The origin of oughtness a case for metaethical conativism
The origin of oughtness: a case for metaethical conativism

How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Fischer, Stefan 1965- (VerfasserIn)
Format: Abschlussarbeit Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Berlin De Gruyter [2018]
Schriftenreihe:Practical philosophy volume 22
Schlagworte:
Normativität
Metaethik
Sollen
Hochschulschrift
Online-Zugang:DE-1046
DE-859
DE-860
DE-188
DE-473
DE-739
DE-1043
DE-858
URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Zusammenfassung:How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory – metaethical conativism – and defend it against some historically influential objections
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (XIII, 284 Seiten)
ISBN:9783110599787
9783110599251
DOI:10.1515/9783110599787

Es ist kein Print-Exemplar vorhanden.

Fernleihe Bestellen Achtung: Nicht im THWS-Bestand! Volltext öffnen

Ähnliche Einträge