Market and network corruption:
Economists tend to reduce all corruption to impersonal market-like transactions, ignoring the role of social ties in shaping corruption. In this paper, we show that this simplification substantially limits the understanding of corruption. We distinguish between market corruption (impersonal bribery)...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
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Regensburg
Leibniz Institute for Eastern and Southeastern European Studies
February 2019
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| Schriftenreihe: | IOS working papers
No. 380 |
| Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
| Zusammenfassung: | Economists tend to reduce all corruption to impersonal market-like transactions, ignoring the role of social ties in shaping corruption. In this paper, we show that this simplification substantially limits the understanding of corruption. We distinguish between market corruption (impersonal bribery), and network (or parochial) corruption which is conditional on the social connections between bureaucrats and private agents. We argue, both theoretically and empirically, that these types of corruption have different qualities. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) which covers all post-socialist countries we show, first, that the correlation between market and network corruption is weak, which implies that ignoring network corruption leads not only to an underestimation of the overall scale of corruption but also biases national corruption rankings. Secondly, in line with theoretical expectations, we find that network corruption is more persistent over time, less related to contemporary national socio-economic and institutional characteristics and has stronger historical roots than market corruption. Yet, network corruption, unlike bribery, is not able to ‘grease the wheels’ and is not associated with political instability. Lastly, we show that the decline in bribery which was observed in almost all post-socialist countries in the period from 2010 to 2016 was accompanied by rising network corruption in many of them, which has important policy implications. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (v, 41 Seiten) Diagramme |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Economists tend to reduce all corruption to impersonal market-like transactions, ignoring the role of social ties in shaping corruption. In this paper, we show that this simplification substantially limits the understanding of corruption. We distinguish between market corruption (impersonal bribery), and network (or parochial) corruption which is conditional on the social connections between bureaucrats and private agents. We argue, both theoretically and empirically, that these types of corruption have different qualities. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) which covers all post-socialist countries we show, first, that the correlation between market and network corruption is weak, which implies that ignoring network corruption leads not only to an underestimation of the overall scale of corruption but also biases national corruption rankings. Secondly, in line with theoretical expectations, we find that network corruption is more persistent over time, less related to contemporary national socio-economic and institutional characteristics and has stronger historical roots than market corruption. Yet, network corruption, unlike bribery, is not able to ‘grease the wheels’ and is not associated with political instability. Lastly, we show that the decline in bribery which was observed in almost all post-socialist countries in the period from 2010 to 2016 was accompanied by rising network corruption in many of them, which has important policy implications. | |
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| spelling | Kravtsova, Maria aut Market and network corruption Maria Kravtsova and Aleksey Oshchepkov Regensburg Leibniz Institute for Eastern and Southeastern European Studies February 2019 1 Online-Ressource (v, 41 Seiten) Diagramme txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IOS working papers No. 380 Economists tend to reduce all corruption to impersonal market-like transactions, ignoring the role of social ties in shaping corruption. In this paper, we show that this simplification substantially limits the understanding of corruption. We distinguish between market corruption (impersonal bribery), and network (or parochial) corruption which is conditional on the social connections between bureaucrats and private agents. We argue, both theoretically and empirically, that these types of corruption have different qualities. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) which covers all post-socialist countries we show, first, that the correlation between market and network corruption is weak, which implies that ignoring network corruption leads not only to an underestimation of the overall scale of corruption but also biases national corruption rankings. Secondly, in line with theoretical expectations, we find that network corruption is more persistent over time, less related to contemporary national socio-economic and institutional characteristics and has stronger historical roots than market corruption. Yet, network corruption, unlike bribery, is not able to ‘grease the wheels’ and is not associated with political instability. Lastly, we show that the decline in bribery which was observed in almost all post-socialist countries in the period from 2010 to 2016 was accompanied by rising network corruption in many of them, which has important policy implications. Oščepkov, Aleksej Ju. (DE-588)132579340 aut IOS working papers No. 380 (DE-604)BV040033175 380 http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_380.pdf Verlag kostenfrei |
| spellingShingle | Kravtsova, Maria Oščepkov, Aleksej Ju Market and network corruption IOS working papers |
| title | Market and network corruption |
| title_auth | Market and network corruption |
| title_exact_search | Market and network corruption |
| title_full | Market and network corruption Maria Kravtsova and Aleksey Oshchepkov |
| title_fullStr | Market and network corruption Maria Kravtsova and Aleksey Oshchepkov |
| title_full_unstemmed | Market and network corruption Maria Kravtsova and Aleksey Oshchepkov |
| title_short | Market and network corruption |
| title_sort | market and network corruption |
| url | http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_380.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV040033175 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kravtsovamaria marketandnetworkcorruption AT oscepkovaleksejju marketandnetworkcorruption |