Believing Against the Evidence: Agency and the Ethics of Belief
The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormic...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Florence
Taylor and Francis
2014
|
Schriftenreihe: | Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy
63 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | UER01 |
Zusammenfassung: | The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief |
Beschreibung: | Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (159 pages) |
ISBN: | 9781136682681 |
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author | McCormick, Miriam Schleifer |
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discipline | Geschichte Philosophie |
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spelling | McCormick, Miriam Schleifer Verfasser (DE-588)1071879596 aut Believing Against the Evidence Agency and the Ethics of Belief Florence Taylor and Francis 2014 © 2015 1 online resource (159 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy 63 Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief Belief and doubt Ethics Evidence Logik (DE-588)4036202-4 gnd rswk-swf Voluntarismus (DE-588)4188613-6 gnd rswk-swf Evidenz (DE-588)4129356-3 gnd rswk-swf Voluntarismus (DE-588)4188613-6 s Evidenz (DE-588)4129356-3 s 1\p DE-604 Logik (DE-588)4036202-4 s 2\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe McCormick, Miriam Schleifer Believing Against the Evidence : Agency and the Ethics of Belief Florence : Taylor and Francis,c2014 9780415818841 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | McCormick, Miriam Schleifer Believing Against the Evidence Agency and the Ethics of Belief Belief and doubt Ethics Evidence Logik (DE-588)4036202-4 gnd Voluntarismus (DE-588)4188613-6 gnd Evidenz (DE-588)4129356-3 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4036202-4 (DE-588)4188613-6 (DE-588)4129356-3 |
title | Believing Against the Evidence Agency and the Ethics of Belief |
title_auth | Believing Against the Evidence Agency and the Ethics of Belief |
title_exact_search | Believing Against the Evidence Agency and the Ethics of Belief |
title_full | Believing Against the Evidence Agency and the Ethics of Belief |
title_fullStr | Believing Against the Evidence Agency and the Ethics of Belief |
title_full_unstemmed | Believing Against the Evidence Agency and the Ethics of Belief |
title_short | Believing Against the Evidence |
title_sort | believing against the evidence agency and the ethics of belief |
title_sub | Agency and the Ethics of Belief |
topic | Belief and doubt Ethics Evidence Logik (DE-588)4036202-4 gnd Voluntarismus (DE-588)4188613-6 gnd Evidenz (DE-588)4129356-3 gnd |
topic_facet | Belief and doubt Ethics Evidence Logik Voluntarismus Evidenz |
work_keys_str_mv | AT mccormickmiriamschleifer believingagainsttheevidenceagencyandtheethicsofbelief |