Verfügbarkeit: Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms?

Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms?:

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser:	Lörch, Matthias (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Abschlussarbeit Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Hamburg Verlag Dr. Kovač 2018
Schriftenreihe:	Schriftenreihe Finanzmanagement Band 130
Schlagworte:	Liquiditätsreserve Gemeinwirtschaftliches Unternehmen Cash holdings Agency costs Non-financial firms Corporate finance Liquiditätshaltung Agency Kosten Nicht-finanzielle Unternehmen Unternehmensfinanzierung Hochschulschrift
Online-Zugang:	Inhaltsverzeichnis Ausführliche Beschreibung Inhaltsverzeichnis
Beschreibung:	409 Seiten Diagramme
ISBN:	9783339102065

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Datensatz im Suchindex

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adam_text	I. CONTENTS I. CONTENTS.................................................................................................. 5 II. LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................ 11 III. LIST OF TABLES..........................................................................................13 IV. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15 V. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE........................................................................25 A. THEORETICAL APPROACHES EXPLAINING CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CASH HOLDINGS ............................................................................................ 25 1. OVERVIEW.........................................................................................25 2. TRADE-OFF THEORY............................................................................. 29 3. PECKING ORDER THEORY.......................................................................37 A. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND THE BASIC MODEL ............................ 37 B. DISCUSSION OF THE PECKING-ORDER M ODEL ..................................... 42 C. MANAGERIAL IRRATIONALITY.................................................................45 4. AGENCY THEORY.................................................................................47 A. SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT ................................ 47 B. FREE CASH FLOW............................................................................... 49 C. AGENCY COSTS OF DE B T....................................................................51 D. AGENCY COSTS AND CASH HOLDINGS...................................................55 E. AN AGENCY COST MODEL OF CASH HOLDINGS ..................................... 58 5. EVALUATION OF THE THREE MODELS ..................................................... 61 A. VALUE OF CASH HOLDINGS.................................................................61 B. DISTINGUISHING THE THREE MODELS..................................................62 6. FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY ......................................................................... 67 A. FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY M ODELS ......................................................... 67 B. FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY AS WIDER CONCEPT.........................................70 B. PREDICTED EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES....................................................................................... 73 1. PECKING ORDER THEORY ...................................................................... 73 2. AGENCY THEORY..................................................................................79 3. TRADE-OFF.......................................................................................... 83 4. CASH SUBSTITUTES...............................................................................93 5. DETERMINANTS OF THE VALUE OF CASH................................................ 97 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ............................................................... 99 C. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE MODELS AND CASH HOLDINGS........................................................................................... 103 1. OVERVIEW....................................................................................... 103 2. DETERMINANTS OF CASH HOLDINGS....................................................107 A. FIRM INDIVIDUAL FACTORS ............................................................... 107 B. MACROECONOMIC, COUNTRY AND INDUSTRY SPECIFIC FACTORS .......... 127 3. TRADE-OFF VS. PECKING-ORDER: TARGET CASH LEVELS ......................... 133 A. GENERAL EVIDENCE ON TARGET FINANCIAL RATIOS...............................133 B. TESTING THE PECKING-ORDER AGAINST THE TRADE-OFF MODEL ........... 137 C. RELIABILITY OF THE RESULTS .............................................................. 141 D. THE ROLE OF DEBT CAPACITY ........................................................... 145 E. FINANCING DECISIONS..................................................................... 150 F. CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................. 155 4. EVIDENCE ON THE AGENCY THEORY....................................................159 A. LEVEL OF CASH HOLDINGS ............................................................... 159 (1) FIRM-SPECIFIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE .................................... 159 (2) DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES ............................................. 174 B. EXCESS CASH .................. C. VALUE OF CASH HOLDINGS .............................................................. 188 (1) CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSES .......................................................... 188 (2) FIRM CHARACTERISTIC BASED APPROACHES .................................. 194 D. SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE AGENCY MOTIVE........................................................................................200 5. EVIDENCE ON FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY .................................................. 203 6. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS .................................. 207 VI. SAMPLE, VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, AND METHODOLOGY ............................... 211 A. SAMPLE.............................................................................................. 211 B. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS ......................................................................... 219 C. METHODOLOGY....................................................................................229 VII. RESULTS................................................................................................. 237 A. GENERAL EVIDENCE FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF CASH HOLDINGS ............. 237 1. UNIVARIATE TESTS............................................................................. 237 2. DO FIRMS HAVE TARGET CASH LEVELS.................................................243 3. CASH HOLDINGS OF SMES................................................................251 A. BASIC REGRESSIONS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF CASH ........................ 251 B. PANEL DATA ESTIMATIONS ON CASH HOLDINGS ................................. 257 4. CASH HOLDINGS OF LISTED FIRMS....................................................... 267 5. PREDICTION OF CASH HOLDINGS OF PUBLIC FIRMS USING SME ESTIMATION RESULTS.......................................................................... 273 B. AGENCY COSTS AND CASH HOLDINGS .................................................... 277 1. COMPARING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIRM S...........................................277 2. LEGAL FORMS AND CASH HOLDINGS .................................................... 281 3. THE PROPENSITY-SCORE MATCHING APPROACH .................................. 291 4. IMPACT OF CHANGES IN THE LEGAL FORM ........................................... 297 5. FREE-FLOAT ANALYSIS FOR CORPORATIONS............................................ 305 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE FOR AGENCY COSTS................................................................................................313 C. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LOW CASH HOLDINGS OF PRIVATELY HELD FIRMS...........................................................................317 1. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY..............................317 2. RELEVANCE OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF CASH................................................................................................ 321 A. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF CASH................................................................ 321 (1) INTRODUCTION AND THE BASIC MODEL ........................................ 321 (2) OTHER MODELS CONSIDERING FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND CASHFLOW SENSITIVITY................................................................ 325 B. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS ........................................................ 329 C. ESTIMATIONS BASED ON GERMAN SME DATA ................................ 333 (1) MEASURING FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS............................................ 333 (2) THE CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF SM E ........................................ 341 (3) CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY AND LEGAL FORM .................................... 346 3. RELEVANCE OF FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: TARGET LEVELS OF CASH .......... 353 4. RELEVANCE OF FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY.................................................363 5. HEDGING NEEDS * IS CASH NEGATIVE DEBT? ...................................... 367 A. MODEL INTRODUCTION.....................................................................367 B. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HEDGING NEEDS AND CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY...................................................................................... 370 VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.............................................................. 377 IX. LITERATURE.............................................................................................383 X. ANNEX................................................................................................. 399 A. TESTING FOR TARGET CASH LEVELS IN THE PTF SAMPLE..........................399 B. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF CASH REGRESSIONS ..... 401 C. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR CASH HOLDINGS AND LEGAL FORMS ................. 405 D. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS FOR THE CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY OF CASH..............409
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spelling	Lörch, Matthias Verfasser (DE-588)116229289X aut Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms? Matthias Lörch Hamburg Verlag Dr. Kovač 2018 409 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Schriftenreihe Finanzmanagement Band 130 Dissertation Universität Hohenheim 2018 Liquiditätsreserve (DE-588)4167819-9 gnd rswk-swf Gemeinwirtschaftliches Unternehmen (DE-588)4206575-6 gnd rswk-swf Cash holdings Agency costs Non-financial firms Corporate finance Liquiditätshaltung Agency Kosten Nicht-finanzielle Unternehmen Unternehmensfinanzierung (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Gemeinwirtschaftliches Unternehmen (DE-588)4206575-6 s Liquiditätsreserve (DE-588)4167819-9 s DE-604 Verlag Dr. Kovač (DE-588)16100321-7 pbl Schriftenreihe Finanzmanagement Band 130 (DE-604)BV013087358 130 B:DE-101 application/pdf http://d-nb.info/1157025951/04 Inhaltsverzeichnis X:MVB text/html http://www.verlagdrkovac.de/978-3-339-10206-5.htm Ausführliche Beschreibung DNB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030505029&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis
spellingShingle	Lörch, Matthias Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms? Schriftenreihe Finanzmanagement Liquiditätsreserve (DE-588)4167819-9 gnd Gemeinwirtschaftliches Unternehmen (DE-588)4206575-6 gnd
subject_GND	(DE-588)4167819-9 (DE-588)4206575-6 (DE-588)4113937-9
title	Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms?
title_auth	Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms?
title_exact_search	Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms?
title_full	Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms? Matthias Lörch
title_fullStr	Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms? Matthias Lörch
title_full_unstemmed	Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms? Matthias Lörch
title_short	Agency costs and corporate cash holdings - why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms?
title_sort	agency costs and corporate cash holdings why do public firms hold so much more cash than private firms
topic	Liquiditätsreserve (DE-588)4167819-9 gnd Gemeinwirtschaftliches Unternehmen (DE-588)4206575-6 gnd
topic_facet	Liquiditätsreserve Gemeinwirtschaftliches Unternehmen Hochschulschrift
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volume_link	(DE-604)BV013087358
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