Fallibilism: evidence and knowledge
What strength of evidence is required for knowledge? Ordinarily, we often claim to know something on the basis of evidence which doesn't guarantee its truth. For instance, one might claim to know that one sees a crow on the basis of visual experience even though having that experience does not...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2018
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | FUBA1 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | What strength of evidence is required for knowledge? Ordinarily, we often claim to know something on the basis of evidence which doesn't guarantee its truth. For instance, one might claim to know that one sees a crow on the basis of visual experience even though having that experience does not guarantee that there is a crow (it might be a rook, or one might be dreaming). As a result, those wanting to avoid philosophical scepticism have standardly embraced 'fallibilism': one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Despite this, there's been a persistent temptation to endorse 'infallibilism', according to which knowledge requires evidence that guarantees truth. For doesn't it sound contradictory to simultaneously claim to know and admit the possibility of error? |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource |
| ISBN: | 9780191840364 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/oso/9780198801771.001.0001 |
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| 520 | |a What strength of evidence is required for knowledge? Ordinarily, we often claim to know something on the basis of evidence which doesn't guarantee its truth. For instance, one might claim to know that one sees a crow on the basis of visual experience even though having that experience does not guarantee that there is a crow (it might be a rook, or one might be dreaming). As a result, those wanting to avoid philosophical scepticism have standardly embraced 'fallibilism': one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Despite this, there's been a persistent temptation to endorse 'infallibilism', according to which knowledge requires evidence that guarantees truth. For doesn't it sound contradictory to simultaneously claim to know and admit the possibility of error? | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Brown, Jessica |
| author_GND | (DE-588)116049178X |
| author_facet | Brown, Jessica |
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| author_sort | Brown, Jessica |
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| dewey-full | 121.65 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 121 - Epistemology (Theory of knowledge) |
| dewey-raw | 121.65 |
| dewey-search | 121.65 |
| dewey-sort | 3121.65 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/oso/9780198801771.001.0001 |
| edition | First edition |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| isbn | 9780191840364 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Brown, Jessica Verfasser (DE-588)116049178X aut Fallibilism evidence and knowledge Jessica Brown First edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press 2018 1 Online-Ressource txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier What strength of evidence is required for knowledge? Ordinarily, we often claim to know something on the basis of evidence which doesn't guarantee its truth. For instance, one might claim to know that one sees a crow on the basis of visual experience even though having that experience does not guarantee that there is a crow (it might be a rook, or one might be dreaming). As a result, those wanting to avoid philosophical scepticism have standardly embraced 'fallibilism': one can know a proposition on the basis of evidence that supports it even if the evidence doesn't guarantee its truth. Despite this, there's been a persistent temptation to endorse 'infallibilism', according to which knowledge requires evidence that guarantees truth. For doesn't it sound contradictory to simultaneously claim to know and admit the possibility of error? Evidence Knowledge, Theory of Fallibilismus (DE-588)4250187-8 gnd rswk-swf Fallibilismus (DE-588)4250187-8 s DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-0-19-880177-1 (DE-604)BV044933606 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801771.001.0001 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Brown, Jessica Fallibilism evidence and knowledge Evidence Knowledge, Theory of Fallibilismus (DE-588)4250187-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4250187-8 |
| title | Fallibilism evidence and knowledge |
| title_auth | Fallibilism evidence and knowledge |
| title_exact_search | Fallibilism evidence and knowledge |
| title_full | Fallibilism evidence and knowledge Jessica Brown |
| title_fullStr | Fallibilism evidence and knowledge Jessica Brown |
| title_full_unstemmed | Fallibilism evidence and knowledge Jessica Brown |
| title_short | Fallibilism |
| title_sort | fallibilism evidence and knowledge |
| title_sub | evidence and knowledge |
| topic | Evidence Knowledge, Theory of Fallibilismus (DE-588)4250187-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Evidence Knowledge, Theory of Fallibilismus |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801771.001.0001 |
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