Extra votes to signal loyalty: regional political cycles and national elections in Russia
Under the system of appointing regional governors by the president, which existed in Russia between 2005–2012, governors’ loyalty to the central government and particularly their ability to deliver satisfactory results to the ruling party in national-level elections were crucial to their likelihood...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Regensburg
Leibniz Institute for Eastern and Southeastern European Studies
October 2018
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IOS working papers
No. 376 |
| Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
| Zusammenfassung: | Under the system of appointing regional governors by the president, which existed in Russia between 2005–2012, governors’ loyalty to the central government and particularly their ability to deliver satisfactory results to the ruling party in national-level elections were crucial to their likelihood of being re-appointed for the next term. In this paper, we show that governors, anticipating the relationship between loyalty and re-appointments, attempted to increase their likelihood of being re-appointed by delivering additional votes to the ruling party, and that these attempts were subject to regional political cycles. We argue that delivering satisfactory results may have different importance to a governor depending on the stage of his term at which elections are held. If elections are held close to the expiration of a governor’s current term, the results are likely to be pivotal to his further political career. Exploiting variation in the starting and expiry dates of Russian regional governors’ terms of office, we find that the winning margins for a pro-government party across Russian regions in national-level elections held between 2007–2012 were substantially higher when elections were closer to the expiration of a regional governor’s term. However, for elections held between 1999–2004, when governors were subject to a direct vote by the regional population, no similar effect is found. We then implement several exercises to identify the source of the additional votes for the ruling party and demonstrate that governors, while unlikely using the means of electoral fraud, exerted efforts to stimulate turnout among ruling party supporters. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (v, 30 Seiten) Diagramme |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV045297441 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20231013 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 181119s2018 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV045297441 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-Re13 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Sidorkin, Oleg |d 198X-2023 |0 (DE-588)1305980921 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Extra votes to signal loyalty |b regional political cycles and national elections in Russia |c Oleg Sidorkin and Dmitriy Vorobyev |
| 264 | 1 | |a Regensburg |b Leibniz Institute for Eastern and Southeastern European Studies |c October 2018 | |
| 300 | |a 1 Online-Ressource (v, 30 Seiten) |b Diagramme | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a IOS working papers |v No. 376 | |
| 520 | 3 | |a Under the system of appointing regional governors by the president, which existed in Russia between 2005–2012, governors’ loyalty to the central government and particularly their ability to deliver satisfactory results to the ruling party in national-level elections were crucial to their likelihood of being re-appointed for the next term. In this paper, we show that governors, anticipating the relationship between loyalty and re-appointments, attempted to increase their likelihood of being re-appointed by delivering additional votes to the ruling party, and that these attempts were subject to regional political cycles. We argue that delivering satisfactory results may have different importance to a governor depending on the stage of his term at which elections are held. If elections are held close to the expiration of a governor’s current term, the results are likely to be pivotal to his further political career. Exploiting variation in the starting and expiry dates of Russian regional governors’ terms of office, we find that the winning margins for a pro-government party across Russian regions in national-level elections held between 2007–2012 were substantially higher when elections were closer to the expiration of a regional governor’s term. However, for elections held between 1999–2004, when governors were subject to a direct vote by the regional population, no similar effect is found. We then implement several exercises to identify the source of the additional votes for the ruling party and demonstrate that governors, while unlikely using the means of electoral fraud, exerted efforts to stimulate turnout among ruling party supporters. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Vorobyev, Dmitriy |4 aut | |
| 830 | 0 | |a IOS working papers |v No. 376 |w (DE-604)BV040033175 |9 376 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_376.pdf |x Verlag |z kostenfrei |
| 912 | |a ebook | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030684655 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804179079761494016 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Sidorkin, Oleg 198X-2023 Vorobyev, Dmitriy |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1305980921 |
| author_facet | Sidorkin, Oleg 198X-2023 Vorobyev, Dmitriy |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Sidorkin, Oleg 198X-2023 |
| author_variant | o s os d v dv |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV045297441 |
| collection | ebook |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV045297441 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02790nmm a2200301 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV045297441</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20231013 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">181119s2018 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV045297441</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-Re13</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sidorkin, Oleg</subfield><subfield code="d">198X-2023</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1305980921</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Extra votes to signal loyalty</subfield><subfield code="b">regional political cycles and national elections in Russia</subfield><subfield code="c">Oleg Sidorkin and Dmitriy Vorobyev</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Regensburg</subfield><subfield code="b">Leibniz Institute for Eastern and Southeastern European Studies</subfield><subfield code="c">October 2018</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 Online-Ressource (v, 30 Seiten)</subfield><subfield code="b">Diagramme</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">IOS working papers</subfield><subfield code="v">No. 376</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Under the system of appointing regional governors by the president, which existed in Russia between 2005–2012, governors’ loyalty to the central government and particularly their ability to deliver satisfactory results to the ruling party in national-level elections were crucial to their likelihood of being re-appointed for the next term. In this paper, we show that governors, anticipating the relationship between loyalty and re-appointments, attempted to increase their likelihood of being re-appointed by delivering additional votes to the ruling party, and that these attempts were subject to regional political cycles. We argue that delivering satisfactory results may have different importance to a governor depending on the stage of his term at which elections are held. If elections are held close to the expiration of a governor’s current term, the results are likely to be pivotal to his further political career. Exploiting variation in the starting and expiry dates of Russian regional governors’ terms of office, we find that the winning margins for a pro-government party across Russian regions in national-level elections held between 2007–2012 were substantially higher when elections were closer to the expiration of a regional governor’s term. However, for elections held between 1999–2004, when governors were subject to a direct vote by the regional population, no similar effect is found. We then implement several exercises to identify the source of the additional votes for the ruling party and demonstrate that governors, while unlikely using the means of electoral fraud, exerted efforts to stimulate turnout among ruling party supporters.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Vorobyev, Dmitriy</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">IOS working papers</subfield><subfield code="v">No. 376</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV040033175</subfield><subfield code="9">376</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_376.pdf</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ebook</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030684655</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV045297441 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:14:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030684655 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 1 Online-Ressource (v, 30 Seiten) Diagramme |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publishDateSearch | 2018 |
| publishDateSort | 2018 |
| publisher | Leibniz Institute for Eastern and Southeastern European Studies |
| record_format | marc |
| series | IOS working papers |
| series2 | IOS working papers |
| spelling | Sidorkin, Oleg 198X-2023 (DE-588)1305980921 aut Extra votes to signal loyalty regional political cycles and national elections in Russia Oleg Sidorkin and Dmitriy Vorobyev Regensburg Leibniz Institute for Eastern and Southeastern European Studies October 2018 1 Online-Ressource (v, 30 Seiten) Diagramme txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IOS working papers No. 376 Under the system of appointing regional governors by the president, which existed in Russia between 2005–2012, governors’ loyalty to the central government and particularly their ability to deliver satisfactory results to the ruling party in national-level elections were crucial to their likelihood of being re-appointed for the next term. In this paper, we show that governors, anticipating the relationship between loyalty and re-appointments, attempted to increase their likelihood of being re-appointed by delivering additional votes to the ruling party, and that these attempts were subject to regional political cycles. We argue that delivering satisfactory results may have different importance to a governor depending on the stage of his term at which elections are held. If elections are held close to the expiration of a governor’s current term, the results are likely to be pivotal to his further political career. Exploiting variation in the starting and expiry dates of Russian regional governors’ terms of office, we find that the winning margins for a pro-government party across Russian regions in national-level elections held between 2007–2012 were substantially higher when elections were closer to the expiration of a regional governor’s term. However, for elections held between 1999–2004, when governors were subject to a direct vote by the regional population, no similar effect is found. We then implement several exercises to identify the source of the additional votes for the ruling party and demonstrate that governors, while unlikely using the means of electoral fraud, exerted efforts to stimulate turnout among ruling party supporters. Vorobyev, Dmitriy aut IOS working papers No. 376 (DE-604)BV040033175 376 http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_376.pdf Verlag kostenfrei |
| spellingShingle | Sidorkin, Oleg 198X-2023 Vorobyev, Dmitriy Extra votes to signal loyalty regional political cycles and national elections in Russia IOS working papers |
| title | Extra votes to signal loyalty regional political cycles and national elections in Russia |
| title_auth | Extra votes to signal loyalty regional political cycles and national elections in Russia |
| title_exact_search | Extra votes to signal loyalty regional political cycles and national elections in Russia |
| title_full | Extra votes to signal loyalty regional political cycles and national elections in Russia Oleg Sidorkin and Dmitriy Vorobyev |
| title_fullStr | Extra votes to signal loyalty regional political cycles and national elections in Russia Oleg Sidorkin and Dmitriy Vorobyev |
| title_full_unstemmed | Extra votes to signal loyalty regional political cycles and national elections in Russia Oleg Sidorkin and Dmitriy Vorobyev |
| title_short | Extra votes to signal loyalty |
| title_sort | extra votes to signal loyalty regional political cycles and national elections in russia |
| title_sub | regional political cycles and national elections in Russia |
| url | http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_376.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV040033175 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sidorkinoleg extravotestosignalloyaltyregionalpoliticalcyclesandnationalelectionsinrussia AT vorobyevdmitriy extravotestosignalloyaltyregionalpoliticalcyclesandnationalelectionsinrussia |