What it is like to perceive: direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York
Oxford University Press
[2018]
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | xxiv, 360 Seiten Illustrationen |
| ISBN: | 9780190854751 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Maloney, J. Christopher |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a What it is like to perceive |b direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception |c J. Christopher Maloney (Professor of Philosophy and Member of Cognitive Science Program, University of Arizona) |
| 264 | 1 | |a New York |b Oxford University Press |c [2018] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c © 2018 | |
| 300 | |a xxiv, 360 Seiten |b Illustrationen | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Perception (Philosophy) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Mental representation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Intentionalism | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Realism | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |z 9780190854775 |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030475597&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804178702936834048 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | CONTENTS
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction xiii
1 What Is What It Is Like? xiii
2 Initial Assumptions xv
3 Intentionalism and Higher Order Theory xvi
4 Advertisement of Direct Realism xviii
5 The Hypothesis of the Extended Mind xxi
6 Disjunctivism Denied xxii
1. Intentionalism and Recurrent Cognitive Content 1
1 What Is What It Is Like? 1
2 Qualitative versus Subjective Character 4
3 The Forks of Intentionalism: Reductive and Not 6
4 Intentionalism’s Doctrine of Nonrecurrent Perceptual
Content 9
4.1 Tense and the Doctrine of Nonrecurrent Perceptual
Content 10
4.2 The Rich Content Thesis and the Doctrine of Nonrecurrent
Perceptual Content 14
4.3 The Master Argument Bedeviling Intentionalism 15
2. Intentionalism, Cognition, and Representation 19
1 The Cognitive Face of Experience 19
2 Representations and Propositions 22
3 Minimal and Maximal Intentionalism 26
4 Intentionalism and Perceptual Attitudes 28
5 Getting the Given from the Gotten 30
5.1 The Supervenience of Character on Content 34
5.2 The Identification of Phenomenal Character with
Perceptual Content 37
(vi) Contents
3. Intentionalism’s Troubles Begin 40
1 Intentionalism’s Puzzling Exportation of Phenomenal
Character 40
2 Two Questions for Intentionalism 42
2.1 Coincident Perceptual Content but Divergent Phenomenal
Character 44
2.2 Perceptual Content 45
3 Byrnes Argument for Minimal Intentionalism 49
4 Objections to Byrne s Argument 51
4.1 Recurrent Content and Attitude Proliferation 53
4.2 Reasoning within Experience 55
4. Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content 58
1 Intentionalism and Troubling Peculiar Perceptual Content 58
2 Plenitudinous versus Parsimonious Perceptual Content 60
2.1 Attention and Smudge 61
2.2 Mnemonic Amplification 66
2.3 Memory Systems 67
2.4 Idle Mnemonic Residue 69
3 Fine-Grained Content 71
3.1 Concepts as Constituents of Mental Representations 73
3.2 Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content 75
3.3 Nonconceptual Content as Immature Conceptual
Content 76
3.4 Poised Perceptual Content 86
4 Fineness of Grain Reconsidered 90
4.1 Cognitively Penetrable Perception 90
4.2 Cognitive Penetration and Cognitive Rehearsal 94
5 Sperling on Perception and Memory 95
5.1 Sperling’s Hypothesis and Intentionalism 101
5.2 Sperling’s Hypothesis Rejected 103
5.3 Mnemonic Preservation 106
5.4 Phillips on Postdiction 107
5.5 Reply to Phillips 109
5. Higher Order Theory 111
1 Representations Represented 111
1.1 Is Phenomenal Character Relational? 112
1.2 Thinking about Perceiving 116
2 Transparency and Higher Order Theory (HOT) 117
3 Unconscious Perception 119
3.1 Unconscious or Forgotten Experience? 120
3.2 Unsuffered Phenomenal Character 121
3.3 On Behalf of Mnemonic Lapse 126
Contents (viz)
4 Unconscious Phenomenal Character 127
5 Rosenthal’s Rendition of Higher Order Theory 132
5.1 First Order versus Higher Order Mental
Representations 133
5.2 Overt versus Covert HOT Production 137
5.3 The Attractions of Rosenthals Higher Order Theory
6 Objections to Higher Order Theory 144
6.1 Goldman against Relationally Determined Phenomenal
Character 144
6.2 Impossible Phenomenal Character 146
6.3 Bogus Phenomenal Character 149
6.4 Recurrent HOTs without Recurrent Phenomenal
Character 150
6. Dual Aspect Theory 152
1 Carruthers on Consciousness 152
1.1 The Dual Functions of Perception 154
1.2 Dual Representation 156
1.3 Unconscious Perception and the Unemployed Attitude
Manager 158
1.4 A Brief Interlude on Narrow-Content 159
1.5 Narrow Dual Content of the Attitude Manager’s
Representations 166
1.5.1 The Narrow-Content of HOT-RED 168
1.5.2 The Narrow-Content of RED 168
1.5.3 Sufferance of Phenomenal Character According to
Dual-Content Theory 169
2 Objections to Dual-Content Theory 172
2.1 Cognitive Ambiguity 172
2.2 Dual Narrow-Content for the Movement
Manager 176
2.3 Logical Structure and Phenomenal Character 180
2.4 Disjunctive First Order Content 181
2.5 Dissolved Dispositions and Persistent Phenomenal
Character 183
2.6 Actors in Representational Roles 185
7. Direct Realism and the Extended Mind 188
1 A Fresh Representationalist Theory of Phenomenal
Character 188
2 The Representational Theory of Mind Revisited
and Revised 192
3 Demonstrative Reference and the Hypothesis of the
Extended Mind 195
141
( viii ) Contents
3.1 Demonstrative Reference in Perception 196
3.2 Perceptual Demonstratives 203
3.3 The Hypothesis of the Extended Mind 205
4 The Phenomenal Character of Perceptual Experience According to
Direct Realism 212
5 Self-Representation 217
6 Direct Realism Depicted 219
7 Some Reasons Favorable to Direct Realism 223
7.1 The Best Explanation of Phenomenal Character 224
7.2 Phenomenal Character, Transparency, and Direct
Realism 226
8 Acquaintance and the Objective Character of Perception 228
9 Phenomenal Similarity, Change Blindness, and Direct
Realism 233
10 Objections to Direct Realism 238
8. Direct Realism and Illusion 240
1 Illusion 240
1.1 Conditions of Observation 241
1.2 The Conjecture of Relative Property Identity 247
1.3 Demonstrative Predication in Perception 249
1.4 Inference, Conceptualization, and Recognition 253
1.4.1 Rudimentary and Sophisticated Perceptual
Conceptualization 253
1.4.2 Inference and Perceptual Conceptualization 255
2 Neo-Whorfian Perceptual Conceptualization 260
2.1 Neo-Whorfian Conceptual Ascension 266
2.2 Mitigating Perceptual Conceptualization 270
2.3 How Conditions of Observation Mitigate Perceptual
Conceptualization 273
2.4 Logically Sophisticated Perceptual Conceptualization 277
3 Aspect Alteration 281
9. Direct Realism and Hallucination 287
1 Hallucination and Thoughts about Nonexistents 287
1.1 Fictivism 288
1.2 Disjunctivism 292
2 Problems for Fictivism and Disjunctivism 295
2.1 Fictivism s Problems 295
2.2 Disjunctivism s Problems 297
3 Selective Eliminativism on Behalf of Direct Acquaintance 303
3.1 Selective Eliminativism Advertised 305
3.2 Selective Eliminativism and the Proper Conception of
Hallucination 309
Contents (ix)
4 Hallucination Properly Conceived 311
4.1 Hallucination and a Scenes Census 311
4.2 Macbeth s Dagger 315
4.3 Veridical Hallucination 318
4.4 E Pluribus Unum 320
4.5 Perception and the Past 324
5 Inverted and Absent Phenomenal Character 327
6 Blindsight 330
6.1 Blindsight and Internal Perceptual Representation
6.2 Blindsight and Unacknowledged Awareness 334
7 Subliminal Priming and Unconscious Perception 335
Works Cited 337
Index 355
330
|
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| spelling | Maloney, J. Christopher Verfasser aut What it is like to perceive direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception J. Christopher Maloney (Professor of Philosophy and Member of Cognitive Science Program, University of Arizona) New York Oxford University Press [2018] © 2018 xxiv, 360 Seiten Illustrationen txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Perception (Philosophy) Mental representation Intentionalism Realism Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 9780190854775 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030475597&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Maloney, J. Christopher What it is like to perceive direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception Perception (Philosophy) Mental representation Intentionalism Realism |
| title | What it is like to perceive direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception |
| title_auth | What it is like to perceive direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception |
| title_exact_search | What it is like to perceive direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception |
| title_full | What it is like to perceive direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception J. Christopher Maloney (Professor of Philosophy and Member of Cognitive Science Program, University of Arizona) |
| title_fullStr | What it is like to perceive direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception J. Christopher Maloney (Professor of Philosophy and Member of Cognitive Science Program, University of Arizona) |
| title_full_unstemmed | What it is like to perceive direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception J. Christopher Maloney (Professor of Philosophy and Member of Cognitive Science Program, University of Arizona) |
| title_short | What it is like to perceive |
| title_sort | what it is like to perceive direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception |
| title_sub | direct realism and the phenomenal character of perception |
| topic | Perception (Philosophy) Mental representation Intentionalism Realism |
| topic_facet | Perception (Philosophy) Mental representation Intentionalism Realism |
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