Austin's way with skepticism: an essay on philosophical method
In 'Austin's Way with Skepticism', Mark Kaplan argues that J. L Austin's 'ordinary language' approach to epistemological problems has been misread. Contrary to the consensus view, Kaplan presents Austin's methods as both a powerful critique of the project of constr...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
[2018]
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | In 'Austin's Way with Skepticism', Mark Kaplan argues that J. L Austin's 'ordinary language' approach to epistemological problems has been misread. Contrary to the consensus view, Kaplan presents Austin's methods as both a powerful critique of the project of constructive epistemology and an appreciation of how epistemology needs to be done |
| Beschreibung: | xii, 179 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780198824855 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Cover; Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; 1: Austin's Critical Method; I A Skeptical Argument; II Some Remarks about the Pretensions and Workings of the Argument; III Austin's Way with the Argument; IV The Consensus: Austin's Appeal to Ordinary Practice is Misguided; V Austin Misread; VI Austin's Actual Brief; VII The Nature of the Evidence to which Austin Appeals; VIII The "Snag of Divergent Usage"; IX The Problem of Pragmatics; X The Appeal to Philosophical Detachment; XI The Appeal to Intuitions | |
| 505 | 8 | |a XII Two Kinds of Freedom to TheorizeXIII The Work Left to Do; 2: Austin as Theorist; I The Mistake of Thinking of Austin as an Anti-Philosopher; II Austin on the Nature of Knowledge; III If You Know, You Can't Be Wrong; IV The Four Worries about Austin's Account of Knowledge; V Special Reasons; VI The Charge of Over-Intellectualization; VII The Missing "in Virtue" Account; VIII The Argument from Ignorance; 3: Philosophical Detachment Revisited; I Looking for a Route between the Horns; II The Plane-Spotters; III Understanding Human Knowledge in General; IV The Nature of Experience | |
| 505 | 8 | |a V Explaining How It's Possible for You to Know Anything about a SubjectVI The Tug of the Dream Argument; VII Pragmatics Revisited; VIII A More Ecumenical Attempt; IX The Challenge that Remains; 4: How to Do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface; I The Requirement of Deductive Cogency; II The Confidence Threshold Requirement; III Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part I; IV Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part II; V Two Senses of "Believe": The Lottery Paradox Dissolved; VI The Preface: Saying It's All True; VII The Preface: A Matter of Modesty | |
| 505 | 8 | |a VIII The Preface: Saying the ImprobableIX A Worry about Downstream Consequences; X The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part I; XI The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part II; XII Coming to Terms with Our Human Fallibility; 5: How to Do Things with Austin: Gettier's Challenge; I Is it Important to Decide What You Know?; II Knowledge and Evidence; III Justified Belief and Evidence; IV Why Justified Belief Isn't Evidence; V Why Justified True Belief Isn't Evidence; VI The Methodological Import of Gettier's Case | |
| 505 | 8 | |a VII A Case that hasn't the Methodological Import of Gettier'sVIII A Moral about Experimental Epistemology; IX Moral Reinforced: The Pragmatic Encroachment Thesis; 6: Epistemology Austin's Way; Appendix: A Brief Exercise in Product Differentiation; Bibliography; Index | |
| 520 | |a In 'Austin's Way with Skepticism', Mark Kaplan argues that J. L Austin's 'ordinary language' approach to epistemological problems has been misread. Contrary to the consensus view, Kaplan presents Austin's methods as both a powerful critique of the project of constructive epistemology and an appreciation of how epistemology needs to be done | ||
| 600 | 1 | 4 | |a Austin, J. L. / (John Langshaw) / 1911-1960 / Criticism and interpretation |
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| 650 | 4 | |a Knowledge, Theory of | |
| 650 | 7 | |a PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern |2 bisacsh | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Skeptizismus |0 (DE-588)4055225-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Erkenntnistheorie |0 (DE-588)4070914-0 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804178739719831552 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Kaplan, Mark 1951- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)172990246 |
| author_facet | Kaplan, Mark 1951- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Kaplan, Mark 1951- |
| author_variant | m k mk |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV045104271 |
| classification_rvk | CI 6377 |
| contents | Cover; Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; 1: Austin's Critical Method; I A Skeptical Argument; II Some Remarks about the Pretensions and Workings of the Argument; III Austin's Way with the Argument; IV The Consensus: Austin's Appeal to Ordinary Practice is Misguided; V Austin Misread; VI Austin's Actual Brief; VII The Nature of the Evidence to which Austin Appeals; VIII The "Snag of Divergent Usage"; IX The Problem of Pragmatics; X The Appeal to Philosophical Detachment; XI The Appeal to Intuitions XII Two Kinds of Freedom to TheorizeXIII The Work Left to Do; 2: Austin as Theorist; I The Mistake of Thinking of Austin as an Anti-Philosopher; II Austin on the Nature of Knowledge; III If You Know, You Can't Be Wrong; IV The Four Worries about Austin's Account of Knowledge; V Special Reasons; VI The Charge of Over-Intellectualization; VII The Missing "in Virtue" Account; VIII The Argument from Ignorance; 3: Philosophical Detachment Revisited; I Looking for a Route between the Horns; II The Plane-Spotters; III Understanding Human Knowledge in General; IV The Nature of Experience V Explaining How It's Possible for You to Know Anything about a SubjectVI The Tug of the Dream Argument; VII Pragmatics Revisited; VIII A More Ecumenical Attempt; IX The Challenge that Remains; 4: How to Do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface; I The Requirement of Deductive Cogency; II The Confidence Threshold Requirement; III Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part I; IV Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part II; V Two Senses of "Believe": The Lottery Paradox Dissolved; VI The Preface: Saying It's All True; VII The Preface: A Matter of Modesty VIII The Preface: Saying the ImprobableIX A Worry about Downstream Consequences; X The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part I; XI The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part II; XII Coming to Terms with Our Human Fallibility; 5: How to Do Things with Austin: Gettier's Challenge; I Is it Important to Decide What You Know?; II Knowledge and Evidence; III Justified Belief and Evidence; IV Why Justified Belief Isn't Evidence; V Why Justified True Belief Isn't Evidence; VI The Methodological Import of Gettier's Case VII A Case that hasn't the Methodological Import of Gettier'sVIII A Moral about Experimental Epistemology; IX Moral Reinforced: The Pragmatic Encroachment Thesis; 6: Epistemology Austin's Way; Appendix: A Brief Exercise in Product Differentiation; Bibliography; Index |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1048582610 (DE-599)BVBBV045104271 |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| edition | First edition |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV045104271 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:08:46Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780198824855 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-030494774 |
| oclc_num | 1048582610 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-20 DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-20 DE-12 |
| physical | xii, 179 Seiten |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publishDateSearch | 2018 |
| publishDateSort | 2018 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Kaplan, Mark 1951- Verfasser (DE-588)172990246 aut Austin's way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method Mark Kaplan First edition Oxford, United Kingdom Oxford University Press [2018] © 2018 xii, 179 Seiten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Cover; Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; 1: Austin's Critical Method; I A Skeptical Argument; II Some Remarks about the Pretensions and Workings of the Argument; III Austin's Way with the Argument; IV The Consensus: Austin's Appeal to Ordinary Practice is Misguided; V Austin Misread; VI Austin's Actual Brief; VII The Nature of the Evidence to which Austin Appeals; VIII The "Snag of Divergent Usage"; IX The Problem of Pragmatics; X The Appeal to Philosophical Detachment; XI The Appeal to Intuitions XII Two Kinds of Freedom to TheorizeXIII The Work Left to Do; 2: Austin as Theorist; I The Mistake of Thinking of Austin as an Anti-Philosopher; II Austin on the Nature of Knowledge; III If You Know, You Can't Be Wrong; IV The Four Worries about Austin's Account of Knowledge; V Special Reasons; VI The Charge of Over-Intellectualization; VII The Missing "in Virtue" Account; VIII The Argument from Ignorance; 3: Philosophical Detachment Revisited; I Looking for a Route between the Horns; II The Plane-Spotters; III Understanding Human Knowledge in General; IV The Nature of Experience V Explaining How It's Possible for You to Know Anything about a SubjectVI The Tug of the Dream Argument; VII Pragmatics Revisited; VIII A More Ecumenical Attempt; IX The Challenge that Remains; 4: How to Do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface; I The Requirement of Deductive Cogency; II The Confidence Threshold Requirement; III Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part I; IV Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part II; V Two Senses of "Believe": The Lottery Paradox Dissolved; VI The Preface: Saying It's All True; VII The Preface: A Matter of Modesty VIII The Preface: Saying the ImprobableIX A Worry about Downstream Consequences; X The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part I; XI The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part II; XII Coming to Terms with Our Human Fallibility; 5: How to Do Things with Austin: Gettier's Challenge; I Is it Important to Decide What You Know?; II Knowledge and Evidence; III Justified Belief and Evidence; IV Why Justified Belief Isn't Evidence; V Why Justified True Belief Isn't Evidence; VI The Methodological Import of Gettier's Case VII A Case that hasn't the Methodological Import of Gettier'sVIII A Moral about Experimental Epistemology; IX Moral Reinforced: The Pragmatic Encroachment Thesis; 6: Epistemology Austin's Way; Appendix: A Brief Exercise in Product Differentiation; Bibliography; Index In 'Austin's Way with Skepticism', Mark Kaplan argues that J. L Austin's 'ordinary language' approach to epistemological problems has been misread. Contrary to the consensus view, Kaplan presents Austin's methods as both a powerful critique of the project of constructive epistemology and an appreciation of how epistemology needs to be done Austin, J. L. / (John Langshaw) / 1911-1960 / Criticism and interpretation Austin, J. L. 1911-1960 (DE-588)11850519X gnd rswk-swf Knowledge, Theory of PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern bisacsh Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd rswk-swf Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd rswk-swf Austin, J. L. 1911-1960 (DE-588)11850519X p Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 s Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 s DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Kaplan, Mark 1951- Austin's way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method Cover; Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; 1: Austin's Critical Method; I A Skeptical Argument; II Some Remarks about the Pretensions and Workings of the Argument; III Austin's Way with the Argument; IV The Consensus: Austin's Appeal to Ordinary Practice is Misguided; V Austin Misread; VI Austin's Actual Brief; VII The Nature of the Evidence to which Austin Appeals; VIII The "Snag of Divergent Usage"; IX The Problem of Pragmatics; X The Appeal to Philosophical Detachment; XI The Appeal to Intuitions XII Two Kinds of Freedom to TheorizeXIII The Work Left to Do; 2: Austin as Theorist; I The Mistake of Thinking of Austin as an Anti-Philosopher; II Austin on the Nature of Knowledge; III If You Know, You Can't Be Wrong; IV The Four Worries about Austin's Account of Knowledge; V Special Reasons; VI The Charge of Over-Intellectualization; VII The Missing "in Virtue" Account; VIII The Argument from Ignorance; 3: Philosophical Detachment Revisited; I Looking for a Route between the Horns; II The Plane-Spotters; III Understanding Human Knowledge in General; IV The Nature of Experience V Explaining How It's Possible for You to Know Anything about a SubjectVI The Tug of the Dream Argument; VII Pragmatics Revisited; VIII A More Ecumenical Attempt; IX The Challenge that Remains; 4: How to Do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface; I The Requirement of Deductive Cogency; II The Confidence Threshold Requirement; III Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part I; IV Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part II; V Two Senses of "Believe": The Lottery Paradox Dissolved; VI The Preface: Saying It's All True; VII The Preface: A Matter of Modesty VIII The Preface: Saying the ImprobableIX A Worry about Downstream Consequences; X The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part I; XI The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part II; XII Coming to Terms with Our Human Fallibility; 5: How to Do Things with Austin: Gettier's Challenge; I Is it Important to Decide What You Know?; II Knowledge and Evidence; III Justified Belief and Evidence; IV Why Justified Belief Isn't Evidence; V Why Justified True Belief Isn't Evidence; VI The Methodological Import of Gettier's Case VII A Case that hasn't the Methodological Import of Gettier'sVIII A Moral about Experimental Epistemology; IX Moral Reinforced: The Pragmatic Encroachment Thesis; 6: Epistemology Austin's Way; Appendix: A Brief Exercise in Product Differentiation; Bibliography; Index Austin, J. L. / (John Langshaw) / 1911-1960 / Criticism and interpretation Austin, J. L. 1911-1960 (DE-588)11850519X gnd Knowledge, Theory of PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern bisacsh Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)11850519X (DE-588)4055225-1 (DE-588)4070914-0 |
| title | Austin's way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method |
| title_auth | Austin's way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method |
| title_exact_search | Austin's way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method |
| title_full | Austin's way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method Mark Kaplan |
| title_fullStr | Austin's way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method Mark Kaplan |
| title_full_unstemmed | Austin's way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method Mark Kaplan |
| title_short | Austin's way with skepticism |
| title_sort | austin s way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method |
| title_sub | an essay on philosophical method |
| topic | Austin, J. L. / (John Langshaw) / 1911-1960 / Criticism and interpretation Austin, J. L. 1911-1960 (DE-588)11850519X gnd Knowledge, Theory of PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern bisacsh Skeptizismus (DE-588)4055225-1 gnd Erkenntnistheorie (DE-588)4070914-0 gnd |
| topic_facet | Austin, J. L. / (John Langshaw) / 1911-1960 / Criticism and interpretation Austin, J. L. 1911-1960 Knowledge, Theory of PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern Skeptizismus Erkenntnistheorie |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kaplanmark austinswaywithskepticismanessayonphilosophicalmethod |