What deters and why: exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression
The challenge of deterring territorial aggression, which for several decades has been an afterthought in U.S. strategy toward most regions of the world, is taking on renewed importance. An increasingly belligerent Russia is threatening Eastern Europe and the Baltic States with possible aggression, c...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Santa Monica, Calif.
RAND Corporation
[2018]
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Schlagworte: | |
Zusammenfassung: | The challenge of deterring territorial aggression, which for several decades has been an afterthought in U.S. strategy toward most regions of the world, is taking on renewed importance. An increasingly belligerent Russia is threatening Eastern Europe and the Baltic States with possible aggression, conventional and otherwise. China is pursuing its territorial ambitions in the East and South China Seas with greater force, including the construction of artificial islands and occasional bouts of outright physical intimidation. North Korea remains a persistent threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK), including the possibility of large-scale aggression using its rapidly advancing nuclear arsenal. Yet the discussion of deterrence-as a theory and practical policy requirement-has lagged in U.S. military and strategy circles. The authors aim to provide a fresh look at the subject in this context, with two primary purposes: to review established concepts about deterrence, and to provide a framework for evaluating the strength of deterrent relationships. For greater focus, they concentrate on a specific category or form of deterrence: extended deterrence of interstate aggression. The authors consider the requirements for the United States to deter potential aggressors abroad from attacking U.S. allies or other countries in large-scale conventional conflicts. Examples include Russian attacks on the Baltic States and a North Korean assault on the ROK. The study stems from a specific research question: What are the requirements of effective extended deterrence of large-scale military aggression? The focus is therefore on the criteria that tend to distinguish successful from unsuccessful efforts to deter interstate aggression |
Beschreibung: | xx, 212 Seiten Karte, Diagramme |
ISBN: | 9781977400642 |
Internformat
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a What deters and why |b exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression |c Michael J. Mazarr [and 7 others] |
264 | 1 | |a Santa Monica, Calif. |b RAND Corporation |c [2018] | |
300 | |a xx, 212 Seiten |b Karte, Diagramme | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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505 | 8 | |a Understanding Deterrence and Dissuasion -- Effective Deterrence and Dissuasion: A Framework for Analysis -- Evaluating and Revising the Framework: Quantitative and Case Study Assessments -- Applying the Revised Framework: Deterring Russia in the Baltic Region -- Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications for the U.S. Army -- Appendix A: Quantitative Analysis: Cases of U.S. Extended Deterrence Since 1945 -- Appendix B: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Berlin -- Appendix C: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Deterring Saddam, 1990 -- Appendix D: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: NATO's Northern Flank in the Cold War -- Appendix E: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Russian Aggression Against Georgia | |
520 | 3 | |a The challenge of deterring territorial aggression, which for several decades has been an afterthought in U.S. strategy toward most regions of the world, is taking on renewed importance. An increasingly belligerent Russia is threatening Eastern Europe and the Baltic States with possible aggression, conventional and otherwise. China is pursuing its territorial ambitions in the East and South China Seas with greater force, including the construction of artificial islands and occasional bouts of outright physical intimidation. North Korea remains a persistent threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK), including the possibility of large-scale aggression using its rapidly advancing nuclear arsenal. Yet the discussion of deterrence-as a theory and practical policy requirement-has lagged in U.S. military and strategy circles. The authors aim to provide a fresh look at the subject in this context, with two primary purposes: to review established concepts about deterrence, and to provide a framework for evaluating the strength of deterrent relationships. For greater focus, they concentrate on a specific category or form of deterrence: extended deterrence of interstate aggression. The authors consider the requirements for the United States to deter potential aggressors abroad from attacking U.S. allies or other countries in large-scale conventional conflicts. Examples include Russian attacks on the Baltic States and a North Korean assault on the ROK. The study stems from a specific research question: What are the requirements of effective extended deterrence of large-scale military aggression? The focus is therefore on the criteria that tend to distinguish successful from unsuccessful efforts to deter interstate aggression | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Mazarr, Michael J. 1965- |
author_GND | (DE-588)132965380 |
author_facet | Mazarr, Michael J. 1965- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Mazarr, Michael J. 1965- |
author_variant | m j m mj mjm |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV045447293 |
contents | Understanding Deterrence and Dissuasion -- Effective Deterrence and Dissuasion: A Framework for Analysis -- Evaluating and Revising the Framework: Quantitative and Case Study Assessments -- Applying the Revised Framework: Deterring Russia in the Baltic Region -- Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications for the U.S. Army -- Appendix A: Quantitative Analysis: Cases of U.S. Extended Deterrence Since 1945 -- Appendix B: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Berlin -- Appendix C: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Deterring Saddam, 1990 -- Appendix D: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: NATO's Northern Flank in the Cold War -- Appendix E: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Russian Aggression Against Georgia |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1268186643 (DE-599)BVBBV045447293 |
format | Book |
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geographic_facet | USA |
id | DE-604.BV045447293 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:18:20Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9781977400642 |
language | English |
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physical | xx, 212 Seiten Karte, Diagramme |
publishDate | 2018 |
publishDateSearch | 2018 |
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publisher | RAND Corporation |
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spelling | Mazarr, Michael J. 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)132965380 aut What deters and why exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression Michael J. Mazarr [and 7 others] Santa Monica, Calif. RAND Corporation [2018] xx, 212 Seiten Karte, Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Understanding Deterrence and Dissuasion -- Effective Deterrence and Dissuasion: A Framework for Analysis -- Evaluating and Revising the Framework: Quantitative and Case Study Assessments -- Applying the Revised Framework: Deterring Russia in the Baltic Region -- Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications for the U.S. Army -- Appendix A: Quantitative Analysis: Cases of U.S. Extended Deterrence Since 1945 -- Appendix B: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Berlin -- Appendix C: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Deterring Saddam, 1990 -- Appendix D: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: NATO's Northern Flank in the Cold War -- Appendix E: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Russian Aggression Against Georgia The challenge of deterring territorial aggression, which for several decades has been an afterthought in U.S. strategy toward most regions of the world, is taking on renewed importance. An increasingly belligerent Russia is threatening Eastern Europe and the Baltic States with possible aggression, conventional and otherwise. China is pursuing its territorial ambitions in the East and South China Seas with greater force, including the construction of artificial islands and occasional bouts of outright physical intimidation. North Korea remains a persistent threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK), including the possibility of large-scale aggression using its rapidly advancing nuclear arsenal. Yet the discussion of deterrence-as a theory and practical policy requirement-has lagged in U.S. military and strategy circles. The authors aim to provide a fresh look at the subject in this context, with two primary purposes: to review established concepts about deterrence, and to provide a framework for evaluating the strength of deterrent relationships. For greater focus, they concentrate on a specific category or form of deterrence: extended deterrence of interstate aggression. The authors consider the requirements for the United States to deter potential aggressors abroad from attacking U.S. allies or other countries in large-scale conventional conflicts. Examples include Russian attacks on the Baltic States and a North Korean assault on the ROK. The study stems from a specific research question: What are the requirements of effective extended deterrence of large-scale military aggression? The focus is therefore on the criteria that tend to distinguish successful from unsuccessful efforts to deter interstate aggression Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 gnd rswk-swf Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf Deterrence (Strategy) USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 s Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 s DE-604 |
spellingShingle | Mazarr, Michael J. 1965- What deters and why exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression Understanding Deterrence and Dissuasion -- Effective Deterrence and Dissuasion: A Framework for Analysis -- Evaluating and Revising the Framework: Quantitative and Case Study Assessments -- Applying the Revised Framework: Deterring Russia in the Baltic Region -- Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications for the U.S. Army -- Appendix A: Quantitative Analysis: Cases of U.S. Extended Deterrence Since 1945 -- Appendix B: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Berlin -- Appendix C: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Deterring Saddam, 1990 -- Appendix D: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: NATO's Northern Flank in the Cold War -- Appendix E: Qualitative Case Study Analyses: Russian Aggression Against Georgia Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 gnd Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4000230-5 (DE-588)4057952-9 (DE-588)4003846-4 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
title | What deters and why exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression |
title_auth | What deters and why exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression |
title_exact_search | What deters and why exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression |
title_full | What deters and why exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression Michael J. Mazarr [and 7 others] |
title_fullStr | What deters and why exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression Michael J. Mazarr [and 7 others] |
title_full_unstemmed | What deters and why exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression Michael J. Mazarr [and 7 others] |
title_short | What deters and why |
title_sort | what deters and why exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression |
title_sub | exploring requirements and effective deterrence of interstate aggression |
topic | Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 gnd Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd |
topic_facet | Abschreckung Strategie Außenpolitik USA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT mazarrmichaelj whatdetersandwhyexploringrequirementsandeffectivedeterrenceofinterstateaggression |