused Humans 271
8.1.2. Four Observable Outcomes 272
8.1.3. What Has Happened to the Original Participants? 274
8.14. Combinationism and the Fusion of Persons 276
Xll
Contents
8.2. Fusion from the Perspective of the Parts 277
8.2.1. Lets Talk, Brain to Brain 277
8.2.2. Is This Telepathy? 279
8.2.3. Unifying the Participants Experiences 281
8.2.4. The Growth of Shared Responsibility 283
8.2.5. Can the Participants Still Know Their Own Minds? 285
8.2.6. Surviving as Part of a Person 286
8.3. Fusion from the Perspective of the Whole 288
8.3.1. Being a Pair of People 288
8.3.2. How the Pair Knows Itself 290
8.3.3. New Forms of Phenomenal Blending 291
8.4. Conclusions 293
9. Concluding Remarks 294
9.1. Many Problems and Many Theories 294
9.2. The Oddness of Humans 296
9.3. Why Is This All So Confusing? 298
BIBLIOGRAPHY 301
INDEX 329
|
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| spelling | Roelofs, Luke (DE-588)1180510631 aut Combining minds how to think about composite subjectivity Luke Roelofs New York Oxford University Press [2019] © 2019 XVI, 336 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Philosophy of mind series "Roelof's monograph is the first sustained, book-length defense of "constitutive panpsychism," an increasingly prominent theory of consciousness that argues that consciousness is a general feature inherent in matter. Constitutive panpsychism holds that the consciousness of humans and other complex beings are constituted out of this basic consciousness in the same way that human bodies are constituted out of physical matter. Roelofs defends this view against the 'combination problem', which is widely recognised as the most serious objection to it"... Panpsychism Subjectivity Panpsychismus (DE-588)4173183-9 gnd rswk-swf Subjektivismus (DE-588)4183908-0 gnd rswk-swf Panpsychismus (DE-588)4173183-9 s Subjektivismus (DE-588)4183908-0 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-19-085908-4 (DE-604)BV045508033 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030929794&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Roelofs, Luke Combining minds how to think about composite subjectivity Panpsychism Subjectivity Panpsychismus (DE-588)4173183-9 gnd Subjektivismus (DE-588)4183908-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4173183-9 (DE-588)4183908-0 |
| title | Combining minds how to think about composite subjectivity |
| title_auth | Combining minds how to think about composite subjectivity |
| title_exact_search | Combining minds how to think about composite subjectivity |
| title_full | Combining minds how to think about composite subjectivity Luke Roelofs |
| title_fullStr | Combining minds how to think about composite subjectivity Luke Roelofs |
| title_full_unstemmed | Combining minds how to think about composite subjectivity Luke Roelofs |
| title_short | Combining minds |
| title_sort | combining minds how to think about composite subjectivity |
| title_sub | how to think about composite subjectivity |
| topic | Panpsychism Subjectivity Panpsychismus (DE-588)4173183-9 gnd Subjektivismus (DE-588)4183908-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Panpsychism Subjectivity Panpsychismus Subjektivismus |
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