Federalism in China and Russia: story of success and story of failure?
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA
EE, Edward Elgar Publishing
[2019]
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Studies in fiscal federalism and state-local finance
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis Register // Gemischte Register |
| Beschreibung: | Titel und Verantwortlichkeitsangabe von der Landingpage, da keine Titelseite |
| Beschreibung: | vi, 223 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9781788972185 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV045531873 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20200121 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 190327s2019 |||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781788972185 |c hardback |9 978-1-78897-218-5 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)1107343889 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV045531873 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-N2 |a DE-19 |a DE-12 |a DE-824 |a DE-188 |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 084 | |a OST |q DE-12 |2 fid | ||
| 084 | |a ME 8000 |0 (DE-625)122634: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a MH 50960 |0 (DE-625)122902:12229 |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a MG 85960 |0 (DE-625)122868:12229 |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Libman, Alexander |d 1981- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)132180766 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Federalism in China and Russia |b story of success and story of failure? |c Alexander Libman, Michael Rochlitz |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA |b EE, Edward Elgar Publishing |c [2019] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c © 2019 | |
| 300 | |a vi, 223 Seiten |b Diagramme | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Studies in fiscal federalism and state-local finance | |
| 500 | |a Titel und Verantwortlichkeitsangabe von der Landingpage, da keine Titelseite | ||
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1978- |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wirtschaftswachstum |0 (DE-588)4066527-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Föderalismus |0 (DE-588)4017754-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 7 | |a China |0 (DE-588)4009937-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Russland |0 (DE-588)4076899-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Russland |0 (DE-588)4076899-5 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a China |0 (DE-588)4009937-4 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Föderalismus |0 (DE-588)4017754-3 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Wirtschaftswachstum |0 (DE-588)4066527-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 4 | |a Geschichte 1978- |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Rochlitz, Michael |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1169085210 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |z 978-1-78897-219-2 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Literaturverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Register // Gemischte Register |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 940 | 1 | |q BSB_NED_20190918 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030915968 | ||
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 330.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090511 |g 471 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 330.09 |e 22/bsb |f 09049 |g 471 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 351.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090511 |g 471 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 351.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090512 |g 471 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 351.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090512 |g 51 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 330.09 |e 22/bsb |f 0904 |g 51 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 330.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090511 |g 51 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 351.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090511 |g 51 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 351.09 |e 22/bsb |f 0904 |g 51 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 351.09 |e 22/bsb |f 09049 |g 471 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 330.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090512 |g 471 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 330.09 |e 22/bsb |f 090512 |g 51 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804179491021389824 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents List of abbreviations 1 vi Introduction 1 2 Fiscal federalism 8 3 Bureaucratic incentives 39 4 Information, monitoring and control 5 The local state 70 101 6 Logic of divergence 139 7 167 Conclusion References Index 176 217 v
References Abashin, S. (1997), Natsionalizmy v Tsentraľnoi Ázii v Poisikakh Identichnosti. St. Petersburg, Russia: Ab Imperio. Aghion, P., Cai, J., Dewatripont, M., Du, L., Harrison, A. and P. Legros (2015), ‘Industrial policy and competition’, American Economic Jour nal: Macroeconomics, 7(4), 1-32. Alexeev, M. and A. Chemyavskiy (2015), ‘Taxation of natural resources and economic growth in Russia’s regions’, Economic Systems, 39(2), 317-38. Alexeev, M. and A. Chemyavskiy (2018), ‘A tale of two crises: Federal transfers and regional economies in Russia in 2009 and 20142015’, Economic Systems, 42(2), 175-85. Alexeev, M. and G. Kurlyandskaya (2003), ‘Fiscal federalism and incentives in a Russian region’, Journal of Comparative Eco nomics, 31(1), 20-33. Alexopoulos, G. (1999), ‘Victim talk: Defense testimony and denuncia tion under Stalin’, Law and Social Inquiry, 24(3), 637-54. Alexseev, M. A. (2001), ‘Decentralization versus state collapse: Explain ing Russia’s endurance’, Journal of Peace Research, 38(1), 101-106. Ames, B. (1970), ‘Bases of support for Mexico’s dominant party’, American Political Science Review, 64(1), 153-67. Anderson, R. W. and L. Hua (2018), ‘Sustainable local public finance in China: Are muni bonds the structural solution?’, Working Paper. Andersson, K. P. and E. Ostrom (2007), ‘An analytical agenda for the study of decentralized resource regimes’, Working Paper, Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program, Virginia Tech. Andreas, J. (2007), ‘The structure of charismatic mobilization: A case study
of rebellion during the Chinese cultural revolution’, American Sociological Review, 72(3), 434-58. Andrienko, Y. and S. Guriev (2004), ‘Determinants of interregional mobility in Russia’, Economics of Transition, 12(1), 1-27. Araral, E., Li, H., Khuong, V. and K. Hartley (2017), ‘Has China’s anti-corruption campaign slowed down growth?’, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper, No. 17-29. 176
References 177 Armey, L. E. and R. M. McNab (2018), ‘Expenditure decentralization and natural resources’, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 70, 52-61. Armstrong, J. (1972), Old-regime governors: Bureaucratic and patrimo nial attributes’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14(1), 2-29. Bahl, R. and S. Wallace (1995), ‘Intergovernmental fiscal relations in China’, Proceedings of the Annual Conference on Taxation Held under the Auspices of the National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America, 88, 110-14. Bahry, D. (2005), ‘The new federalism and the paradoxes of regional sovereignty in Russia’, Comparative Politics, 37(2), 127-46. Bai, C., Tao, Z. and Y. S. Tong (2008), ‘Bureaucratic integration and regional specialization in China’, China Economic Review, 19(2), 308-19. Bai, Y. and R. Jia (2016), ‘Elite recruitment and political stability: the impact of the abolition of China’s civil service exam’, Economet rica, 84(2), 677-733. Balzer, H. (2004), ‘State and society in transitions from Communism: China in comparative perspective’, in Gries, R, and S. Rosen (eds), State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 235-56. Balzer, H. (2005), Ordinary Russians? Rethinking August 1991’, Demokratizatsiya, 13(2), 193-219. Balzer, H. (2008), ‘Russia and China in the global economy’, Demokra tizatsiya, 16(1), 37-48. Balzer, H. and J. Askonas (2014), ‘Innovation in Russia and China compared’, Russian Analytical Digest, 23, 2-6. Balzer, H. and J. Askonas (2016), ‘The triple helix after Communism: Russia and
China compared’, Triple Helix, 3(1), DOI: 10.1186/s40604015-0031-4 Baranov, A., Maikov, E„ Polishchuk, L., Rochlitz, M. and G. Syunyaev (2015), ‘How (not) to measure Russian regional institutions’, Russian Journal of Economics, 1(2), 154-81. Barceló, J. (2018), ‘Are western-educated leaders less prone to initiate militarized disputes?’, British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming. Barrett, B. (2000), ‘Decentralization in Japan: Negotiating the transfer of authority’, Japanese Studies, 20(1), 33—48. Baturo, A. and J. A. Elkink (2016), ‘Dynamics of regime personalization and patron-client networks in Russia, 1999-2014’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 32(1), 75-98.
178 Federalism in China and Russia Baturo, A. and S. Mikhaylov (2014), ‘Reading the tea leaves: Medve dev’s presidency through political rhetoric of federal and sub-national actors’, Europe-Asia Studies, 66(6), 969-92. Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1974), ‘Law enforcement, malfeasance, and compensation of enforcers’, Journal of Legal Studies, 3(1), 1-18. Behrend, J. and L. Whitehead (eds.) (2016), Illiberal Practices: Terri torial Variance Within Large Lederai Democracies. Baltimore, MD, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bell, D. (2015), The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits to Democracy. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Belmonte, A. and M. Rochlitz (2018), ‘The political economy of collective memories: Evidence from Russian politics’, HSE Political Science Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 59. Berkowitz, D. and D. N. DeJong (1999), ‘Russia’s internal border’, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 29(5), 633^4-9. Berkowitz, D. and D. N. DeJong (2003), ‘Regional integration: an empirical assessment of Russia’, Journal of Urban Economics, 53(3), 541-9. Berkowitz, D. and W. Li (2000), ‘Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?’, Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 369-97. Berliner, J. (1952), ‘The informal organization of the Soviet firm’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 66(3), 342-65. Bernstein, T. and H. Li (eds.) (2010), China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present. Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series, Lanham, MD, USA: Rowman Littlefield. Besley, T. and M. Kudamatsu (2008), ‘Making autocracy work’, in E.
Helpman (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance, Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, pp. 452-510. Besley, T., Montalvo, J. G. and M. Reynal-Querol (2011), ‘Do educated leaders matter?’, Economic Journal, 121(554), F205-27. Bimey, M. (2007), Can Local Elections Contribute to Democratic Progress in Authoritarian Regimes? Exploring the Political Ramifica tions of China’s Village Elections. PhD thesis, Department of Political Science, Yale University. Bimey, M. (2014), ‘Decentralization and veiled corruption under China’s “rale of mandates’”, World Development, 53, 55-67. Blanchard, O. and A. Shleifer (2001), ‘Federalism with and without political decentralization: China versus Russia’, IMF Staff Papers, 48(1), 171-9. Blanchard, O. and M. Kremer (1997), ‘Disorganization’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1091-26.
References 179 Blancke, S. (2018), ‘Tigers, flies and crocodiles: Hunting season for Chinese intelligence. Chinese anti-corruption campaigns in an aggres sive foreign policy’, Zeitschrift für Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik, 11(3), 343-64. Blaydes, L. (2011), Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Blecher, M. and V. Shue (1996), Tethered Deer: Government and Economy in a Chinese County. Stanford, CA, USA: Stanford Univer sity Press. Bo, Z. (1996), ‘Economic performance and political mobility: Chinese provincial leaders’, Journal of Contemporary China, 5(12), 135-54. Bogaards, M. (2009), ‘How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democ racy and electoral authoritarianism’, Democratization, 16(2), 399^423. Boix, C. and M. Svolik (2013), ‘The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictator ships’, Journal of Politics, 75(2), 300-16. Boldyrev, I. and O. Kirtchik (2017), ‘The cultures of mathematical economics in the postwar Soviet Union: More than a method, less than a discipline’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 63, 1-10. Bollen, К. (1993), ‘Liberal democracy: Validity and method factors in cross-national measures’, American Journal of Political Science, 37(4), 1207-30. Bouma, A. (2014), ‘Strategies of complaint: Interest organizations of GDR Staatssicherheit coworkers after German Reunification’, Labora torium, 6(3), 27-54. Bremmer, I. and S. Charap (2007), ‘The siloviki in Putin’s Russia: who they are and what they want’, Washington
Quarterly, 30(1), 83-92. Brendecke, A. (2016), The Empirical Empire: Spanish Colonial Rule and the Politics of Knowledge. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter. Brownlee, J. (2007), Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Buck, T., Filatochev, I., Nolan, P. and M. Wright (2000), ‘Different paths to economic reform in Russia and China: Causes and consequences’, Journal of World Business, 35(4), 379-400. Buckley, N. and O. J. Reuter (2019), ‘Performance incentives under autocracy: Evidence from Russia’s Regions’, Comparative Politics, 51(2), 239-66. Bunce, V. and S. Wolchik (2011), Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge Univer sity Press. Burawoy, M. (1996), ‘The state and economic involution: Russia through a China lens’, World Development, 24(6), 1105-17.
180 Federalism in China and Russia Burkhardt, F. and A. Libman (2018), ‘The tail wagging the dog? Top-down and bottom-up explanations for bureaucratic appointments in authoritarian regimes’, Russian Politics, 3(2), 239-59. Bums, J. (1987), ‘China’s nomenklatura system’, Problems of Commu nism, 36(5), 36-51. Busygina, I. (2012), ‘Threats to critical infrastructure and state responses: The case of 2010 forest fires in Russia’, in K. Pynnoniemi (ed.), Russian critical infrastructures: Vulnerabilities and policies. Helsinki, Finland: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, pp. 57-76. Busygina, I., Filippov, M. and E. Taukebaeva (2018), ‘To decentralize or to continue on the centralization track: The cases of authoritarian regimes in Russia and Kazakhstan’, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 9(1), 61-71. Cai, H. and D. Treisman (2004), ‘State corroding federalism’, Journal of Public Economics, 88(3—4), 819-43. Cai, H. and D. Treisman (2005), ‘Does competition for capital discipline governments? Decentralization, globalization, and public policy’, American Economic Review, 95(3), 817-30. Cai, H. and D. Treisman (2006), ‘Did government decentralization cause China’s economic miracle?’, World Politics, 58(4), 505-35. Cai, Y. (2000), ‘Between state and peasant: Local cadres and statistical reporting in rural China’, China Quarterly, 163, 783-805. Cai, Y. and L. Zhu (2013), ‘Disciplining local officials in China: The case of conflict management’, China Journal, 70, 98-119. Caldeira, E. (2012), ‘Yardstick competition in a federation: Theory and evidence from China’, China Economic
Review, 23(4), 878-97. Callander, S. and B. Harstad (2015), ‘Experimentation in federal sys tems’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(2), 951-1002. Cattell, D. T. (1964), ‘Local government and the sovnarkhoz in the USSR, 1957-1962’, Soviet Studies, 15(4), 430^42. Caulfield, J. L. (2006), ‘Local government reform in China: A rational actor perspective’, International Review of Administrative Sci ences, 72(2), 253-67. Che, J., Chung, K. S. and Y.K. Lu (2017), ‘Decentralization and political career concerns’, Journal of Public Economics, 145, 201-10. Chebankova, E. (2005), ‘The limitations of central authority in the regions and the implications for the evolution of Russia’s federal system’, Europe-Asia Studies, 57(7), 933—49. Chebankova, E. (2009), Russia’s Federal Relations: Putin’s Reforms and Management of the Regions. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Chen, H. and S. Rozelle (1999), ‘Leaders, managers, and the organ ization of township and village enterprises in China’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 60(2), 529-57.
References 181 Chen, J. (2004), Popular Political Support in Urban China. Stanford, CA, USA: Stanford University Press. Chen, J., Pan J. and Y. Xu (2016), ‘Sources of authoritarian responsive ness: A field experiment in China’, American Journal of Political Science, 60(2), 383-400. Chen, L. H. (1992), ‘Chen Jiongming (1878-1933) and the Chinese federalist movement’, Republican China, 17(1), 21-37. Chen, T., Kung, J. K. S. and C. Ma (2017), ‘Long live keju! The persistent effects of China’s imperial examination system’, Working Paper. Chen, Y., Li, H. and L. Zhou (2005), ‘Relative performance evaluation and the turnover of provincial leaders in China’, Economics Letters, 88, 421-5. Chibber, V. (2006), Locked in Place: State-Building and Late Industrial ization in India. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Choi, E. (2012), ‘Patronage and performance: Factors in the political mobility of provincial leaders in post-Deng China’, China Quarterly, 212, 965-81. Chorzempa, M., Triolo, R. and S. Sacks (2018), ‘China’s social credit system: A mark of progress or a threat to privacy?’, Working Paper No. 18-14, Peterson Institute for International Economics. Class, F., Kohler, U. and M. Krawietz (2018), The Potsdam grievance statistics file. New data on quality of life and political participation for the German Democratic Republic 1970-1989’, Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History, 51(2), 92-114. Collier, D. and S. Levitsky (1997), ‘Democracy with adjectives: Concep tual innovation in comparative research’, World Politics, 49(3),
430-51. Colton, T. J. and M. McFaul (2003), Popular choice and managed democracy: The Russian elections of 1999 and 2000. Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press. Commander, S., Nikoloski, Z. and A. Plekhanov (2011), ‘Employment concentration and resource allocation: One-company towns in Russia’, IZA Discussion Paper, No. 6034. Corina, G. A. and V. Popov (eds.) (2001), Transition and Institutions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Creemers, R. (2018), ‘China’s social credit system: An evolving practice of control’, Working Paper, Leiden University. Crowley, S. (1997), ‘Coal miners and the transformation of the USSR’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 13(2), 167-95. Crowley, S. (2016), ‘Monotowns and the political economy of industrial restructuring in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 32(5), 397-422. Cummings, S. N. (2000), Kazakhstan: Centre-Periphery Relations. Lon don, UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
182 Federalism in China and Russia Dabla-Norris, E., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and J. Norregaard (2000), ‘Fiscal decentralization in Russia: Economic performance and reform issues’, Working Paper. Darrell, S. (1997), ‘Russia’s market-distorting federalism’, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 38(8), 445-60. Dawisha, K. (2014), Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? New York, NY, USA: Simon Schuster. De Figueiredo Jr, R. J. and B. R. Weingast (2005), ‘Self-enforcing federalism’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 21(1), 103-35. De Silva, M. O., Galina, K., Golovanova, N. and E. Andreeva (2009), Intergovernmental reforms in the Russian Federation: one step forward, two steps back? Washington, DC, USA: The World Bank. De Stefano, C. (2017), ‘Kremlin-governor relations in the run-up to the 2018 presidential elections’, Russian Analytical Digest, 201, 2-7. Demsetz, H. (1983), ‘The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm’, Journal of Law Economics, 26(2), 375-90. Deng, F. F. (2005) ‘Public land leasing and the changing roles of local government in urban China’, Annals of Regional Science, 39(2), 353-73. Deng, J. (2018), ‘The national supervision commission: A new anti corruption model in China’, International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 52, 58-73. Desai, R. M., Freinkman, L. and I. Goldberg (2005), ‘Fiscal federalism in rentier regions: evidence from Russia’, Journal of Comparative Eco nomics, 33(4), 814-34. Diaz-Cayeros, A., Magaloni, B. and B. R. Weingast (2003), ‘Tragic brilliance: Equilibrium hegemony and democratization in Mexico’, Working Paper,
Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Dikötter, F. (2017), The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History. Lon don, UK: Bloomsbury. Dimitrov, M. K. (2014a), ‘What the party wanted to know: Citizen complaints as a “barometer of public opinion” in Communist Bul garia’, East European Politics and Societies and Cultures, 28(2), 271-95. Dimitrov, M. K. (2014b), ‘Tracking public opinion under authoritarian ism’, Russian History, 41(3), 329-53. Dimitrov, M. K. (2015), ‘Internal government assessments of the quality of governance in China’, Studies in Comparative International Devel opment, 50(1), 50-72. Dimitrov, M. K. (2017), ‘The political logic of media control in China’, Problems of Post-Communism, 64(3-4), 121-7.
References 183 Djankov, S., Roland, G., Qian, Y. and E. Zhuravskaya (2006), ‘Entre preneurship in China and Russia compared’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 4(2-3), 352-65. Dong, X., Bowles, R and S. Ho (2002), ‘The determinants of employee ownership in China’s privatized rural industry: Evidence from Jiangsu and Shandong’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 30(2), 415-37. Donnithome, A. (1972), ‘China’s cellular economy: Some economic trends since the Cultural Revolution’, China Quarterly, 52, 605-19. Dowley, K. M. (1998), ‘Striking the federal bargain in Russia: Compara tive regional government strategies’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31(4), 359-80. Dreher, A., Lamia, M. J., Lein, S. M. and F. Somogyi (2009), ‘The impact of political leaders’ profession and education on reforms’, Jour nal of Comparative Economics, 37(1), 169-93. Du, J., Fang, H. and X. Jin (2014), ‘The “growth-first strategy” and the imbalance between consumption and investment in China’, China Economic Review, 31, 441-58. Duckett, J. (1998), The Entrepreneurial State in China: Real Estate and Commerce Departments in Reform Era Tianjin. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Duckett, J. (2001), ‘Bureaucrats in business, Chinese-style: The lessons of market reform and state entrepreneurialism in the People’s Republic of China’, World Development, 29(1), 23-37. Duncan, P. (2013), ‘Russia, the West and the 2007-2008 electoral cycle: Did the Kremlin really fear a “coloured revolution”?’, Europe-Asia Studies, 65(1), 1-25. Durán-Cabré, J. M., Esteller-Moré, A. and L. Salvadori (2015), ‘Empir ical
evidence on horizontal competition in tax enforcement’, Inter national Tax and Public Finance, 22(5), 834-60. Easter, G. M. (1997), ‘Redefining centre-regional relations in the Russian federation: Sverdlovsk oblasť, Europe-Asia Studies, 49(4), 617-35. Eaton, S. and G. Kostka (2017), ‘Central protectionism in China: The “Central SOE problem” in environmental governance’, China Quar terly, 231, 685-704. Eberhardt, M., Wang, Z. and Z. Yu (2016), ‘From one to many central plans: Drug advertising inspections and intra-national protectionism in China’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 44(3), 608-22. Eckardt, S. (2002), ‘Russia’s market distorting federalism: Decentral isation, governance, and economic performance in Russia in the 90s’, Working Paper, Osteuropa-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin. Edin, M. (2003), ‘State capacity and local agent control in China: CCP cadre management from a township perspective’, China Quarterly, 173, 35-52.
184 Federalism in China and Russia Elman, B. (1991), ‘Political, social, and cultural reproduction via civil service examinations in late Imperial China’, Journal of Asian Studies, 50(1), 7-28. Elman, B. (2009), ‘Civil Service Examinations’, in Cheng L. (ed.), Berkshire Encyclopedia of China, Great Barrington, MA, USA: Berk shire Publishing Group, pp. 405-10. Elman, B. (2013), Civil Examinations and Meritocracy in Late Imperial China. Harvard, MA, USA: Harvard University Press. Estrin, S. and M. Prevezer (2011), ‘The role of informal institutions in corporate governance: Brazil, Russia, India and China compared’, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(1), 41-67. Evans, P. (1995), Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transform ation: States, Firms and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Fainsod, M. (1970, 6th edition), How Russia is Ruled. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press. Feld, L. P. and J. G. Matsusaka (2003), ‘Budget referendums and govern ment spending: evidence from Swiss cantons’, Journal of Public Economics, 87(12), 2703-24. Feld, L. R, Fischer, J. A. and G. Kirchgässner (2010), ‘The effect of direct democracy on income redistribution: evidence for Switzer land’, Economic Inquiry, 48(4), 817֊40. Feld, L. R, Schaltegger, C. A. and J. Schnellenbach (2008), On govern ment centralization and fiscal referendums’, European Economic Review, 52(4), 611-45. Fenby, J. (2004), Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the China He Lost. Cambridge, MA, USA: Da Capo Press. Feng, G., Dong, M., Wen, J. and C. Chang (2018), ‘The
impacts of environmental governance on political turnover of municipal party secretary in China’, Environmental Science and Pollution Research, 25(25), 24668-81. Feng, J., Lichtenberg, E. and C. Ding (2015) ‘Balancing act: Economic incentives, administrative restrictions, and urban land expansion in China’, China Economic Review, 36, 184-97. Fewsmith, J. (2013), The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Filippov, M. and O. Shvetsova (1999), ‘Asymmetric bilateral bargaining in the new Russian Federation: A path-dependence explanation’, Com munist and Post-Communist Studies, 32(1), 61-76. Filippov, M., Ordeshook, P. C. and O. Shvetsova (2004), Designing federalism: Ճ theory of self-sustainable federal institutions. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
References 185 Fisman, R. and Y. Wang (2015), ‘The mortality cost of political connec tions’, Review of Economic Studies, 82(4), 1346-82. Fitzpatrick, S. (1996) Supplicants and Citizens: Public Letter-Writing in Soviet Russia in the 1930s. Slavic Review, 55, 78-105. Florini, A. M., Lai, H. and Y. Tan (2012), China experiments: From local innovations to national reform. Washington. DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press. Freinkman, L., Kholodilin, K. A. and U. Thießen (2011), ‘Incentive effects of fiscal equalization: Has Russian style improved?’, Eastern European Economics, 49(2), 5-29. Friedgut, T. H. (1979), Political Participation in the USSR. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press Frye, T., Gehlbach, S., Marquardt, К. and O. J. Reuter (2017), Ts Putin’s popularity real?’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 33(1), 1-15. Frye, T, Reuter, O. J. and D. Szakonyi (2014), ‘Political machines at work: Voter mobilization and electoral subversion in the workplace’, World Politics, 66(2), 195-228. Frye, T., Reuter O. J. and D. Szakonyi (2018), ‘Hitting them with carrots: Voter intimidation and vote buying in Russia’, British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming. Furman, D. (1993), ‘Vorzvrashchenie v tretiy mir: Grustnaya istoriya pro azerbaiidshanskuyu demokratiyu’, Svobodnaya Mysl, (11), http:// dmitriyfurman.ru/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/возвращение-в-третийMnp.pdf, accessed 15 October 2018. Furman, D. (1999), ‘“Centers” and “peripheries”: The political systems of the three East Slavic republics’, Russian Politics and Law, 37(2), 16-35. Furman, D. (2010) Dvizhenie po spirali:
Politicheskaya sistema Rossii v ryadu drugikh sistem. Moscow, Russia: Ves Mir. Gabuev, A. (2014), ‘Gosudarstvo ushlo iz kitaistiki’, Yuzhnyi Kitay, 20 October. Galeotti, M. (2016), ‘Putin’s hydra: Inside Russia’s intelligence services’, European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief. Gao, H., Ru, H. and D. Y. Tang (2016), ‘Subnational debt of China: The politics-finance nexus’, Working Paper. Gao, J. (2016), “‘Bypass the lying mouths”: How does the CCP tackle information distortion at local levels?’, China Quarterly, 228, 950-69. Gao, J. (2017), The Impact of China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign: Have ‘Tigers’ Harbored More ‘Flies’? MA thesis, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Georgetown University. Gamaut, J. (2012) The Rise and Fall of the House of Bo: How a Murder Exposed the Cracks in China’s Leadership. London, UK: Penguin.
186 Federalism in China and Russia Gaubatz, K. T. (1996), ‘Democratic states and commitment in inter national relations’, International Organization, 50(1), 109-39. Ge, W. (1999), ‘Special economic zones and the opening of the Chinese economy: Some lessons for economic liberalization’, World Develop ment, 27(7), 1267-85. Gehlbach, S. and A. Simpser (2015), ‘Electoral manipulation as bureau cratic control’, American Journal of Political Science, 59(1), 212-24. Gel’man, V. (1999), ‘Regime transition, uncertainty and prospects for démocratisation: The politics of Russia’s Regions in a comparative perspective’, Europe-Asia Studies, 51(6), 939-56. Gel’man, V. (2006), ‘Vozvrashchenie Leviafana? Politika retsentralizatsii v sovremennoi Rossii’, Polis, (2), 90-109. Gel’man, V. (2010), ‘The dynamics of subnational authoritarianism (Russia in comparative perspective)’, Russian Politics and Law, 48(2), 7-26. Gel’man, V. (2015), Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes. Pittsburgh, PA, USA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Gel’man, V. and C. Ross (eds.) (2010), The Politics of Sub-National Authoritarianism in Russia. Famham, UK: Ashgate Publishing. Gel’man, V., Ryzhenkov, S. and M. Brie (2003), Making and breaking democratic transition: The comparative politics of Russian regions. Lanham, MD, USA: Rowman Littlefield. Gerasimov, I., Mogilner, M. and S. Glebov (2017), Novaya Imperskaya Istoriya Sevemoy Evrazii. Kazan, Russia: Ab Imperio. Gerovitch, S. (2008), ‘InterNyet: Why the Soviet Union did not build a nationwide computer network’, History and Technology, 24(4),
335-50. Gervasoni, C. (2010), ‘A rentier theory of subnational regimes: Fiscal federalism, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Argentine prov inces’, World Politics, 62(2), 302-40. Getty, J. A. (2013), Practicing Stalinism. New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press. Gevorkyan, N., Timakova, N. and A. Kolesnikov (2000), Ot Pervogo Litsa: Razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym. Moscow, Russia: Vagrius. Gibson, E. L. (2005), ‘Boundary control: Subnational authoritarianism in democratic countries’, World Politics, 58(1), 101-32. Gibson, E. L. and T. G. Falleti (2004), ‘Unity by the stick’, In Gibson, E. L. (ed.), Federalism and democracy in Latin America. Baltimore, MD, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 226-54. Gift, T. and D. Krcmaric (2017), ‘Who democratizes? Western-educated leaders and regime transitions’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(3), 671-701.
References 187 Gilev, A. (2017), ‘Politicheskie mashiny і politicheskiy klientalizm v rossiyskikh regionakh’, Politicheskaya Nauka, (4), 61-84. Gill, G. and R. Pitty (1997) Power in the party: The organization of power and central-republican relations in the USSR. New York, NY, USA: St. Martin’s Press. Gilley, B. and A. Nathan (2002), ‘China’s new rulers: What they want’, New York Review of Books, 49(15), 28-32. Gilley, B. (2010), ‘Democratic enclaves in authoritarian regimes’, Democratization, 17(3), 389-415. Gillin, D. (1967), Warlord: Yen Hsi-Shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Gimpelson, V., Kapelyushnikov, R. and A. Lukyanova (2010), ‘Employ ment protection legislation in Russia: Regional enforcement and labor market outcomes’, Comparative Economic Studies, 52(4), 611-36. Giraudy, A. (2015), Democrats and Autocrats: Pathways of Subnational Undemocratic Regime Continuity within Democratic Countries. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Giuliano, E. (2011), Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russia’s Republics. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. Gluschenko, K. (2003), ‘Market integration in Russia during the trans formation years’, Economics of Transition, 11(3), 411-34. Golosov, G. V. (2011), ‘The regional roots of electoral authoritarianism in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63(4), 623-39. Golosov, G. V. (2014), ‘Machine politics: The concept and its impli cations for post-Soviet studies’, Demokratizatsiya, 21(4), 459-80. Golosov, G. V. (2018), ‘Russia’s centralized authoritarianism in the disguise of
democratic federalism: Evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections’, International Area Studies Review, 21(3), 231—4-8. Gong, T. (2006), ‘Corruption and local governance: The double identity of Chinese local governments in market reform’, Pacific Review, 19(1), 85-102. Goode, J. P. (2007), ‘The puzzle of Putin’s gubernatorial appoint ments’, Europe-Asia Studies, 59(3), 365-99. Gore, L. (2015), ‘The Central Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party’, East Asia Institute Background Brief No. 1013, National University of Singapore. Gorlizki, Y. (2010), ‘Too much trust: Regional party leaders and local political networks under Brezhnev’, Slavic Review, 69(3), 676-700. Gorokhovskaia, Y. (2017), ‘Testing for sources of electoral competition under authoritarianism: An analysis of Russia’s gubernatorial elec tions’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 33(5), 356-69.
188 Federalism in China and Russia Gradstein, M. (2017), ‘Government decentralization as a commitment in non-democracies’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 45(1), 110-18. Grindie, M. S. (1977), ‘Patrons and clients in the bureaucracy: Career networks in Mexico’, Latin American Research Review, 12(1), 37-66. Gruber, W. (1971), ‘Career patterns in Mexico’s political elite’, Western Political Quarterly, 24(3), 467-82. Guo, G. (2007), ‘Retrospective economic accountability under authori tarianism’, Political Research Quarterly, 60(3), 378-90. Guo, G. (2008), ‘Vertical imbalance and local fiscal discipline in China’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 8(1), 61-88. Guo, X. (2014), ‘Controlling corruption in the party: China’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission’, China Quarterly, 219, 597-624. Guriev, S. and E. Zhuravskaya (2010), ‘Why Russia is not South Korea’, Journal of International Affairs, 63(2), 125-39. Guriev, S. and D. Treisman (2015), ‘How modem dictators survive: An informational theory of the new authoritarianism’, Working Paper No. 21136, National Bureau of Economic Research. Gusev, A. and M. Yurevich (2015), ‘Regional’nyi protektsionizm v gosudarstvennykh zakupkakh’, Voprosy Ekonomiki, (10), 109-31. Hale, H. E. (2000), ‘The parade of sovereignties: Testing theories of secession in the Soviet setting’, British Journal of Political Sci ence, 30(1), 31-56. Hale, H. E. (2003), ‘Explaining machine politics in Russia’s regions: Economy, ethnicity, and legacy’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 19(3), 228-63. Hall, S. G. and T. Ambrosio (2017), ‘Authoritarian learning: a
conceptual overview’, East European Politics, 33(2), 143-61. Han, L. and J. K. S. Kung (2015), ‘Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments: Evidence from China’, Journal of Development Economics, 116, 89-104. Hanson, P. (2006), ‘Federalism with a Russian face: Regional inequality, administrative capacity and regional budgets in Russia’, Economic Change and Restructuring, 39(3^1), 191-211. Harding, H. (1982), Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy. Stanford, CA, USA: Stanford University Press. Hayek, F. A. (1945), ‘The use of knowledge in society’, American Economic Review, 35(4), 519-30. He, B. and S. Thøgersen (2010), ‘Giving the people a voice? Experi ments with consultative authoritarian institutions in China’, Journal of Contemporary China, 19(66), 675-92. Hedlund, S. (2005), Russian Path Dependence. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Heilmann, S. (2008a), ‘From local experiments to national policy: the origins of China’s distinctive policy process’, China Journal, 59, 1-30.
References 189 Heilmann, S. (2008b), ‘Policy experimentation in China’s economic rise’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 43(1), 1-26. Heilmann, S. (2018), Red Swan: How Unorthodox Policy-Making Facili tated China’s Rise. Hong Kong, China: Chinese University Press. Heinzig, D. (2003), The Soviet Union and Communist China: 1945— 1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Hemment, J. (2012), ‘Nashi, youth voluntarism, and Potemkin NGOs: Making sense of civil society in post-Soviet Russia’, Slavic Review, 71(2), 234-60. Hentschke, J. (ed.) (2006), Vargas and Brazil: New Perspectives. Basing stoke, UK: Paigrave MacMillan. Herrmann-Pillath, C. (2006), ‘Cultural species and institutional change in China’, Journal of Economic Issues, 40(3), 539-74. Herrmann-Pillath, C. (2010), ‘Social capital, Chinese style: Individual ism, relational collectivism and the cultural embeddedness of the institutions-performance link’, China Economic Journal, 2(3), 325-50. Herrmann-Pillath, C. (2016), China’s Economic Culture: The Ritual Order of State and Markets. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Herrmann-Pillath, C. (2017), ‘Modernisierangsblokaden 1917-2017: Utopische Eigentumsrevolutionen in Russland, 1917-2017’, Osteur opa, 67(6-8), 133143. Herrmann-Pillath, C. and Q. Zhu (1998), ‘Stille Föderalisierung oder kalte Desintegration? Zum institutionellen Wandel des chinesischen Steuerstaates’, WeltTrends, 21, 103-30. Herrmann-Pillath, C, Libman, A. and X. Yu (2014), ‘Economic integra tion in China: Politics and culture’, Journal of Comparative Eco nomics, 42(2),
470-92. Hess, S. (2011), Authoritarian Landscapes: State Decentralization, Popu lar Mobilization, and the Institutional Sources of Resilience in Nonde mocracies, PhD thesis, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. Hill, F. and C. G. Gaddy (2003), The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold. Washington, DC, USA: Brook ings Institution Press. Hillman, B. (2010), ‘Factions and spoils: Examining political behavior within the local state in China’, China Journal, 64, 1-18. Hillman, B. (2014), Patronage and Power: Local State Networks and Party-State Resilience in Rural China. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univer sity Press. Ho, P. (2005), Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights, and Social Conflict in China. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
190 Federalism in China and Russia Holmstrom, В. and P. Milgrom (1991), ‘Multitask principal-agent analy ses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7, 24-52. Holz, C. A. (2009), ‘No razor’s edge: Reexamining Alwyn Young’s evidence for increasing interprovincial trade barriers in China’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(3), 599-616. Horowitz, M. C. and A. C. Stam (2014), ‘How prior military experience influences the future militarized behavior of leaders’, International Organization, 68(3), 527-59. Horowitz, S. and P. Yu (2015), ‘Holding China’s West: Explaining CCP strategies of rule in Tibet and Xinjiang’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 20(4), 451-75. Hough (1991), Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision Making. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press. Howard, R, Duffy, A., Freelon, D., Hussain, M., Mari, W. and M. Maziad (2011), Opening closed regimes: What was the role of social media during the Arab Spring?’, PITPI Working Paper, No. 2011.1. Howell, J. (2006), ‘Reflections on the Chinese state’, Development and Change, 37(2), 273-97. Huang, Y. (1994), ‘Information, bureaucracy, and economic reforms in China and the Soviet Union’, World Politics, 47(1), 102-34. Huang, Y. (2002), ‘Managing Chinese bureaucrats: An institutional economics perspective’. Political Studies, 50(1), 61-79. Huang, Z., Li, L., Ma, G. and L. C. Xu (2017), ‘Hayek, local infor mation, and commanding heights: Decentralizing state-owned enter prises in China’, American Economic Review, 107(8),
2455-78. Hughes, J. (2001), ‘Managing secession potential in the Russian Federa tion’, Regional and Federal Studies, 11(3), 36-68. Ickes, B. W. and R. Ryterman (1992), ‘The interenterprise arrears crisis in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 8(4), 331-61. Intriligator, M., Wedel, J. and C. Lee (2006), ‘What Russia can learn from China in its transition to a market economy’, in Verweij, M. and M. Thompson (eds), Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World. Global Issues Series. London, UK: Paigrave Macmillan, pp. 105-31. Jacoby, W. (2006), ‘Inspiration, coalition, and substitution: external influences on postcommunist transformations’, World Politics, 58(4), 623-51. Jandl, T. (2014), ‘State versus state: The principal-agent problem in Vietnam’s decentralizing economic reforms’, in London, J. (ed.), Politics in Contemporary Vietnam: Party, State and Authority Rela tions. Basingstoke, UK: Paigrave Macmillan, pp. 64-83. Jarocińska, E. (2010), ‘Intergovernmental grants in Russia’, Economics of Transition, 18(2), 405-27.
References 191 Jefferson, G. and T. Rawski (1995), ‘How industrial reform worked in China: The role of innovation, competition, and property rights’, World Bank Economic Review, 8(10), 129-56. Jia, J., Guo, Q. and J. Zhang (2014), ‘Fiscal decentralization and local expenditure policy in China’, China Economic Review, 28, 107-22. Jia, R. (2017), ‘Pollution for promotion’, Working Paper. Jia, R., Kudamatsu, M. and D. Seim (2015), ‘Political selection in China: The complementary roles of connections and performance’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 13(4), 631-68. Jiang, T. and Z. Zhao (2003), ‘Government transfer payments and regional development in China’, in Gamaut, R. and L. Song (eds), China: New Engine of World Growth. Canberra, Australia: ANU Press, pp. 434-57. Jiang, Y. H. (2018), ‘Confucian political theory in contemporary China’, Annual Review of Political Science, 21, 155-73. Jin, H., Qian, Y. and B. R. Weingast (2005), ‘Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style’, Journal of Public Economics, 89(9-10), 1719-42. Jin, J. and H. F. Zou (2005), ‘Fiscal decentralization, revenue and expenditure assignments, and growth in China’, Journal of Asian Economics, 16(6), 1047-64. Johnson J. (1994), ‘Should Russia adopt the Chinese model of economic reform?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 27(1), 59-75. Johnson, J. and S. Kostem (2016), ‘Frustrated leadership: Russia’s economic alternative to the West’, Global Policy, 7(2), 207-16. Jones Luong, P. (2004), ‘Economic “decentralization” in Kazakhstan: Causes and consequences’, in
P. Jones Luong (ed.), The Transform ation of Central Asia. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, pp. 182-210. Kadochnikov, D. (2016), ‘Byudzhetnaya detsentralizatsiya і mezhbyudzhetnye otnosheniya: Opyt kitayskikh reform i ego aktuaľnosť dlya Rossii’, Terra Económicas, 14(2), 109-26. Kahn, J., Trochev, A. and N. Balayan (2009), ‘The unification of law in the Russian Federation’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 25(4), 310—46. Kalgin, A. (2016), ‘Implementation of performance management in regional government in Russia: Evidence of data manipulation’, Public Management Review, 18(1), 110-38. Kalinin, K. and W. Mebane (2017), ‘Worst election ever in Russia?’, Working Paper. Kazakevitch, G. and R. Smyth (2005), ‘Gradualism versus shock therapy: (Re)interpreting the Chinese and Russian experiences’, Asia Pacific Business Review, 11(1), 69-81.
192 Federalism in China and Russia Ke, K., Liu, N. and S. Tang (2018), ‘The economic consequences of anti-corruption campaigns: Evidence from China’, Working Paper. Keller, F. and Y. Wang (2015), ‘Farewell comrades! Power straggle and elite removal during authoritarian leadership succession’, Working Paper. Khodzhaeva, E. (2016), Lokal’nye Initsiativy Okhrany Obshchestvennogo Poryadka v Rossii: Ot Narodnykh Druzhin to Munitsipal’noi Militsii. Moscow, Russia: TsSR. King, G., Pan, J. and M. Roberts (2013), ‘Flow censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression’, Ameri can Political Science Review, 107(2), 326—43. King, G., Pan, J. and M. Roberts (2014), ‘Reverse-engineering censor ship in China: Randomized experimentation and participant obser vation’, Science, 345(6199), 891. King, G., Pan, J. and M. Roberts (2017), ‘How the Chinese government fabricates social media posts for strategic distraction, not engaged argument’, American Political Science Review, 111(3), 484-501. Kirby, W. (1990), ‘Continuity and change in modem China: Economic planning on the mainland and on Taiwan, 1943-1958’, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 24, 121—41. Kiser, E. and X. Tong (1992), ‘Determinants of the amount and type of corruption in state fiscal bureaucracies: An analysis of late Imperial China’, Comparative Political Studies, 25(3), 300-31. Kluge, J. (2018), ‘Russischer Haushalt unter Druck’, Stiftung Wissen schaft und Politik, SWP Studie No. 14. Koritzkiy, E. (1989), Kakim Byť Planu: Diskussii 20-h Godov. Lenin grad, USSR: Lenizdat. Kosals, L.
and S. Pavlenko (2018), ‘Criminal justice’, in Studin, I. (ed.), Russia: Strategy, Policy and Administration. Basingstoke, UK: Paigrave MacMillan, pp. 331-8. Kostka, G. (2018), ‘China’s social credit systems and public opinion: Explaining high levels of approval’, Working Paper, Freie Universität Berlin. Kostka, G. and X. Yu (2015), ‘Career backgrounds of municipal party secretaries in China: Why do so few municipal party secretaries rise from the county level?’, Modern China, 41(5), 467-505. Kozlov, V., Libman, A. and A. Schultz (2018), ‘Testosterone and repres sion in non-democracies: Evidence from a sample of Russian gover nors’, Kyklos, 71(2), 244-78. Kozlov, Y. and L. Popov (eds) (1999), Administrativnoe Pravo. Moscow, Russia: Yurist.
References 193 Kropp, S., Aasland, A., Berg-Nordlie, M., Holm-Hansen, J. and J. Schuhmann (eds) (2017), Governance in Russian Regions: A Policy Comparison. Basingstoke: Paigrave MacMillan. Krug, B. and A. Libman (2015), ‘Commitment to local autonomy in non-democracies: Russia and China compared’, Constitutional Political Economy, 26(2), 221—45. Krug, B., Zhu, Z. and H. Hendrischke (2004), ‘China’s emerging tax regime: Devolution, fiscal federalism, or tax farming?’, Working Paper, ERIM. Kryshtanovskaya, O. (2003), ‘Formirovanie regional’noi elity: Printsipy і mekhanizmy’, SOTSIS, (11), 3-13. Kryshtanovskaya, О. and S. White, (2003), ‘Putin’s militocracy’, PostSoviet Affairs, 19(4), 289-306. Kung, J. and S. Chen (2011), ‘The tragedy of the nomenklatura: Career incentives and political radicalism during China’s Great Leap famine’, American Political Science Review, 105(1), 27-45. Kung, J. and T. Chen (2016), ‘Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China’, Journal of Develop ment Economics, 123, 86-106. Kung, J. and Y. Lin (2007), ‘The decline of township-and-village enterprises in China’s economic transition’, World Development, 35(4), 569-84. Kurkchiyan, M. (2009), ‘Russian legal culture: An analysis of adaptive response to an institutional transplant’, Law and Social Inquiry, 34(2), 337-64. Kurlyandskaya, G. and N. Golovanova (2006), ‘Decentralization in the Russian Federation’, Economic Change and Restructuring, 39(3-4), 213-33. Kushubakova, B. (2010), Otchet deyatel’nosti organov ispolnitel’noy vlasti sub’ektov Rossiyskoy Federácii
suchetom effektivnosti ispol’zovaniya gosudarstvennykh aktivov’, Ekonomika, (4), 72-81. Kusznir, J. (2012), Der politische Einfluss von Wirtschaftseliten in russischen Regionen: eine Analyse am Beispiel der Erdöl-und Erd gasindustrie, 1992-2005. Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag. Kynev, A. (2016), ‘Inertia of the state power hierarchy: The Kremlin loses control of regional elites’, Russian Politics and Law, 54(4), 374-85. Lachmann, R. (2000), Capitalists in Spite of Themselves: Elite Conflict and Economic Transition in Early Modern Europe. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. Landry, P. (2003), ‘The political management of mayors in post-Deng China’, Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 17, 31-58.
194 Federalism in China and Russia Landry, P. (2008), Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Com munist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era. Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press. Landry, P., Lu, X. and H. Duan (2018), ‘Does performance matter? Evaluating political selection along the Chinese administrative ladder’, Comparative Political Studies, 51(8), 1074-105. Lankina, T. (2012), ‘Unbroken links? From imperial human capital to post-communist modernisation’, Europe-Asia Studies, 64(4), 623-43. Lankina, T. and A. Libman (2019), ‘Soviet legacies of economic devel opment, oligarchic rule and electoral quality in Eastern Europe’s partial democracies: The case of Ukraine’, Comparative Politics, forthcoming. Lankina, T. and L. Getachew (2006), ‘A geographic incremental theory of democratization: Territory, aid, and democracy in postcommunist regions’, World Politics, 58(4), 536-82. Lankina, T., Libman, A. and A. Obydenkova (2016a), ‘Appropriation and subversion: Precommunist literacy, communist party saturation, and postcommunist democratic outcomes’, World Politics, 68(2), 229-74. Lankina, T., Libman, A. and A. Obydenkova (2016b), ‘Authoritarian and democratic diffusion in post-communist regions’, Comparative Polit ical Studies, 49(12), 1599-629. Lapidus, G. W. (1999), ‘Asymmetrical federalism and state breakdown in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 15(1), 74-82. Larsson, T. (2006), ‘Reform, corruption, and growth: Why corruption is more devastating in Russia than in China’, Communist and PostCommunist Studies, 39(2), 265-81. Lavrovskiy, B. and A.
Novikov (2002), ‘Regional’noe vyravnivanie і mezhbyudzhetnye otnosheniya: Uroki 1990Һ’, Ekonomicheskiy Zhumal VShE, (1), 28-44. Lehmbruch, G. (2002), ‘Der unitarische Bundesstaat in Deutschland: Pfadabhängigkeit und Wandel’, MPFiG Discussion Paper No. 02-2. Levitsky, S. and L. A. Way (2010), Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Lewin, M. (2005), The Soviet Century. London, UK: Verso. Lewis, M. (2007), Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press. Li, D. (1998), ‘Changing incentives of the Chinese bureaucracy’, Ameri can Economic Review, 88(2), 393-7. Li, H. and L. Zhou (2005), ‘Political turnover and economic perform ance: The incentive role of personnel control in China’, Journal of Public Economics, 89(9-10), 1743-62.
References 195 Li, H. and S. Rozelle (2003), ‘Privatizing rural China: Insider privat ization, innovative contracts and the performance of township enter prises’, China Quarterly, 176, 981-1005. Li, J. (2015), ‘The paradox of performance regimes: Strategic responses to target regimes in Chinese local government’, Public Adminis tration, 93(4), 1152-67. Li, J., Qiu, L. and Q. Sun (2003), ‘Interregional protectionism: Impli cations of fiscal decentralization and trade integration’, China Eco nomic Review, 14(3), 227-45. Li, P. (2005), ‘The puzzle of China’s township-village enterprises: The paradox of local corporatism in a dual-track economic transition’, Management and Organization Review, 1(2), 197-224. Li, S. and P. Lian (1999), ‘Decentralization and coordination: China’s credible commitment to preserve the market under authoritarian ism’, China Economic Review, 10(2), 161-90. Libman, A. (2010a), ‘Constitutions, regulations, and taxes: Contradic tions of different aspects of decentralization’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 38(4), 395-418. Libman, A. (2010b), ‘Cycles of decentralization in the post-Soviet space’, Russian Politics and Law, 48(1), 8-20. Libman, A. (2011), ‘Russian federalism and post-Soviet integration: Divergence of development paths’, Europe-Asia Studies, 63(8), 1323-55. Libman, A. (2012), ‘Democracy, size of bureaucracy, and economic growth: evidence from Russian regions’, Empirical Economics, 43(3), 1321-52. Libman, A. (2013), ‘Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?’, Energy Eco nomics,
31, 82-99. Libman, A. (2016a), Consequences of Informai Autonomy: The Case of Russian Federalism. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang. Libman, A. (2016b), ‘Russische Regionen. Sichere Basis oder Quelle der Instabilität für den Kreml?’, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWPStudie 19/2016. Libman, A. (2017a), ‘Russian power politics and the Eurasian Economic Union: the real and the imagined’, Rising Powers Quarterly, 1(1), 81-103. Libman, A. (2017b), ‘Subnational political regimes and formal economic regulation: Evidence from Russian regions’, Regional and Federal Studies, 27(2), 127-51. Libman, A. and A. Obydenkova (2014a), ‘Governance of commons in a large nondemocratic country: The case of forestry in the Russian Federation’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 44(2), 298-323.
196 Federalism in China and Russia Libman, A. and A. Obydenkova (2014b), ‘International trade as a limiting factor in democratization: An analysis of subnational regions in post communist Russia’, Studies in Comparative International Develop ment, 49(2), 168-96. Libman, A. and Obydenkova, A. V. (2015). CPSU legacies and regional democracy in contemporary Russia. Political Studies, 63(S1), 173-190. Libman, A. and L. R Feld (2013), ‘Strategic tax collection and fiscal decentralization: The case of Russia’, German Economic Review, 14(4), 449-82. Libman, A. and V. Kozlov (2017), ‘The legacy of compliant activism in autocracies: post-Communist experience’, Contemporary Politics, 23(2), 195-213. Libman, A., Kozlov, V. and A. Schultz (2012), ‘Roving bandits in action: Outside option and governmental predation in autocracies’ Kyklos, 65(4), 526-62. Libman, A., Schultz, A. and T. Graeber (2016), ‘Tax return as political statement’, Review of Law and Economics, 12(2), 377-445. Lichtenberg, E. and C. Ding (2009), ‘Local officials as land developers: Urban spatial expansion in China’, Journal of Urban Economics, 66(1), 57-64. Lim, K. and N. Horesh (2017), ‘The Chongqing vs. Guangdong develop mental “models” in post-Mao China: Regional and historical perspec tives on the dynamics of socioeconomic change’, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 22(3), 372-95. Lin, J. (1988), ‘The household responsibility system in China’s agricul tural reform: A theoretical and empirical study’, Economic Develop ment and Cultural Change, 36(3), 199-224. Lipset, S. M. (1959), ‘Some social requisites
of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy’, American Political Science Review, 53(1), 69-105. Liu, M., Shih, V. and D. Zhang (2018), ‘The fall of the old guards: Explaining decentralization in China’, Studies in Comparative Inter national Development, 53(4), 379-403. Liu, T. T. and D. Faure (1996), Unity and Diversity: Local Cultures and Identities in China. Hong Kong, China; Hong Kong University Press. Liu, Y. and G. Ye (2019), ‘Competition policy and trade barriers: Empirical evidence from China’, Review of Industrial Organization, 54(2), 193-219. Liu, Y. and J. Martinez-Vazquez (2014), ‘Interjurisdictional tax com petition in China’, Journal of Regional Science, 54(4), 606-28. Liu, Y, Martinez-Vazquez, J. and A. M. Wu (2017), ‘Fiscal decentral ization, equalization, and intra-provincial inequality in China’, Inter national Tax and Public Finance, 24(2), 248-81.
References 197 Liu, Y., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and В. Qiao (2014), ‘Falling short: Inter governmental transfers in China’, Working Paper. Liu, Y., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and B. Qiao (2015), ‘Frozen in time: The much-needed reform of expenditures assignments in China’, Public Finance and Management, 15(4), 297-325. Lii, X. and P. Landry (2014), ‘Show me the money: Interjurisdiction political competition and fiscal extraction in China’, American Political Science Review, 108(3), 706-22. Luehrmann, L. M. (2003), ‘Facing citizen complaints in China, 19511996’, Asian Survey, 43(5), 845-66. Ma, L., Tang, H. and B. Yan (2015), ‘Public employees’ perceived promotion channels in Local China: Merit-based or guanxiorientated T, Australian Journal ofPublic Administration, 73(3), 283-97. Magaioni В. (2006), Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Malesky, E. J. (2004), ‘Leveled mountains and broken fences: Measuring and analyzing de facto decentralization in Vietnam’, European Journal of South East Asian Studies, 3(2), 307-37. Malesky, E. J. (2008), ‘Straight ahead on red: How foreign direct investment empowers subnational leaders’, Journal of Politics, 70(1), 97-119. Malesky, E. J., Abrami, R. and Y. Zheng (2011), ‘Institutions and inequality in single-party regimes: A comparative analysis of Vietnam and China’, Comparative Politics, 43(4), 409-27. Malesky, E. J. and J. London (2014), ‘The political economy of develop ment in China and Vietnam’, Annual Review of Political Science, 17, 395—419. Malesky, E. J.
and P. Schuler (2011), ‘The single-party dictator’s dilemma: Information in elections without opposition’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 36(4), 491-530. Malinova, О. (2018), ‘Problema znachimogo drugogo: Povorot na Vostok v rossiyskoy vneshney politike і analiz ritoricheskikh ssylok na SShA і KNR v diskursakh politikov і ekspertov’, Kontrapunkt, (12), http:// www.counter-point.org/12_malinova/, accessed 15 October 2018. Mamonova, N. (2016), ‘Naive monarchism and rural resistance in contemporary Russia’, Rural Sociology, 81(3), 316^42. Manion, M. (1984), ‘Cadre recruitment and management in the People’s Republic of China’, Chinese Law and Government, 17(3), 3-15. Manion, M. (1985), ‘The cadre management system, post-Mao: The appointment, promotion, transfer and removal of party and state leaders’, China Quarterly, 102, 203-33.
198 Federalism in China and Russia Manion, M. (2006), ‘Democracy, community, trust: The impact of elections in rural China’, Comparative Political Studies, 39(3), 301-24. Manion, M. (2009), ‘How to assess village elections in China’, Journal of Contemporary China, 18(60), 379-83. Manion, M. (2016), ‘Taking China’s anticorruption campaign seriously’, Economic and Political Studies, 4(1), 3-18. Marsh, C. (2003), ‘Learning from your comrade’s mistakes: The impact of the Soviet past on China’s future’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36(3), 259-72. Martin, T. D. (2001), The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2007), Asymmetric Federalism in Russia: Cure or Poison? Cheltenham, UK, and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. Martinez-Vazquez, J. and A. Timofeev (2014), ‘Intra-regional equaliza tion and growth in Russia’, Comparative Economic Studies, 56(3), 469-89. Martinez-Vazquez, J. and J. Boex (1999), ‘Fiscal decentralization in the Russian Federation during the transition’, Georgia State University, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, International Studies Program Working Paper, 99-3. Martinez-Vazquez, J., Qiao, B. and L. Zhang (2008), ‘The role of provincial policies in fiscal equalization outcomes in China’, China Review, 8(2), 135-67. Martinez-Vazquez, J., Timofeev, A. and J. Boex (2006), Reforming Regional-Local Finance in Russia. Washington, DC, USA: World Bank. Maskin, E., Qian, Y. and C. Xu (2000), ‘Incentives, information, and organizational form’,
Review of Economic Studies, 67(2), 359-78. Matsuzato, K. (2004), ‘Authoritarian transformations of the Mid-Volga national republics: An attempt at macro-regionology’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20(2), 98-123. Mau, V, Golant, O. and S. Zhavoronkov (2001), Regional’nye PolitikoEkonomicheskie Elity. Moscow: IEPP. McCarthy, L. (2014), ‘The day-to-day work of the Russian police’, Russian Analytical Digest, 151, 5-8. McCarthy, L. (2018), ‘Decision-making in the Russian criminal justice system: Investigators, procurators, judges and human trafficking cases’, in Kurkchiyan, M. and A. Kubal (eds), A Sociology of Justice in Russia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 205-30. McGee, R. W., and Z. Guo (2007), ‘A survey of law, business and philosophy students in China on the ethics of tax evasion’, Society and Business Review, 2(3), 299-315.
References 199 McGregor, R. (2013), The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers. New York, NY, USA: HarperCollins. McMahon, D. (2018), China’s Great Wall of Debt: Shadow Banks, Ghost Cities, Massive Loans and the End of the Chinese Miracle. Boston, MA, USA: Little, Brown and Company. McMann, K. M. (2006), Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. McMann, K. M. (2018), ‘Measuring subnational democracy: Toward improved regime typologies and theories of regime change’, Democra tization, 25(1), 19-37. McMann, K., Gerring, J., Maguire, M., Coppedge, M. and S. I. Lindberg (2016), ‘Governing countries: A theory of subnational regime varia tion’, V-Dem Working Paper No. 28. Mehlum, H., Moene, К. and R. Tõrvik (2006), ‘Institutions and the resource curse’, Economic Journal, 116(508), 1-20. Meisels, A. G. (2013) ‘Lessons learned in China from the collapse of the Soviet Union’, University of Sydney China Studies Center Policy Paper Series No. 3. Meng, T, Pan, J. and P. Yang (2017), ‘Conditional receptivity to citizen participation: Evidence from a survey experiment in China’, Compara tive Political Studies, 50(4), 399-433. Merkel, W. (2004), ‘Embedded and defective democracies’, Democrati zation, 11(5), 33-58. Meri, S. (2012), Politische Kommunikation in der Diktatur. Göttingen, Germany: Wallstein. Michailova, S. and V. Worm (2003), ‘Personal networking in Russia and China: Blat and guanxi’, European Management Journal, 21(4), 509-19. Mikeseik J. L. (2003), ‘International experience with
administration of local taxes: A review of practices and issues’, Working Paper. Mikhailov, V. V. (2010), ‘Authoritarian regimes of Russia and Tatarstan: coexistence and subjection’, Journal of Communist Studies and Tran sition Politics, 26(4), 471-93. Miller, C. (2016), The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR. Chapel Hill, NC, USA: UNC Press. Miller, M. (2014), ‘Elections, information, and policy responsiveness in autocratic regimes’, Comparative Political Studies, 48(6), 691-727. Minakir, P. (2018), ‘Ukaznaya ekonomika’, Prostranstvennaya Ekono mika, (2), 8-16. Minasyan, A. (2018), ‘US aid, US educated leaders and economic ideology’, European Journal of Political Economy, 55, 244—57.
200 Federalism in China and Russia Minzner, C. (2018), End of an Era: How China’s Authoritarian Revival is Undermining its Rise. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Montero, A. and D. Samuels (eds) (2004), Decentralization and Democ racy in Latin America. Notre Dame, IN, USA: University of Notre Dame Press. Montinola, G., Qian, Y. and B. R. Weingast (1995), ‘Federalism, Chinese style: The political basis for economic success in China’, World Politics, 48(1), 50-81. Moore, В. (1966), Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston, MA, USA: Beacon Press. Moses, J. C. (2008), ‘Who has led Russia? Russian regional political elites, 1954-2006’, Europe-Asia Studies, 60(1), 1-24. Müller, M. (2011), ‘State dirigisme in megaprojects: Governing the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi’, Environment and Planning A, 43(9), 2091-108. Munro, N. M. (2009), ‘Democracy postponed: Chinese learning from the Soviet collapse’, Working Paper. Myerson, R. B. (2015), ‘Moral hazard in high office and the dynamics of aristocracy’, Econometrica, 83(6), 2083-126. Nathan, A. J. (2003), ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, Journal of Democracy 14(1), 6-17. Naughton, B. (2006), The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. Neumeier, F. (2018), ‘Do businessmen make good governors?’, Eco nomic Inquiry, 56(4), 2116-37. Ngo, T. (2008), ‘Rent-seeking and economic governance in the structural nexus of corruption in China’, Crime, Law and Social Change, 49(1), 27^14. Nolan, P. (1995), China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall: Politics, Economics, and
Planning in the Transition from Stalinism. Basingstoke, UK: Paigrave MacMillan. Nye, J. V. and O. Vasilyeva (2015), ‘When does local political com petition lead to more public goods? Evidence from Russian regions’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 43(3), 650-76. Oakes, T. (2000), ‘China’s provincial identities: Reviving regionalism and reinventing “Chineseness”’, Journal of Asian Studies, 59(3), 667-92. Oates, W. E. (1999), ‘An essay on fiscal federalism’, Journal of Eco nomic Literature, 37(3), 1120-49. Obydenkova, A. (2008a), ‘Regime transition in the regions of Russia: The freedom of mass media: Transnational impact on sub-national democratization?’, European Journal of Political Research, 47(2), 221^16.
References 201 Obydenkova, A. (2008b), Democratization, Regionalization and Euro peanization in Russia: Interplay of National and Transnational Fac tors. Saarbrucken, Germany: VDM Verlag. Obydenkova, A. (2011), ‘A triangle of Russian federalism: Democratiza tion, (de-)centralization, and local politics’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 41(4), 734-41. Obydenkova, A. (2012), ‘Democratization at the grassroots: The Euro pean Union’s external impact’, Democratization, 19(2), 230-57. Obydenkova, A. and A. Libman (2012), ‘The impact of external factors on regime transition: Lessons from the Russian regions’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 28(3), 346—401. Obydenkova, A. and A. Libman (2013), ‘National autocratization and the survival of sub-national democracy: Evidence from Russia’s parliamen tary elections of 2011’, Acta Politica, 48(4), 459-89. Obydenkova, A. and A. Libman (2015), Causes and Consequences of Democratization: The Regions of Russia. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Oi, J. (1992), ‘Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in China’, World Politics, 45(1), 99-126. Oi, J. (1995), ‘The role of the local state in China’s transitional economy’, China Quarterly, 144, 1132—49. Oi, J. (1999), Rural China Takes Off. Berkeley, CA, USA: University of California Press. Oksenberg, M. (1968), ‘The institutionalization of the Chinese Commu nist revolution: the ladder of success on the eve of the cultural revolution’, China Quarterly, 36, 61-92. Olson, M. (1993), ‘Dictatorship, democracy, and development’, American Political Science Review, 87(3), 567-76. Ong,
L. (2006), ‘The political economy of township government debt, township enterprises and rural financial institutions in China’, China Quarterly, 186, ЗП-400. Ong, L. (2012), ‘Between developmental and clientelist states: Local state-business relationships in China’, Comparative Politics, 44(2), 191-209. Ong, L. (2018), ‘“Thugs-for-hire”: Subcontracting of state coercion and state capacity in China’, Perspectives on Politics, 16(3), 680-95. Opper, S., Nee, V. and S. Brehm (2015), ‘Homophily in the career mobility of China’s political elite’, Social Science Research, 54, 332-52. Orttung, R. W. (2004), ‘Business and politics in the Russian regions’, Problems of Post-Communism, 51(2), 48-60. Osburg, J. (2018), ‘Making business personal: Corruption, anti corruption, and elite networks in post-Mao China’, Current Anthro pology, 59(18), 149-59.
202 Federalism in China and Russia Paarmann, В. (2007), Evolving Centre-Periphery Relations in Transition Countries: The Case of Kazakhstan. MPhil thesis, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK. Pan, J. and K. Chen (2018), ‘Concealing corruption: How Chinese officials distort upward reporting of online grievances’, American Political Science Review, 112(3), 602-20. Paneyakh, E. (2014), ‘The overregulated state’, Social Sciences, 45(1), 20-33. Panov, P. and C. Ross (2013a), ‘Sub-national elections in Russia: Variations in United Russia’s domination of regional assemblies’, Europe-Asia Studies, 65(4), 737-52. Panov, P. and C. Ross (2013b), ‘Patterns of electoral contestation in Russian regional assemblies: Between “competitive” and “hegemonic” authoritarianism’, Demokratizatsiya, 21(3), 36999. Parker, E., and J. Thornton (2007), ‘Fiscal centralisation and decentral isation in Russia and China’, Comparative Economic Studies, 49(4), 514-42. Pei, M. (2006), China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press. Pei, M. (2016), China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press. Pepinsky, T. (2014), ‘The institutional turn in comparative authoritarian ism’, British Journal of Political Science, 44(3), 631-53. Peregudov, S., Lapina, N. and I. Semenenko (1999), Gruppy Interesov і Rossiyskoe Gosudarstvo. Moscow, Russia: URSS. Persson, R, and E. Zhuravskaya (2012), ‘The limits of career concerns in federalism: Evidence from China’, Journal of the European Economic
Association, 14(2), 338-74. Pertzik, V. A. (1984), ‘Organisatsionno-pravovye problemy territorial’noproizvodstvennykh kompleksov’, Pravovedenie, (1), 65-75. Petrov, N. (2002), ‘Seven faces of Putin’s Russia: Federal districts as the new level of state-territorial composition’, Security Dialogue, 33(1), 73-91. Petrov N. (2005a), ‘Siloviki in Russian regions: New dogs, old tricks’, Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, 2, https:// joumals.openedition.org/pipss/331, accessed 15 October 2018. Petrov, N. (2005b), ‘Demokratichnost’ regionov Rossii’, Moscow Carn egie Center Briefing, volume 7, issue 9. Petrov, N. (2016), ‘The year 2015: A chronicle of growing authoritarian ism’, Russian Politics and Law, 54(4), 317-40. Pogorletskiy, A. I. and N. N. Bashkirova (2015), ‘The dynamics of tax system and tax administration development in the Russian Federa tion’, Journal of Tax Reform, 1(1), 4-24.
References 203 Pohlner, H. (2016), ‘Institutional change and the political economy of water megaprojects: China’s south-north water transfer’, Global Envir onmental Change, 38, 205-16. Polishchuk, L. (1998), ‘“Rossiiskaia model” peregovomogo federalisma (politiko-ekonomicheskii aspekt)’, Voprosy Ekonomiki, (6), 68-86. Poncet, S. (2003), ‘Measuring Chinese domestic and international inte gration’, China Economic Review, 14(1), 1-21. Poncet, S. (2005), ‘A fragmented China: Measure and determinants of Chinese domestic market disintegration’, Review of International Eco nomics, 13(3), 409-30. Popov, V. (2004), ‘Fiscal federalism in Russia: Rules versus electoral politics’, Comparative Economic Studies, 46(4), 515-41. Popov, V. (2007), ‘Shock therapy versus gradualism reconsidered: Les sons from transition economies after 15 years of reforms’, Compara tive Economic Studies, 49(1), 1-31. Puffer, S. M., McCarthy, D. J. and M. Boisot (2010), ‘Entrepreneurship in Russia and China: The impact of formal institutional voids’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(3), 441-67. Qian, Y., and B. R. Weingast (1996), ‘China’s transition to markets: Market-preserving federalism, Chinese style’, Journal of Policy Reform, 1(2), 149-85. Qian, Y., and C. Xu (1993), ‘Why China’s economic reforms differ: The M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector’, Eco nomics of Transition, 1(2), 135-70. Qian, Y, Roland, G. and C. Xu (1999), ‘Why is China different from Eastern Europe? Perspectives from organization theory’, European Economic Review, 43(4-6), 1085-94. Qian, Y, Roland,
G. and C. Xu (2006), ‘Coordination and experimenta tion in M-form and U-form organizations’, Journal of Political Economy, 114(2), 366-402. Qiu, X. (2015), Don’t Cry, Tai Lake. Hodder and Stoughton. Qu, G., Sylwester, К. and F. Wang (2018), Anticorruption and growth: Evidence from China’, European Journal of Political Economy, 55, 373-90. Qun, W., Yongle, L. andY. Siqi (2015), ‘The incentives of China’s urban land finance’, Land Use Policy, 42, 432-42. Raeff, M. (1979), ‘The bureaucratic phenomena of Imperial Russia, 1700-1905’, American Historical Review, 84(2): 399—411. Remington, T. F. (2011), The Politics of Inequality in Russia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Remington, T. F. (2015), ‘Why is interregional inequality in Russia and China not falling?’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 48(1), 1-13.
204 Federalism in China and Russia Ren, L. (2009), Surveying Public Opinion in Transitional China: An Examination of Survey Response. PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh. Renz, B. (2006), ‘Putin’s militocracy? An alternative interpretation of Siloviki in contemporary Russian politics’, Europe-Asia Studies, 58(6), 903-24. Reuter O. J. (2017), The Origins of Dominant Parties: Building Authori tarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Reuter, O. J. (2013), ‘Regional patrons and hegemonic party electoral performance in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 29(2), 101-35. Reuter, O. J. and G. Robertson (2012), ‘Subnational Appointments in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial Appointments’, Journal of Politics, 74(4), 1023-37. Richter, K. (2006), ‘Wage arrears and economic voting in Rus sia’, American Political Science Review, 100(1), 133-45. Riker, W. (1964), Federalism: Origin, Operations, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. Rigby, T. H. (1972), ‘The Soviet politburo: A comparative profile, 1951-1971’, Soviet Studies, 24(1), 3-23. Rigby, T. H. (1999), ‘New top elites for old in Russian politics’, British Journal of Political Science, 29(2), 323—43. Rivera, S. W. and D. W. Rivera (2006), ‘The Russian elite under Putin: Militocratic or bourgeois?’ Post-Soviet Affairs, 22(2), 125-44. Rivera, S. W. and D. W. Rivera (2014), ‘Is Russia a militocracy? Concep tual issues and extant findings regarding elite militarization’, PostSoviet Affairs, 22(2), 125-44. Robbins, R. (1987), The Tsar’s Viceroys: Russian Provincial
Governors in the Last Years of the Empire. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. Roberts, M. (2018), Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Robertson, G. (2009), ‘Managing society: Protest, civil society, and regime in Putin’s Russia’, Slavic Review, 68(3), 528-47. Rochlitz, M. (2014), ‘Corporate raiding and the role of the state in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 30(2-3), 89-114. Rochlitz, M. (2016), ‘Political loyalty vs economic performance: Evi dence from machine politics in Russia’s regions’, HSE Basic Research Program, Political Science Working Paper No. 34/PS/2016. Rochlitz, M. (2018), ‘The power of the Siloviki: Do Russia’s security services control Putin, or does he control them?’, Russian Analytical Digest, 223, 2-4.
References 205 Rochlitz, M., Kazun, A. and A. Yakovlev (2016), ‘Unter Räubern Russland: Investitionsrisiko Untemehmensplünderangen’, Osteuropa, 66(5), 95-110. Rochlitz, M., Kulpina, V., Remington, T. and A. Yakovlev (2015), ‘Performance incentives and economic growth: Regional officials in Russia and China’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 56(4), 421-45. Rodrik, D. (2000), ‘Institutions for high-quality growth: what they are and how to acquire them’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 35(3), 3-31. Rosenberg, D., Kozlov, V. and A. Libman (2018), ‘Political regimes, income and health: Evidence from sub-national comparative method’, Social Science Research, 72, 20-37. Rosenberg, H. (1958), Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press. Ross, C. (2003) ‘Putin’s federal reforms and the consolidation of federalism in Russia: One step forward, two steps back!’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36(1), 29-47. Ross, C. (2010), ‘Federalism and inter-governmental relations in Russia’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 26(2), 165-87. Ross, M. L. (2001), ‘Does oil hinder democracy?’, World Politics, 53(3), 325-61. Rutland, P. (1993), The Politics of Economic Stagnation in the Soviet Union. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. Saich, T. (2002), ‘The blind man and the elephant: Analysing the local state in China’, in L. Tomba (ed.), East Asian Capitalism: Conflicts, Growth and Crisis. Milan, Italy: Fondazione Giangiaocomo Feltrinelli pp.75-100. Saikkonen, I. A. L.
(2016), ‘Variation in subnational electoral authori tarianism: Evidence from the Russian Federation’, Democratiza tion, 23(3), 437-58. Schedler, A. (2002), ‘The menu of manipulation’, Journal of Democ racy, 13(2), 36-50. Schultz, A. and A. Libman (2015), Ts there a local knowledge advantage in federations? Evidence from a natural experiment’, Public Choice, 162(1-2), 25-42. Schütze, R. (2009), From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Chan ging Structure of European Law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Scott, J. (1988), Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve Human Conditions Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
206 Federalism in China and Russia Shair-Rosenfield, S., Marks, G. and L. Hooghe (2014), A comparative measure of decentralization for Southeast Asia’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 14(1), 85-107. Shang, J. (2016), An Empirical Study on China s Regional Tax Revenue Performance. PhD thesis, University of Gloucestershire. Sharafutdinova, G. (2010), ‘Subnational governance in Russia: How Putin changed the contract with his agents and the problems it created for Medvedev’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 40(4), 672-96. Sharafutdinova, G. (2018), ‘Informality and corruption perceptions in Russia’s regions: Exploring the effects of gubernatorial turnover in patronal regimes’, Russian Politics, 3(2), 216-38. Sharafutdinova, G. and J. Steinbuks (2017), ‘Governors matter: A com parative study of state-business relations in Russia’s regions’, Eco nomics of Transition, 25(3), 471-93. Sharafutdinova, G. and R. Turovsky (2017), ‘The politics of federal transfers in Putin’s Russia: regional competition, lobbying, and federal priorities’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 33(2), 161-75. Shen, C., Jin, J. and H. F. Zou (2012), ‘Fiscal decentralization in China: History, Impact, challenges and next Steps’, Annals of Economics and Finance, 13(1), 1-51. Sheng, A. and N. Soon (2016), Shadow Banking in China: An Opportun ity for Financial Reform. Chichester, UK: Wiley. Sheng, Y. (2007), ‘Global market integration and central political control: foreign trade and intergovernmental relations in China’, Comparative Political Studies, 40(4), 405-34. Sheng, Y. (2009), ‘Career incentives and political
control under authori tarianism: Explaining the political fortunes of subnational leaders in China’, Working Paper, Wayne State University. Shih, A., Adolph, C. and M. Liu (2012), ‘Getting ahead in the Commu nist party: Explaining the advancement of Central Committee members in China’, American Political Science Review, 106(1), 166-87. Shirk, S. (1993), The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China. Berkeley, CA, USA: University of California Press. Shleifer, A. (1997), ‘Government in transition’, European Economic Review, 41(3-5), 385—410. Shurchkov, O. (2012), ‘New elites and their influence on entrepreneurial activity in Russia’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 40(2), 240-55. Sidel, J. T. (2014), ‘Economic foundations of subnational authoritarian ism: Insights and evidence from qualitative and quantitative research’, Democratization, 21(1), 161-84. Sinn, S. (1992), ‘The taming of Leviathan: competition among govern ments’, Constitutional Political Economy, 3(2), 177-96.
References 207 Skinner, W. (1985), ‘Presidential address: The structure of Chinese history’, Journal of Asian Studies, 44(2), 271-92. Skocpol, T. (1976), Old regime legacies and communist revolutions in Russia and China’, Social Forces, 55(2), 284-315. Smirnov, S. (2015), ‘Economic fluctuations in Russia (from the late 1920s to 2015)’, Russian Journal of Economics, 1, 130-53. Smyth, R. and R. Turovsky (2018), ‘Legitimising victories: Electoral authoritarian control in Russia’s gubernatorial elections’, Europe-Asia Studies, 70(2), 182-201. Söderlund, P. J. (2003), ‘The significance of structural power resources in the Russian bilateral treaty process 1994-1998’, Communist and PostCommunist Studies, 36(3), 311-24. Solanko, L. (2006), ‘Coping with missing public infrastructure: An analysis of Russian industrial enterprises’, BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 2. Solanko, L. and M. Tekoniemi (2005), ‘To recentralise or decentralise: Some recent trends in Russian fiscal federalism’, BOFIT Online No. 5. Soldatov, A. and I. Borogan (2015), The Red Web. New York, NY, USA: PublicAffairs. Soldatov, A. and M. Rochlitz (2018), ‘The Siloviki in Russian politics’, in D. Treisman (ed.), The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia. Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 83-108. Solnick, S. L. (1996), ‘The breakdown of hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China: A neo-institutional perspective’, World Politics, 48(2), 209-38. Solnick, S. L. (2002), ‘Federalism and state-building: Post-Communist and post-colonial perspectives’, in A. Reynolds (ed.), The
Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 171-205. Souleimanov, E. A. and G. Jasutis (2016), ‘The dynamics of Kadyrov’s regime: Between autonomy and dependence’, Caucasus Survey, 4(2), 115-28. Stadelmann, D., Portmann, M., and R. Eichenberger (2015), ‘Military careers of politicians matter for national security policy’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 116, 142-56. Starodubtsev, A. (2009), ‘Politicheskaya loyal’nosť ili ekonomicheskaya effektivnosť?’, European University in St. Petersburg Center for Modernization Research Working Paper No. M-02/09. Starodubtsev, A. (2016), ‘How does the government implement unpopu lar reforms? Evidence from education policy in Russia’, in Gel’man, V. (ed.), Authoritarian Modernization in Russia. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 160-177.
208 Federalism in China and Russia Stegarescu, D. (2006), Decentralised Government in an Integrating World: Quantitative Studies for OECD Countries. Heidelberg, Ger many: Physica. Stoner-Weiss, K. (1997), Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Rus sian Regional Governance. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Stoner-Weiss, K. (1999), ‘Central weakness and provincial autonomy: Observations on the devolution process in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 15(1), 87-106. Stoner-Weiss, K. (2002), Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Rus sian Regional Governance. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Stoner-Weiss, K. (2006), Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Su, F. and R. Tao (2017), ‘The China model withering? Institutional roots of China’s local developmentalism’, Urban Studies, 54(1), 230-50. Sundqvist, G.J. (2019), ‘Diffusion of democracy among civil society actors in Guangdong Province’, Studia Orientalia Electronica, 7, 30-51. Summers, T. (2016), ‘China’s “New Silk Roads”: sub-national regions and networks of global political economy’, Third World Quarterly, 37(9), 1628-43. Sun, Y. (1999), ‘Reform, state, and corruption: is corruption less destruc tive in China than in Russia?’, Comparative Politics, 32(1), 1-20. Szakonyi, D. (2018a), ‘Anti-Corruption Campaigns and Political Selec tion: Evidence from Russia’, Working Paper. Szakonyi, D. (2018b), ‘Businesspeople in elected office: Identifying private benefits from firm-level returns’, American Political Science Review, 112(2),
322-38. Sztompka, P. (1993), ‘Civilizational incompetence: The trap of post communist societies’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 22(2), 85-95. Tan, Q. (2006), ‘China’s provincial party secretaries: Roles, powers, and constraints’, Discussion Paper No. 7, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham. Tang, T., Mo, P. L. L. and K. H. Chan (2016), ‘Tax collector or tax avoider? An investigation of intergovernmental agency conflicts’, Accounting Review, 92(2), 247-70. Tang, W. (2005), Public Opinion and Political Change in China. Stan ford, CA, USA: Stanford University Press. Tang, Y. (2017), ‘For whose eyes only? China’s journalistic internal reference and its legal and political implications’, Journal of Infor mation Policy, 7(1), 1-37.
References 209 Tao, R., Su, F., Liu, M. and G. Cao (2010), ‘Land leasing and local public finance in China’s regional development: Evidence from prefecture-level cities’, Urban Studies, 47(10), 2217-36. Thiessen, U. (2006), ‘Fiscal federalism in Russia: Theory, comparisons, evaluations’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 22(3), 189-224. Thireau, I. and H. Linshan (2003), ‘The Moral universe of aggrieved Chinese workers: Workers’ appeals to arbitration committees and letters and visits offices’, China Journal, 50, 83-103. Thornton, J. and K. Nagy (2006), ‘The response of federal transfers to measures of social need in Russia’s regions’, Working Paper. Tiebout, C. M. (1956), ‘A pure theory of local expenditures’, Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 416-24. Tolstrup, J. (2016), ‘Subnational level: Russian support for secessionism and pockets of autocracy’, in Obydenkova, A. and A. Libman (eds.), Autocratic and Democratic External Influences in Post-Soviet Eurasia. Famham, UK: Ashgate, pp. 109-32. Toma, E. F. and M. Toma (1992), ‘Tax collection with agency costs: Private contracting or government bureaucrats?’, Economica, 59(23), 107-20. Torgler, В. (2003), ‘Tax morale in transition countries’, Post-Communist Economies, 15(3), 357-81. Tomeli, A. and P. R. Lane (1999), ‘The voracity effect’, American Economic Review, 89(1), 22-46. Traugott, M. (1995), ‘Capital cities and revolution’, Social Science History, 19(1), 147-68. Treisman, D. (1996), ‘The politics of intergovernmental transfers in post-Soviet Russia’, British Journal of Political Science, 26(3), 299-335. Treisman, D. (1997),
‘Russia’s “ethnic revival”: The separatist activism of regional leaders in a post-communist order’, World Politics, 49(2), 212-49. Treisman, D. (1998), ‘Deciphering Russia’s federal finance: Fiscal appeasement in 1995 and 1996’, Europe-Asia Studies, 50(5), 893-906. Treisman, D. (2003), ‘Fiscal pathologies and Federal politics: Under standing tax arrears in Russia’s regions’, World Bank Technical Paper No. 49-68. Treisman, D. (2007), The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Polit ical Decentralization. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Treisman, D. (2011), ‘Presidential popularity in a hybrid regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin’, American Journal of Political Science, 55(3), 590-609. Treisman, D. (ed.) (2018), The New Autocracy: Information, Politics, and Policy in Putin’s Russia. Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press.
210 Federalism in China and Russia Troyanskaya, M. (2014), ‘Monitoring ispoľzovaniya mekhanizmov nalogovoy konkurentsil subyetkami Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Finansy і Kredit, 33, 51-60. Truex, R. (2016), Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Respon siveness in Modem China. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Tsai, L. (2008), ‘Understanding the falsification of village income statistics’, China Quarterly, 196, 805-26. Tsai, K. S. (2004), Off balance: The unintended consequences of fiscal federalism in China’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 9(2), 1-26. Tsai, K. S. (2006), ‘Adaptive informal institutions and endogenous insti tutional change in China’, World Politics, 59(1), 116-41. Tsang, S. and Y. Cheng (1994), ‘China’s tax reforms of 1994: Break through or compromise?’, Asian Survey, 34(9), 769-88. Tsou, T. (1995), ‘Chinese politics at the top: factionalism or informal politics? Balance-of-power politics or a game to win all?’, China Journal, 34, 95-156. Tsui, K. Y. (2005), ‘Local tax system, intergovernmental transfers and China’s local fiscal disparities’, Journal of Comparative Eco nomics, 33(1), 173-96. Tucker, J., Guess, A., Barbera, R, Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukał, D. and B. Nyhan (2018), ‘Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: A review of the scientific literature’, Working Paper. Turovskii, R. F. (2010), ‘Regional political regimes in Russia: Toward a methodology of analysis’, Russian Politics and Law, 48(2), 27—49. Turovskiy, R. (2003), ‘Konflitky na úrovne sub”ektov federácii: tipologiya,
soderzhanie, perspektívy uregulirovaniya’, Obshchestvennye Nauki i Sovremennost, 6, 79-89. Turovsky, R. (2010), ‘How Russian governors are appointed’, Russian Politics and Law, 48(1), 58-79. van der Kamp, D., Lorentzen, R, and D. Mattingly (2017), ‘Racing to the bottom or to the top? Decentralization, revenue pressures, and govern ance reform in China’, World Development, 95, 164-176. Vanberg, V. and W. Kerber (1994), ‘Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach’, Constitutional Political Economy, 5(2), 193-219. Vasilyeva, O. and A. Libman (2018), ‘Varieties of authoritarianism matter: Natural resources and economic growth in competitive and hegemonic authoritarian regimes’, Working Paper. Vogel, E. (2011), Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
References 211 Volkov, V, Dmitrieva, A., Titaev, K., Khodzhaeva, E., Chetverikova, I. and M. Shklyaruk (2015), Diagnostika Roboty Pravookharniteľnykh Organov po Okhrane Obshchestvennogo Poryadka i Perspektivy Sozdaniya Munitsipal’noi Militsii v Rossii. Moscow, Russia: KGL Wade, R. (1990), Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Wälder A. (1998), ‘Zouping in perspective’, in A. G. Wälder (ed.), Zouping in Transition: The Process of Reform in Rural North China. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, pp. 1-34. Wälder, A. (1995), ‘Career mobility and the Communist political order’, American Sociological Review, 60, 309-28. Wallace, J. (2016), ‘Juking the stats? Authoritarian information problems in China’, British Journal of Political Science, 46(1), 11-29. Wallace, J. and J. Weiss (2015), ‘The political geography of nationalist protest in China: Cities and the 2012 anti-Japanese protests’, China Quarterly, 222, 403-29. Waller, D. (1967), ‘China: Red or expert?’, Political Quarterly, 38(2), 122-31. Wan, X., Ma, Y. and К. Zhang (2015), ‘Political determinants of intergovernmental transfers in a regionally decentralized authoritarian regime: Evidence from China’, Applied Economics, 47(27), 2803-20. Wang, A. (2013), ‘The search for sustainable legitimacy: Environmental law and bureaucracy in China’, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 37, 365^140. Wang, C. (2010), Dì fãng zhèng fű jì xiào käo hé zhï biāo tí xì gòu jiàn yán jiū. PhD thesis, Northwest University, Xi’an.
Wang, J. (2013), ‘The economic impact of special economic zones: Evidence from Chinese municipalities’, Journal of Development Eco nomics, 101, 133-47. Wang, L. (2016), ‘The impacts of anti-corruption on economic growth in China’, Modem Economy, 7(2), 109-17. Wang, S. (1997), ‘China’s 1994 fiscal reform: an initial assess ment’, Asian Survey, 37(9), 801-17. Wang, X. and R. Herd (2013), The System of Revenue Sharing and Fiscal Transfers in China. Paris, France: OECD. Wang, Y. (2011), When Do Authoritarian Leaders Tie their Hands: The Rise of Limited Rule of Law in Sub-National China. PhD thesis, University of Michigan. Wang, Y. (2014), ‘Coercive capacity and the durability of the Chinese Communist state’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 47(1), 13-25.
212 Federalism in China and Russia Wang, Y. and C. Minzner (2015), ‘The rise of the Chinese security state’, China Quarterly, 222, 339-59. Wedeman A. (2017), ‘Xi Jinping’s tiger hunt: Anti-corruption campaign or factional purge?’, Modem China Studies, 24(2), 35-70. Weede, E. (1996), ‘Political regime type and variation in economic growth rates’, Constitutional Political Economy, 7(3), 167-76. Wegren, S. and A. Konitzer (2007), ‘Prospects for managed democracy in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 59(6), 1025-47. Weitzman, M. and C. Xu (1994), ‘Chinese township-village enterprises as vaguely defined cooperatives’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 18(2), 121-45. Wendland, K. J., Lewis, D. J. and J. Alix-Garcia (2014), ‘The effect of decentralized governance on timber extraction in European Rus sia’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 57(1), 19-40. Whiting S. (1995), The Micro-Foundations of Institutional Change in Reform China: Property Rights and Revenue Extraction in the Rural Industrial Sector. PhD thesis, University of Michigan. Whiting S. (2000), Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer sity Press. Whyte, M. (1986), ‘Who hates bureaucracy? A Chinese puzzle’, Univer sity of Michigan Working Paper No. 337. Wingender, M. P. (2018), Intergovernmental Fiscal Reform in China. Washington, DC, USA: International Monetary Fund. Wintrobe, R. (1998), The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Wong, C. P. (2000), ‘Central-local relations revisited the 1994 tax-sharing
reform and public expenditure management in China’, China Perspec tives, 31, 52-63. Woo, W. T. (1994), ‘The art of reforming centrally planned economies: Comparing China, Poland and Russia’, Journal of Comparative Eco nomics, 18(3), 276-308. Woo, W. T. (1999), ‘The real reasons for China’s growth’, China Journal, 41, 115-37. Woodruff, D. (2000) Money Unmade: Barter and the Fate of Russian Capitalism. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. World Bank (2018), Rolling Back Russia’s Spatial Disparities: Re-assembling the Soviet Jigsaw Under a Market Economy. Washing ton, DC, USA: World Bank Worthing, P. (2005), ‘The road through Whampoa: The early career of He Yingqin’, Journal of Military History, 69(4), 953-85.
References 213 Wright, J. (2008), ‘Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legisla tures affect economic growth and investment’, American Journal of Political Science, 52(2), 322-43. Wright, M. (1955), ‘From revolution to restoration: The transformation of Kuomintang ideology’, Far Eastern Quarterly, 14(4), 515-32. Wu, A. M. and W. Wang (2013), ‘Determinants of expenditure decentral ization: Evidence from China’, World Development, 46, 176-84. Wu, J., Deng, Y., Huang, J., Morek, R. and B. Yeung (2013), ‘Incentives and outcomes: China’s environmental policy’, NBER Working Paper No. 18754, National Bureau of Economic Research. Xu, C. (2011), ‘The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development’, Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), 1076-151. Xu, X., Xu, X., Chen, Q. and Y. Che (2015), ‘The impact on regional “resource curse” by coal resource tax reform in China—A dynamic CGE appraisal’, Resources Policy, 45, 277-89. Yakovlev, A. (2006), Agenty Modemizatsii. Moscow: HSE. Yakovlev, A. (2015), ‘Stimuly v sisteme gosudarstvennogo upravleniya і ekonomicheskiy rost (Opyt SSSR, Kıtaya і Rossii)’, Obshchestvennye nauki i s ov remennost’, (2), 5-19. Yakovlev, A., Freinkman, L., Makarov, S. and V. Pogodaev (2017), ‘In response to external shocks: How advanced Russian regions react to changes in federal policies: Experience of Tatarstan’, BOFIT Policy Brief No. 10 Yakovlev, A., Marques, I. and E. Nazrullaeva (2012), ‘From competition to dominance: political determinants of federal transfers in the Russian Federation’, Working Paper. Yakovlev, E. and E. Zhuravskaya
(2013), ‘The unequal enforcement of liberalization: Evidence from Russia’s reform of business regu lation’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(4), 808-38. Yang, R. (2015), ‘Political process and widespread protests in China: The 2010 labor protest’, Journal of Contemporary China, 24(91), 21^4-2. Yao, Y. and M. Zhang (2015), ‘Subnational leaders and economic growth: Evidence from Chinese cities’, Journal of Economic Growth, 20(4), 405-36. Young, A. (2000), ‘The razor’s edge: Distortions and incremental reform in the People’s Republic of China’, Quarterly Journal of Eco nomics, 115(4), 1091-135. Young, D. (2013), The Party Line: How the Media Dictates Public Opinion in Modem China. Singapore: John Wiley Sons. Yu, J., Zhou, L. and G. Zhu (2016), ‘Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities’, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 57, 23-37.
214 Federalism in China and Russia Yurchak, A. (2005), Everything Was Forever, Until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Yushkov, A., Oding, N. and L. Savulkin (2017), ‘Sudby rossiyskikh regionov-donorov’, Voprosy Ekonomiki, (9), 63-82. Zakharov, A. (2008), Unitarnaya Federaciya. Moscow, Russia: Moskovskaya shkola politicheskikh issledovaniy. Zakharov, A. (2014), Spyashchiy Institut: Federalizm v Sovremennoi Rossii i v Mire. Moscow, Russia: NLO. Zang, X. (2003), Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China. London, UK: Routledge. Zhan, J. V. (2013), ‘Strategy for fiscal survival? Analysis of local extra-budgetary finance in China’, Journal of Contemporary China, 22(80), 185-203. Zhan, J. V. (2017), ‘Do natural resources breed corruption? Evidence from China’, Environmental and Resource Economics, 66(2), 237-59. Zhang, B., Zhang, J. and F. Yao (2006), ‘Technology transfer from the Soviet Union to the People’s Republic of China 1949-1966’, Com parative Technology Transfer and Society, 4(2), 105-71. Zhang, K. H. and S. Song (2003), ‘Rural-urban migration and urbaniza tion in China: Evidence from time-series and cross-section analy ses’, China Economic Review, 14(4), 386^100. Zhang, X., Xing, L., Fan, S. and X. Luo (2008), ‘Resource abundance and regional development in China’, Economics of Transition, 16(1), 7-29. Zhang, Z. and J. Martinez-Vazquez (2003), ‘The system of equalization transfers in China’, Working Paper, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State
Univer sity. Zhao, D. (2009), ‘The mandate of heaven and performance legitimation in historical and contemporary China’, American Behavioral Scientist, 53(3), 416-33. Zheng, S. and M. Kahn (2013), ‘Understanding China’s urban pollution dynamics’, Journal of Economic Literature, 51(3), 731-27. Zheng, S. and M. Kahn (2016), Blue Skies over Beijing: Economic Growth and the Environment in China. Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press. Zheng, S., Kahn, M., Sun, W. and D. Luo (2014), ‘Incentivizing China’s urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities: The role of the central government and public environmentalism’, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 47, 61-71. Zheng, Y. (2007), De-Facto Federalism in China: Reforms and Dynamics of Central-local Relations. Singapore: World Scientific.
References 215 Zhong, Y. and W. Hwang (2016), Pollution, Institutions and Street Protests in Urban China, Journal of Contemporary China, 25(98): 216-232. Zhou, M. (2016), Made in China. Paris, France: Editions Gallimard. Zhou, X. and L. Hou (1999), ‘Children of the Cultural Revolution: The state and the life course in the People’s Republic of China’, American Sociological Review, 64(1), 12-36. Zhu, J. (1999), ‘Local growth coalition: The context and implications of China’s gradualist urban land reforms’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(3), 534—48. Zhuravskaya, E. V. (2000), ‘Incentives to provide local public goods: Fiscal federalism, Russian style’, Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), 337-68. Zimmermann, H. (2018), ‘Deutschland - auf dem Weg zum unitarischen Bundesstaat’, Jahrbuch für öffentliche Finanzen, 1, 323—38. Zittrain, J. and B. Edelman (2003), ‘Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China’, Manuscript, Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School (https://cyber.harvard.edu/filtering/china/, accessed 22 February 22). Zubarevich, N. (2005), ‘Big business in Russia’s regions and its role in the federal reform’, in Reddaway, P. and R. Orttung (eds), The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations, voi. 2. Lanham, MD, USA: Rowman Littlefield, pp. 215240. Zubarevich, N. (2015), ‘Geopoliticheskie prioritety v regionaľnoi poli tike Rossii: Vozmozhnosti і riski’, Kontrapunkt, (1), http://www. counter-point.org/zub/, accessed 15 October 2018. Zubarevich, N. (2018), Otnosheniya tsentr-regiony: Chto
izmenilos‘ za chetyre goda krizisa?’, Kontrapunkt, (11), http://www.counterpoint.org/ll_zubarevich/, accessed 15 October 2018. Zweig, D. (2002), Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages. Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press. Zygar, M. (2016), All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin. New York, NY, USA: PublicAffairs.
Index anti-corruption campaigns effects 82-9 Argentinian federalism 143 arrear crisis phenomenon 28 Aushev, Ruslan 56 authoritarian federalism 1,2,5 authoritarian regimes 74, 96, 104, 152, 168, 172, 173 bureaucratic 145 competitive and hegemonic 116-17 developmental autocracies 137 functioning of 118 institutional autocracies 118 modernization 145 research on 140, 174-5 authoritarian states 91, 102, 170, 172-4 comparative perspective 173 decentralization as tool 141 future research 174-5 paradigmatic decentralization 141 principal-agent problem 5, 71-3 beliefs and ideologies, in divergence 154-7 Belykh, Nikita 83 boundary control 103, 110, 115 Brezhnev, Leonid 47 bureaucratic authoritarian regimes 145 bureaucratic incentives Communist bureaucracy 43-7 overview of 39-41 regional administration in Russia and China 41-3 bureaucratic integration 146 cadre responsibility system 52 CCP see Chinese Communist Party center-periphery relations 3, 47, 101, 139, 140, 153, 158, 159, 164, 168, 174 center-regional relations 1, 2 Chinese 3-4, 6, 14, 30 fiscal equalization mechanism 24 Russian 3, 4, 57, 78 tax administration 30 central government as principal 73-4 centralizers 143 Central Organization Department (COD) 74-5 China Development Bank 36 Chinese bureaucracy 49 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 45 Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 82-3 Central Organization Department 74-5 Chinese developmental local state from developmental to clientelist local states 130-31 embedded autonomy model 128 Great Leap Forward 127 historical roots China under Mao 126-7 Ming and Qing dynasties 125
during republican period 125-6 household responsibility system 127 local mafia states 131 local state corporatism 129 model emulation experiments 126 overview of 123-5 return of local state 127-30 Xiaoping, Deng 127-30 The Chinese Mayor (drama) 76 Chinese model of authoritarian federalism 1 217
218 Federalism in China and Russia of center-regional relations 3-4, 6, 14, 30 Chinese Politburo 73 COD see Central Organization Department color revolutions 65 Communist bureaucracy 43-7 comparative perspective authoritarian states 173 decentralization cycle 171 decentralization-recentralization cycle 171-2 fence-breaking concept 171 Institutional Revolutionary Party 173 Kazakhstan vs. Vietnam 170-73 war of laws 171 comparative research strategy 1 competitive authoritarian regimes 116-17 compulsory retirement 53-4 Confucianism 157 conservative Communist forces 108 cooperative federation 27 Cultural Revolution 46-8, 50-52, 54, 127, 142 decentralization cycle 171 decentralization-recentralization cycle 171-2 “democracy with adjectives” concept 116 democratic forces 108 developmental autocracies 137 Dewey, John 126 discretionary grants 21 Don’t Cry, Tai Lake (Xiaolong) 61 dual federation 26-7 Dubrovsky, Boris 81 economic complexity and geography 161—4 economic performance in China 2, 4 in Russia 2 elections vs. appointments 55-8 gubernatorial 55, 57-8, 64, 66, 97, 116, 123, 173, 174 embedded autonomy model 128 ethnicity 147-51 affirmative action empire 151 ethnic regions 149-50 national consciousness 151 non-ethnic territories 149 parade of sovereignties 148 revolutionary moment 151 expenditure and revenue decentralization 1985 reform 12 1988 reform 12 1994 reform 12 fiscal decline 12 Hayekian competition 13-14 laboratory federalism 14 market preserving federalism 11 May Decrees 17-18 model budgets 17 separating tax system 12 sub-national governments in China 9-Ю, 12 fiscal
contracting system 11 regulatory decentralization 15 residual claim 10 in Russia 10-11, 16 substantial regulatory autonomy 13 unfunded expenditure mandates 17 Unified State Exam 18 war of laws 15 Federal Security Service (FSB) 80, 81 Federal Treasury 27, 34 feedback mechanisms 90-98 feeding system 41 fence-breaking concept 171 FFSR see Fund for Financial Support of the Regions fiscal constitution 8 fiscal contracting system 11, 12 fiscal decline 12, 29 fiscal equalization mechanisms 20-26 center-regional relation 24
Index in China 24-6 discretionary grants 21 interregional inequality 20 megaprojects 25 negative effect of 23 in Russia 20-24 tax away revenues 23 transfer system 25 fiscal federalism 4 expenditure and revenue decentralization 9-18 fiscal equalization mechanisms 20-26 intergovernmental grants 20-26 non-tax revenue 30-33 overview of 8-9 public debt 33-7 regional protectionism 30-33 tax collection and administration 26-30 tax legislation authority 18-20 formal bureaucratic institutions 2 formal evaluation criteria 58-9 formal rules of institution selections in China compulsory retirement 53-4 new performance criteria 49-50 one-level down appointment 50-51 performance contracts 51-3 retirement rules 50 step-wise appointment system 49 three-level down appointment 51 two-level down appointment 50-51 in Russia elections vs appointments 55-8 formal evaluation criteria 58-9 FSB see Federal Security Service Fund for Financial Support of the Regions (FFSR) 21, 22 Gayzer, Vyacheslav 83 genetic planning 156 Gogol, Nikolai 42 Gorbachev, Mikhail 106 govemability approach 156 219 “The Government Inspector” (Gogol) 42 grand design models 170 Great Leap Forward 127 gubernatorial elections 55, 57-8, 64, 66, 97, 116, 123, 173, 174 Hale, Henry 65 Hayekian competition 13-14 hegemonic authoritarian regimes 116-17 Heilmann, Sebastian 6 homophily 62 household responsibility system 127 IBLACS see International Business Leaders’ Advisory Council for Shanghai Ilyumzhinov, Kirsan 106 informal performance criteria in China 60-64 homophily 62 provincial-level party secretaries 63 regional economic
performance 62-3 in Russia 64—7 color revolutions 65 party of power concept 65 informal pseudo-voluntary contributions 136 informational autocracies 168 information asymmetry 72, 73, 122 information collection strategies feedback mechanisms 90-98 internet 90-98 new technologies 98-9 polls and public opinion surveys 96-8 selective censorship 90-98 specialized governmental agencies 74-89 institutional autocracies 118 Institutional Revolutionary Party 173 intergovernmental grants 20-26 internal offshorization 20
220 Federalism in China and Russia International Business Leaders’ Advisory Council for Shanghai (IBLACS) 88 internet 90-98 extremist activities 92 major websites and resources 92 monitoring social expression 94 single register 92 troll factories 93-4 Yarovaya law 93 Jinping, Xi 5, 6, 41, 68-9, 82, 86, 87, 89, 118, 132, 165, 169 Kadyrov, Ramzan 113, 124 Kai-shek, Chiang 44 Kazakhstan 170-73 Keqiang, Li 89 Khrushchev, Nikita 46, 139 Kolbin, Gennadiy 106 Kolokoltsev, Vladimir 81 Krug, Barbara 140 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed 106 Kuznetsov, Lev 82 laboratory federalism 14 law enforcement agencies 85 law enforcement system 84 Levchenko, Sergei 57 LGFVs see local government funding vehicles liberal democracy 115 Libman, Alexander 140 Li, Wan 127 local developmental state see Chinese developmental local state; Russian sub-national political regimes; sub-national political regimes local government funding vehicles (LGFVs) 36 local mafia states 131 local state corporatism 129 logic of divergence beliefs and ideologies 154-7 economic complexity 161^1 economic geography 161-4 ethnicity 147-51 affirmative action empire 151 ethnic regions 149-50 national consciousness 151 non-ethnic territories 149 parade of sovereignties 148 revolutionary moment 151 mutual learning 158-61 natural resources 151-3 overview of 139—40 political organization 140-47 authoritarian states 141 bureaucratic integration 146 decentralization benefits 141-2 proponents of decentralization 142-3 Riker’s theory of federalism 143 vertical elite networks 144 resource curse effect 153 Luzhkov, Yuri 56, 64, 79, 81, 144 Made in
China (Meisen) 61 Manifestations of Bureaucracy (Zedong) 48 Markelov, Leonid 83 market preserving federalism 11, 32 Matviyenko, Valentina 78 May Decrees 17-18 Meisen, Zhou 61 Men, Mikhail 81 Ming Dynasty 42 Ministry of the Interior (MVD) 80, 81 Minzer, Carl 6 model budgets 17 model emulation experiments 126 monetary surrogates 28 mutual learning 158-61 MVD see Ministry of the Interior National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 75 National Supervisory Commission (NSC) 82-3 natural resources 151-3 NBS see National Bureau of Statistics neican system, selective censorship 90-91
Index non-tax revenues 30-33 NSC see National Supervisory Commission one-level down appointment 50-51 para-police forces 134 party of power concept 65 People’s Economy Councils 46 performance contracts 51-3 cadre responsibility system 52 “red ví experts” debate 52 target responsibility system 52 performance-related incentives 1, 45, 53 political organization 140—47 authoritarian states 141 bureaucratic integration 146 decentralization benefits 141-2 proponents of decentralization 142-3 Riker’s theory of federalism 143 vertical elite networks 144 polls and public opinion surveys 96-8 principal-agent problem 98, 133, 136 central government and regional administrations 70 central research question 1 central state 41 information asymmetry 72, 73 large authoritarian states 5, 71-3 in multi-task settings 72 in single-task settings 72 provincial-level party secretaries 63 provincial protectionism 32, 33, 37, 152, 159 Prussian bureaucracy 73 public debt economic crisis 35 local government funding vehicles 36 regional 34-5 state-owned banks 34, 35, 36 sub-national governments 36-7 at sub-national level 33-4 Putin, Vladimir 56, 57, 84-5, 93, 95, 111, 112 221 Qing Dynasty 42 Rakhimov, Murtaza 56, 106 regime-focused point of view 119 regional administration feeding system 41 lack of control 42 Ming and Qing dynasties 42 in Russia and China 41-3 regional economic performance 62-3 regional protectionism 30-33 regional public debt 34-5 regulatory decentralization 15 residual claim, sub-national governments 10 resource curse effect 153 revenue decentralization see expenditure and revenue
decentralization Riker’s theory of federalism 143 Rongji, Zhu 88 Russian Federal Antitrust Service 33 Russian Federation 2, 15, 21, 27, 56, 79, 107, 111, 112, 148, 154, 155, 160, 162, 172 Russian model of center-regional relations 3, 4, 57, 78 Russian patterns of resistance 131-6 meritocratic, performance-oriented bureaucracy 131-2 official taxes 135 para-police forces 134 pseudo-voluntary contributions 135-6 unforeseen consequences 133 voluntary contributions 135 Russian sub-national political regimes centralization 111-13 existence of sub-national political regimes 117-22 institutional autocracies 118 ordinary times and extraordinary circumstances 120, 121 regime-focused point of view 119 regime transition 117 Varangians and 119-21
222 Federalism in China and Russia imperfect democracies/autocracies 115-17 boundary control 115 “democracy with adjectives” concept 116 liberal democracy 115 variety of authoritarian regimes 117 institutional variation across regions 105-6 policy consequences 113-15 political regimes of 1990s 106-11 agency factors 110 conscious and unconscious forms 109 ethnic composition 110 formal political institutions 107 informal governance practices 107 modernization 108 political transition 109 structural explanations 109 survival of political regimes in 2000s 111-13 selective censorship 90-98 separating tax system 12 Serdyukov, Anatoliy 83 Shaimiev, Mintimer 56, 106 sleeping institution (Russian federalism) 113 Slyunyayev, Igor 82 Sobyanin, Sergey 78 social credit score 98 Soloviev, Alexander 83 specialized governmental agencies 74-89 American Chamber of Commerce 88 anti-corruption campaigns effects 82-9 authoritarian regimes 74 Central Organization Department (COD) 74-5 Chinese bureaucratic system 75 data on economic and social performance 79 Federal Security Service (FSB) 80, 81 IB LACS 88 law enforcement agencies 85 Ministry of the Interior (MVD) 80, 81 National Bureau of Statistics of China 75 National Supervisory Commission (NSC) 82-3 palochnaya sistema (stick/ticking system) 80-81 prudent data manipulation 77-8 spontaneous institutional design 37 stability of cadres 47 state-corroding federalism 33 state-owned banks 34, 35, 36 State Tax Bureau 29, 30 strategic tax collection 28 step-wise appointment system 49 Stroyev, Yegor 81 sub-national governments in China 9-Ю, 12 fiscal
contracting system 11 public debt 36-7 regulatory decentralization 15 residual claim 10 in Russia 10-11, 16 substantial regulatory autonomy 13 tax rates and tax bases 19 unfunded expenditure mandates 17 sub-national political regimes 5, 101 boundary control 103 conceptual evolution 102-5 democratic/autocratic 105 Russian see Russian sub-national regimes universe of concepts 104 substantial regulatory autonomy 13 target responsibility system 52 tax away revenues 23 tax collection and administration 26-30 arrear crisis phenomenon 28 cooperative federation 27 dual federation 26-7
Index monetary surrogates 28 State Tax Bureau 29, 30 strategic tax collection 28 tax farming 29 tax farming 29 tax legislation authority 18-20 centralization of 19 development zones 20 internal offshores 19 internal offshorization 20 offshore zones 19-20 teleological planning 156 three-level down appointment 51 township and village enterprises (TVEs) 31, 32, 128 transfer system 25 Treisman, Daniel 97 troll factories, internet 93-4 Trutnev, Yuri 81 Tuleev, Aman 135 TVEs see township and village enterprises two-level down appointment 50-51 Ulyukayev, Alexei 83 223 Unified State Exam 18 unitarian federation 27 Vargas, Gentuilo 172 vertical elite networks 144 vertical of power 56 Vietnam 170-73 war of laws 15, 171 Xiaolong, Qiu 61 Xiaoping, Deng 1, 48, 49, 68, 86, 127, 142 Xishan, Yan 126 Xuecun, Murong 99 Yakovlev, Vladimir 56 Yanbo, Geng 76 Yarovaya law 93 Yongkang, Zhou 146 Yuan Dynasty 1,71 Yuxiang, Feng 126 Zedong, Mao 46, 48, 49, 126, 127 Zubarevich, Natalia 153 Bayerisch·) StMtabibUothrt f
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Libman, Alexander 1981- Rochlitz, Michael |
| author_GND | (DE-588)132180766 (DE-588)1169085210 |
| author_facet | Libman, Alexander 1981- Rochlitz, Michael |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Libman, Alexander 1981- |
| author_variant | a l al m r mr |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV045531873 |
| classification_rvk | ME 8000 MH 50960 MG 85960 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1107343889 (DE-599)BVBBV045531873 |
| discipline | Politologie |
| era | Geschichte 1978- gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1978- |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03384nam a2200697 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV045531873</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20200121 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">190327s2019 |||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781788972185</subfield><subfield code="c">hardback</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-78897-218-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)1107343889</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV045531873</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-N2</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-824</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-188</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">OST</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ME 8000</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122634:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MH 50960</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122902:12229</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MG 85960</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122868:12229</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Libman, Alexander</subfield><subfield code="d">1981-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)132180766</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Federalism in China and Russia</subfield><subfield code="b">story of success and story of failure?</subfield><subfield code="c">Alexander Libman, Michael Rochlitz</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA</subfield><subfield code="b">EE, Edward Elgar Publishing</subfield><subfield code="c">[2019]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">© 2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">vi, 223 Seiten</subfield><subfield code="b">Diagramme</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Studies in fiscal federalism and state-local finance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Titel und Verantwortlichkeitsangabe von der Landingpage, da keine Titelseite</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1978-</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftswachstum</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066527-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Föderalismus</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4017754-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">China</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4009937-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Russland</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4076899-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Russland</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4076899-5</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">China</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4009937-4</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Föderalismus</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4017754-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftswachstum</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066527-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1978-</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rochlitz, Michael</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1169085210</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-1-78897-219-2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Literaturverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Register // Gemischte Register</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="q">BSB_NED_20190918</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030915968</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">330.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090511</subfield><subfield code="g">471</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">330.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09049</subfield><subfield code="g">471</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">351.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090511</subfield><subfield code="g">471</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">351.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090512</subfield><subfield code="g">471</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">351.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090512</subfield><subfield code="g">51</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">330.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">0904</subfield><subfield code="g">51</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">330.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090511</subfield><subfield code="g">51</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">351.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090511</subfield><subfield code="g">51</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">351.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">0904</subfield><subfield code="g">51</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">351.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09049</subfield><subfield code="g">471</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">330.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090512</subfield><subfield code="g">471</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">330.09</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">090512</subfield><subfield code="g">51</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | China (DE-588)4009937-4 gnd Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | China Russland |
| id | DE-604.BV045531873 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:20:42Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781788972185 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030915968 |
| oclc_num | 1107343889 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-N2 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 DE-824 DE-188 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-N2 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 DE-824 DE-188 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | vi, 223 Seiten Diagramme |
| psigel | BSB_NED_20190918 |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateSearch | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | EE, Edward Elgar Publishing |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Studies in fiscal federalism and state-local finance |
| spelling | Libman, Alexander 1981- Verfasser (DE-588)132180766 aut Federalism in China and Russia story of success and story of failure? Alexander Libman, Michael Rochlitz Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA, USA EE, Edward Elgar Publishing [2019] © 2019 vi, 223 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Studies in fiscal federalism and state-local finance Titel und Verantwortlichkeitsangabe von der Landingpage, da keine Titelseite Geschichte 1978- gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftswachstum (DE-588)4066527-6 gnd rswk-swf Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd rswk-swf China (DE-588)4009937-4 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g China (DE-588)4009937-4 g Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 s Wirtschaftswachstum (DE-588)4066527-6 s Geschichte 1978- z DE-604 Rochlitz, Michael Verfasser (DE-588)1169085210 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-1-78897-219-2 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Register // Gemischte Register |
| spellingShingle | Libman, Alexander 1981- Rochlitz, Michael Federalism in China and Russia story of success and story of failure? Wirtschaftswachstum (DE-588)4066527-6 gnd Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4066527-6 (DE-588)4017754-3 (DE-588)4009937-4 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | Federalism in China and Russia story of success and story of failure? |
| title_auth | Federalism in China and Russia story of success and story of failure? |
| title_exact_search | Federalism in China and Russia story of success and story of failure? |
| title_full | Federalism in China and Russia story of success and story of failure? Alexander Libman, Michael Rochlitz |
| title_fullStr | Federalism in China and Russia story of success and story of failure? Alexander Libman, Michael Rochlitz |
| title_full_unstemmed | Federalism in China and Russia story of success and story of failure? Alexander Libman, Michael Rochlitz |
| title_short | Federalism in China and Russia |
| title_sort | federalism in china and russia story of success and story of failure |
| title_sub | story of success and story of failure? |
| topic | Wirtschaftswachstum (DE-588)4066527-6 gnd Föderalismus (DE-588)4017754-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Wirtschaftswachstum Föderalismus China Russland |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030915968&sequence=000005&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT libmanalexander federalisminchinaandrussiastoryofsuccessandstoryoffailure AT rochlitzmichael federalisminchinaandrussiastoryofsuccessandstoryoffailure |