The economics of collusion: cartels and bidding rings
Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
MIT Press
2012
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FLA01 UBT01 |
| Zusammenfassung: | Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts--fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases--offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entree to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (xii, 302 Seiten) Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9780262301503 9781280498930 |
Internformat
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| 520 | |a Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts--fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases--offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entree to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Marshall, Robert C. 1956- Marx, Leslie M. 1967- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170052958 (DE-588)171464699 |
| author_facet | Marshall, Robert C. 1956- Marx, Leslie M. 1967- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Marshall, Robert C. 1956- |
| author_variant | r c m rc rcm l m m lm lmm |
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| bvnumber | BV045356271 |
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| dewey-full | 338.8/2 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
| dewey-raw | 338.8/2 |
| dewey-search | 338.8/2 |
| dewey-sort | 3338.8 12 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV045356271 |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:15:51Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780262301503 9781280498930 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Marshall, Robert C. 1956- Verfasser (DE-588)170052958 aut The economics of collusion cartels and bidding rings Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx Cambridge MIT Press 2012 1 Online-Ressource (xii, 302 Seiten) Diagramme txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts--fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases--offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entree to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Econometrics bisacsh Cartels fast Competition fast Price fixing fast Price fixing Cartels Competition Ausschreibung (DE-588)4003822-1 gnd rswk-swf Preisabsprache (DE-588)4802019-9 gnd rswk-swf Abgestimmtes Verhalten (DE-588)4141057-9 gnd rswk-swf Ausschreibung (DE-588)4003822-1 s Preisabsprache (DE-588)4802019-9 s DE-604 Abgestimmtes Verhalten (DE-588)4141057-9 s Marx, Leslie M. 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)171464699 aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Broschur 978-0-262-01732-9 |
| spellingShingle | Marshall, Robert C. 1956- Marx, Leslie M. 1967- The economics of collusion cartels and bidding rings BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Econometrics bisacsh Cartels fast Competition fast Price fixing fast Price fixing Cartels Competition Ausschreibung (DE-588)4003822-1 gnd Preisabsprache (DE-588)4802019-9 gnd Abgestimmtes Verhalten (DE-588)4141057-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4003822-1 (DE-588)4802019-9 (DE-588)4141057-9 |
| title | The economics of collusion cartels and bidding rings |
| title_auth | The economics of collusion cartels and bidding rings |
| title_exact_search | The economics of collusion cartels and bidding rings |
| title_full | The economics of collusion cartels and bidding rings Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx |
| title_fullStr | The economics of collusion cartels and bidding rings Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx |
| title_full_unstemmed | The economics of collusion cartels and bidding rings Robert C. Marshall and Leslie M. Marx |
| title_short | The economics of collusion |
| title_sort | the economics of collusion cartels and bidding rings |
| title_sub | cartels and bidding rings |
| topic | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General bisacsh BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Econometrics bisacsh Cartels fast Competition fast Price fixing fast Price fixing Cartels Competition Ausschreibung (DE-588)4003822-1 gnd Preisabsprache (DE-588)4802019-9 gnd Abgestimmtes Verhalten (DE-588)4141057-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Industries / General BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Econometrics Cartels Competition Price fixing Price fixing Cartels Competition Ausschreibung Preisabsprache Abgestimmtes Verhalten |
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