Electoral systems and political context: how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies
"Why Don't Electoral Rules Have the Same Effects in ALL Countries? In the early 1990s, Japan and Russia each adopted a very similar version of a "mixed-member" electoral system. In the form used in Japan and Russia, in elections to a single house of the legislature each voter cas...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge ; New York
Cambridge University Press
2012
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Why Don't Electoral Rules Have the Same Effects in ALL Countries? In the early 1990s, Japan and Russia each adopted a very similar version of a "mixed-member" electoral system. In the form used in Japan and Russia, in elections to a single house of the legislature each voter cast two ballots: one for a candidate in a single-member district (SMD) and one for a party under proportional representation (PR). In the SMD races, both countries used first-past-the-post (FPTP) rules, meaning that the candidate winning the largest number of votes in the district wins the race, even if tallying under a majority of all the SMD ballots cast. In PR, parties win shares of seats roughly in proportion to their share of the party vote. In both Japan and Russia, the PR systems used closed-list rules, meaning that prior to each election central party leaders put together a rank-ordered list of candidates to determine which individuals would win seats if the party won representation in PR. In PR in both countries, voters were only given the chance to choose a single pre-set party list. Both countries used mixed-member-majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems, meaning that the SMD and PR components of the system were "unlinked" - seats won by parties in one tier (e.g., SMDs) did not affect the number of seats allocated to the party in the other tier (e.g., PR). In short, both Russia and Japan adopted very similar forms of mixed-member electoral systems. In both countries, it was widely expected that the different rules would promote particular outcomes:"-- |
| Beschreibung: | xxiv, 284 p. ill |
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| dewey-full | 324.6 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 324 - The political process |
| dewey-raw | 324.6 |
| dewey-search | 324.6 |
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| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| spelling | Moser, Robert G. 1966- Verfasser aut Electoral systems and political context how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies Robert G. Moser, Ethan Scheiner Cambridge ; New York Cambridge University Press 2012 xxiv, 284 p. ill txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier "Why Don't Electoral Rules Have the Same Effects in ALL Countries? In the early 1990s, Japan and Russia each adopted a very similar version of a "mixed-member" electoral system. In the form used in Japan and Russia, in elections to a single house of the legislature each voter cast two ballots: one for a candidate in a single-member district (SMD) and one for a party under proportional representation (PR). In the SMD races, both countries used first-past-the-post (FPTP) rules, meaning that the candidate winning the largest number of votes in the district wins the race, even if tallying under a majority of all the SMD ballots cast. In PR, parties win shares of seats roughly in proportion to their share of the party vote. In both Japan and Russia, the PR systems used closed-list rules, meaning that prior to each election central party leaders put together a rank-ordered list of candidates to determine which individuals would win seats if the party won representation in PR. In PR in both countries, voters were only given the chance to choose a single pre-set party list. Both countries used mixed-member-majoritarian (MMM) electoral systems, meaning that the SMD and PR components of the system were "unlinked" - seats won by parties in one tier (e.g., SMDs) did not affect the number of seats allocated to the party in the other tier (e.g., PR). In short, both Russia and Japan adopted very similar forms of mixed-member electoral systems. In both countries, it was widely expected that the different rules would promote particular outcomes:"-- Proportional representation Comparative government Vergleichende Regierungslehre (DE-588)4187735-4 gnd rswk-swf Repräsentative Demokratie (DE-588)4049535-8 gnd rswk-swf Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd rswk-swf Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 s Repräsentative Demokratie (DE-588)4049535-8 s Vergleichende Regierungslehre (DE-588)4187735-4 s 1\p DE-604 Scheiner, Ethan 1968- Sonstige oth ProQuest (Firm) Sonstige oth 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Moser, Robert G. 1966- Electoral systems and political context how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies Proportional representation Comparative government Vergleichende Regierungslehre (DE-588)4187735-4 gnd Repräsentative Demokratie (DE-588)4049535-8 gnd Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4187735-4 (DE-588)4049535-8 (DE-588)4139210-3 |
| title | Electoral systems and political context how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies |
| title_auth | Electoral systems and political context how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies |
| title_exact_search | Electoral systems and political context how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies |
| title_full | Electoral systems and political context how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies Robert G. Moser, Ethan Scheiner |
| title_fullStr | Electoral systems and political context how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies Robert G. Moser, Ethan Scheiner |
| title_full_unstemmed | Electoral systems and political context how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies Robert G. Moser, Ethan Scheiner |
| title_short | Electoral systems and political context |
| title_sort | electoral systems and political context how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies |
| title_sub | how the effects of rules vary across new and established democracies |
| topic | Proportional representation Comparative government Vergleichende Regierungslehre (DE-588)4187735-4 gnd Repräsentative Demokratie (DE-588)4049535-8 gnd Wahlsystem (DE-588)4139210-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Proportional representation Comparative government Vergleichende Regierungslehre Repräsentative Demokratie Wahlsystem |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT moserrobertg electoralsystemsandpoliticalcontexthowtheeffectsofrulesvaryacrossnewandestablisheddemocracies AT scheinerethan electoralsystemsandpoliticalcontexthowtheeffectsofrulesvaryacrossnewandestablisheddemocracies AT proquestfirm electoralsystemsandpoliticalcontexthowtheeffectsofrulesvaryacrossnewandestablisheddemocracies |