The phenomenal basis of intentionality:

Some mental states seem to be 'of' or 'about' things or to 'say' something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this work is to explain this phenomenon. Once w...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Mendelovici, Angela A. 1982- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: New York, NY Oxford University Press 2018
Schriftenreihe:Philosophy of mind
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Zusammenfassung:Some mental states seem to be 'of' or 'about' things or to 'say' something. For example, a thought might represent that grass is green, and a visual experience might represent a blue cup. This is intentionality. The aim of this work is to explain this phenomenon. Once we understand intentionality as a phenomenon to be explained, rather than a posit in a theory explaining something else, we can see that there are glaring empirical and in-principle difficulties with currently popular tracking and functional role theories of intentionality, which aim to account for intentionality in terms of tracking relations and functional roles
Beschreibung:Previously issued in print: 2018
ISBN:9780190863838
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780190863807.001.0001

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