Transparency and self-knowledge:
You know what someone else is thinking and feeling by observing them. But how do you know what you are thinking and feeling? This is the problem of self-knowledge: Alex Byrne tries to solve it. The idea is that you know this not by taking a special kind of look at your own mind, but by an inference...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2018
|
| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | You know what someone else is thinking and feeling by observing them. But how do you know what you are thinking and feeling? This is the problem of self-knowledge: Alex Byrne tries to solve it. The idea is that you know this not by taking a special kind of look at your own mind, but by an inference from a premise about your environment |
| Beschreibung: | xi, 227 Seiten 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 0198821611 9780198821618 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
L Problems of Self-Knowledge 1
1.1 Self-knowledge 1
1.2 Transparency 2
1.3 Privileged and peculiar access 4
1.3.1 McKinsey and Ryle 4
1.3.2 Privileged access 5
1.3.3 Peculiar access 8
1.3.4 The independence of privileged and peculiar access 9
1.3.5 Peculiar access and McKinsey’s puzzle 10
1.3.6 Empirical work 11
1.4 Economy, inference, detection, unification 14
1.5 Self-knowledge as a philosophical problem 16
1.6 Preview 22
2. Inner Sense 24
2.1 Introduction 24
2.2 Against inner sense 26
2.2.1 The object perception model and the broad perceptual model 26
2.2.2 Objection 1: inner sense can’t detect extrinsic properties
(Boghossian) 29
2.2.3 Objection 2: inner sense is like clairvoyance (Cassam) 31
2.2.4 Objection 3: inner sense is incompatible with infallibility 33
2.2.5 Objection 4: inner sense is incompatible with self-intimation 37
2.2.6 Objection 5: inner sense leads to alienated self-knowledge (Moran) 38
2.2.7 Objection 6: inner sense cannot explain first-person authority
(Finkelstein) 40
2.2.8 Objection 7: the deliverances of inner sense are not baseless
(McDowell) 42
2.2.9 Objection 8: inner sense implies possibility of self-blindness
(Shoemaker) 43
2.3 Residual puzzles for inner sense 48
3. Some Recent Approaches 50
3.1 Introduction 50
3.2 Davidson on first-person authority 50
3.3 Moran on self-constitution and rational agency 57
3.4 Bar-On’s neo-expressivism 62
3.4.1 Simple expressivism 63
3.4.2 Two questions, one answer 64
3.4.3 Immunity to error through misidentification and misascription 66
3.4.4 Neo-expressivism and the asymmetric presumption of truth 70
X
CONTENTS
4. The Puzzle of Transparency 74
4.1 Introduction 74
4.2 Gallois on the puzzle 77
4.3 Moran on the puzzle 79
4.4 Dretske on the puzzle 83
4.5 The puzzle of transparency for sensations 87
4.6 Kripke’s Wittgenstein on other minds 93
4.7 Hume on the self 94
4.8 Introspective psychology 96
5. Belief 99
5.1 In troduction 99
5.2 The puzzle of transparency revisited 99
5.2.1 Epistemic rules and Bel 100
5.2.2 Evans 103
5.2.3 First variant: reliability 103
5.2.4 Second variant: inadequate evidence 105
5.2.5 Third variant: reasoning through a false step 106
5.3 Peculiar and privileged access explained 108
5.3.1 Peculiar access 108
5.3.2 Privileged access 109
5.4 Economy and detection 112
5.5 Extensions 116
5.5.1 Knowing that one knows 116
5.5.2 Knowing that one does not believe 117
5.5.3 Knowing that one confidently believes 119
5.6 Objections 121
5.6.1 The inference is mad (Boyle) 122
5.6.2 There is no inference (Bar-On) 124
5.6.3 The account conflates do believe and should believe (Bar-On) 125
5.6.4 The account fails when one lacks a belief (Gertler) 126 6
6. Perception and Sensation 128
6.1 Introduction 128
6.2 Perception 129
6.2.1 The amodal problem 130
6.2.2 Alternatives to transparency 131
6.2.3 Option 1: non-observational knowledge 132
6.2.4 Option 2, first pass: visual sensations 134
6.2.5 Option 2» second pass: visual experiences of an F 135
6.2.6 Back to transparency: See 138
6.2.7 The memory objection 140
6.2.8 Evans again, and the known-illusion problem 142
6.2.9 Evans’ proposal 142
6.2.10 Belief-independence 143
CONTENTS XI
6.3 Sensation 147
6.3.1 Pain perception 147
6.3.2 Pain and the world of pain 149
6.3.3 Perceptual theorists on the objects of pain perception 151
6.3.4 Back to naivete 153
7. Desire, Intention, and Emotion 156
7.1 Introduction 156
7.2 The case for uniformity 157
7.3 Desire and Des 158
7.3.1 Circularity 162
7.3.2 Defeasibility 164
7.3.3 Connections 167
7.4 Intention and Int 167
7.4.1 Overgeneration problems 170
7.5 Emotion 172
7.5.1 Disgust and the disgusting 173
7.5.2 Dis and transparency 176
7.5.3 Circularity 178
7.6 Summary: privileged and peculiar access, economy and detectivism 181
8. Memory, Imagination, and Thought 183
8.1 Introduction 183
8.2 Memory 184
8.2.1 The visual world and the visualized world 185
8.2.2 Episodic recollection and transparency 189
8.2.3 Knowing that I am recollecting, first pass 189
8.2.4 First problem: putting the past into the antecedent 191
8.2.5 Second and third problems: belief in images, but not ducks 193
8.2.6 Second pass: Mem-Duck 194
8.3 Imagination and Imag-Duck 195
8.4 Thought 198
8.4.1 Outer and inner speech, and Think 199
8.4.2 Privileged and peculiar access 202
8.4.3 Extensions: pictorial and propositional thinking 204
8.4.4 Inner speech and imagined speech 205
8.4.5 Unsymbolized thinking and imageless thought 207
8.5 Finis 208
Bibliography 209
Index 223
|
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T08:07:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 0198821611 9780198821618 |
| language | English |
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| physical | xi, 227 Seiten 24 cm |
| publishDate | 2018 |
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| publisher | Oxford University Press |
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| spelling | Byrne, Alex 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)105640647X aut Transparency and self-knowledge Alex Byrne First edition Oxford Oxford University Press 2018 xi, 227 Seiten 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier You know what someone else is thinking and feeling by observing them. But how do you know what you are thinking and feeling? This is the problem of self-knowledge: Alex Byrne tries to solve it. The idea is that you know this not by taking a special kind of look at your own mind, but by an inference from a premise about your environment Selbsterkenntnis (DE-588)4054404-7 gnd rswk-swf Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd rswk-swf Self-knowledge, Theory of Philosophy of mind Selbsterkenntnis (DE-588)4054404-7 s Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 s DE-604 Electronic version Byrne, Alex, 1960- Transparency and self-knowledge First edition Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018 9780192554734 Digitalisierung BSB München - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=030451209&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Byrne, Alex 1960- Transparency and self-knowledge Selbsterkenntnis (DE-588)4054404-7 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4054404-7 (DE-588)4248301-3 |
| title | Transparency and self-knowledge |
| title_auth | Transparency and self-knowledge |
| title_exact_search | Transparency and self-knowledge |
| title_full | Transparency and self-knowledge Alex Byrne |
| title_fullStr | Transparency and self-knowledge Alex Byrne |
| title_full_unstemmed | Transparency and self-knowledge Alex Byrne |
| title_short | Transparency and self-knowledge |
| title_sort | transparency and self knowledge |
| topic | Selbsterkenntnis (DE-588)4054404-7 gnd Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Selbsterkenntnis Philosophy of Mind |
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