The phenomenal basis of intentionality:
Some mental states seem to be 'of' or 'about' things or to 'say' something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this work is to explain this phenomenon. Once w...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Electronic eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York, NY
Oxford University Press
2018
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| Series: | Philosophy of mind
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | Some mental states seem to be 'of' or 'about' things or to 'say' something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this work is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles |
| Item Description: | Previously issued in print: 2018 |
| ISBN: | 9780190863838 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001 |
Staff View
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Record in the Search Index
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| author_facet | Mendelovici, Angela A. 1982- |
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| collection | ZDB-28-OSP |
| contents | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-28-OSP)EDZ0001878375 (OCoLC)1051249182 (DE-599)BVBBV045167665 |
| dewey-full | 128.2 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
| dewey-raw | 128.2 |
| dewey-search | 128.2 |
| dewey-sort | 3128.2 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:10:34Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780190863838 |
| language | English |
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| publishDate | 2018 |
| publishDateSearch | 2018 |
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| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Philosophy of mind |
| spelling | Mendelovici, Angela A. 1982- Verfasser aut The phenomenal basis of intentionality Angela Mendelovici New York, NY Oxford University Press 2018 txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Philosophy of mind Previously issued in print: 2018 Includes bibliographical references and index Some mental states seem to be 'of' or 'about' things or to 'say' something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this work is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles Intentionality (Philosophy) Phenomenology Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 gnd rswk-swf Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 gnd rswk-swf Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 s Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 9780190863807 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Mendelovici, Angela A. 1982- The phenomenal basis of intentionality Includes bibliographical references and index Intentionality (Philosophy) Phenomenology Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 gnd Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4027264-3 (DE-588)4045660-2 |
| title | The phenomenal basis of intentionality |
| title_auth | The phenomenal basis of intentionality |
| title_exact_search | The phenomenal basis of intentionality |
| title_full | The phenomenal basis of intentionality Angela Mendelovici |
| title_fullStr | The phenomenal basis of intentionality Angela Mendelovici |
| title_full_unstemmed | The phenomenal basis of intentionality Angela Mendelovici |
| title_short | The phenomenal basis of intentionality |
| title_sort | the phenomenal basis of intentionality |
| topic | Intentionality (Philosophy) Phenomenology Intentionalität (DE-588)4027264-3 gnd Phänomenologie (DE-588)4045660-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Intentionality (Philosophy) Phenomenology Intentionalität Phänomenologie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001 |
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