Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia: violence, corruption, and the demand for law
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, United Kingdom
Cambridge University Press
2017
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| Ausgabe: | first published |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis Register // Gemischte Register |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 275-292) and index |
| Beschreibung: | xii, 298 Seiten Diagramme |
| ISBN: | 9781107153967 1107153964 |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS / INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
VIOLENCE, CORRUPTION, AND DEMAND FOR LAW
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
THE EVOLUTION OF FIRM STRATEGIES
THE ROLE OF STATE LEGAL CAPACITY
DEMAND-SIDE BARRIERS TO THE USE OF LEGAL STRATEGIES
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ILLEGAL STRATEGIES
VARIATION IN STRATEGIES ACROSS FIRMS
FIRMS, STATES, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
DIESES SCHRIFTSTUECK WURDE MASCHINELL ERZEUGT.
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the past]. Biznes.
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INDEX
Note: “fig” after a locator refers to a figure, while tables are indicated by “t” after the locator.
Abramovich, Roman, 86
All-Russian Congress of Private Arbitration
Courts, 63
allocation versus enforcement, 18
American Chamber of Commerce in Russia,
147
anti-corruption initiatives, 192, 200
arbitration and mediation, 59,63,64t, 119,185
arbitrazh courts see commercial (arbitrazh)
courts
Arbitrazh Procedural Code, 74, 80
arrest, as corrupt coercion, 3, 9,193, see also
Khodorkovsky, Mikhail (Yukos)
Bailiffs Service, 75, 80
bandity (Russian criminals), 46,47, 51, 53, 93,
198
bankruptcy
forced, 9, 39, 66,68
legislation, 66, 74, 79, 80
banks and banking system
corrupt coercion, 39,47,127
development in, 127, 142,182, 195
Bashneft (Russian oil company), 192
BEEPS (World Bank-EBRD) Surveys, 13, 35,
36,91, 103
Biznes Solidarnost (association supporting
entrepreneurs), 88
black cash”, 98
bribery
factors influencing, 117,123,127,139,143,
147
legislation, 146,170
and the predatory state, 87,88
Browder, William, 3
Bureau for the Oversight of Entrepreneurs’
Rights, 118
bureaucrats, and corrupt coercion
incidence, 2, 22,43, 198,201
in predatory states, 85, 88, 181,191,192
services provided, 19fig, 20, 39,58
threat posed by, 25, 93, 186
business associations
role/activities, 6,52,99,111, 119,124,181
in transition economies, 199,201
see also American Chamber of Commerce in
Russia; Biznes Solidarnost; OPORA;
RSPP; TPP
capability (operational), of legal institutions,
72, 75, 80,81
cash economy, and illegal strategies, 127,135,
136, 138, 142, 146, 182, 196
cash register machines, legislation, 70
Center for Economic and Financial Research,
Moscow (CEFIR), 87
Center for International Private Enterprises
(CIPE), 118
Chamber of Trade and Industry (TPP), 119
China, People’s Republic of, state legal
capacity, 2, 27, 29,194, 205
ChOPs (Russian private protection
enterprises), 48, 52, 53, 55
CIPE (Center for International Private
Enterprises), 118
client/supplier base, and firms’ property
security strategies, 147, 166
collective action, as demand-side barrier, 23/ig,
28, 33, 124, 204
commercial (arbitrazh) courts, 59,60fig, 74,
82, 84, 94, 192
Procedural Code, 74, 80
in Ukraine, 199
competence, of legal personnel, 76,82
293
294
INDEX
consolidating ownership, of firms, 127, 135
Constitutional Court of the Russian
Federation, 70, 74
consumer electronics sector, 113,123,132,171
contract investigations, 54, 56, 114, 132
contract killings, 9, 43,49
Convention on Combating Bribery of Public
Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD), 146
corporate raiding, illegal {reiderstvo), 9, 39,54,
66, 68, 87
corrupt coercion
definition and use, 11, 19fig, 20, 58,180
impact on formal legal institutions, 3,16,
21,183,186,206
in post-Soviet Russia, 22, 39,43,69, 79,83
in transition countries, 2, 198,201, see also
predatory state
courts, of general jurisdiction, 59, 74,81,82,
84,192
cultural norms, and property security
strategies, 23fig, 29, 37, 66, 97
customs barriers, 113,152,172, see also
regulations, burden posed by
demand-side barriers, to using formal legal
institutions
customs barriers, 152,172
defined, 5,181
as explanatory factor, 17,23,29, 33,182,196
firm size, 152, 177
firms’ expectations and collective action, 28,
32,110,204
in transition countries, 198, 200, 205
normative transformations, 23/ig, 29, 37,66,
97
regulatory burdens, 88, 152,172, 182
tax compliance and informal economy
involvement, 28, 32, 110,151,181
Deripaska, Oleg, 86
dualism, legal, 194
e-govemment, 81,192
economic complexity, need for formal legal
institutions, 6, 30, 38
economic crimes, 89,90
economic security, 11,45, 52
energy/oil sector, 40, 45, 86, 145,193
“enforcement partnerships”, 10
enforcement versus allocation, 18
European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD-BEEPS Surveys),
13, 35,36,91, 103
expectations, of firms see perceptions, firms’,
and property securitys trategies
extortion, 9, 11,46,49, 51
FDI (foreign direct investment), 127, 149,161,
175, 182, 194
Federal Anti-Monopoly Service (FAS), 84
Federal Court of Private Arbitration, 63
Federal Financial Monitoring Service
{Rosfinmonitoring), 83
Federal Narcotics Control Service (FSKN), 90
Federal Security Service (FSB, KGB successor),
10, 54, 56,81,82
Federal Service for Financial Markets (was
Federal Securities Commission), 74, 76
Federal Tax Police, 90
financial sector, development, 72, 126,127,
142, 182,195
financing, of legal institutions, 55, 76,81
firm size, and property security strategies, 152,
177
access to financing, 137-139
informal networks, 28, 112,152, 164,173
protection rackets, 22,47, 51, 55
regulatory / tax burdens, 87, 102,200
use of courts, 44, 59
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (USA), 146
foreign direct investment (FDI), 127, 149,161,
175,182, 194
formal legal institutions, see legal institutions,
formal
FSB (Federal Security Service, KGB successor),
10, 54, 55,81,82
FSKN (Federal Narcotics Control Service), 90
FTAF (International Financial Action Task
Force), 83
Gazprom (oil/natural gas company), 48,86
Ghana, supply-side barriers, 26
goods or services, see output (of firm), and
property security strategies
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 45,46
Gospian (Soviety state planning agency), 45
GUBOP (State Directorate for the Struggle
with Organized Crime), 55
Gutseriev, Mikhail, 86
INDEX
295
illegal strategies, effectiveness of
consolidation of ownership, 127, 135
determining costs and risks, 5, 17, 23fig, 31,
35, 38, 182
development of financial sector, 72, 126,
127,142, 182, 195
firm size, 152, 177
firms’ output, 151, 158, 183
impact of others’ strategies, 33, 99, 116, 125,
181
informal networks, 151-153, 166, 173
and informal strategies, 21, 30, 185, 190
integration into international economy, 126,
128, 149, 182
market size, 153, 160,161
imports, illegal, 113, 152,172
imprisonment of businessmen, 3, 56, 88, 90
INDEM Foundation (Russian NGO), 13
independence (political), of legal institutions,
77, 78, 84
informal economy, involvement in
regulatory burdens, 152, 171, 172
tax compliance, 110, 166, 181, 200, 203
use of formal legal institutions, 23, 28, 98
informal networks, and property security
strategies, 151-153, 166, 173
informal strategies, 21,30, 185, 190
Initial Public Offering (IPO), 143, 144t, 147,
148
institutional/strategic complementarities, 187,
196
institutional demand
developing the theory, 8, 16,23fig, 33, 42,
178, 187
expanding the theory, 188
post-Soviet Russia, 40, 69, 96, 195
role of state, 196
internal security services, firms’, see private
security agencies
International Accounting Standard, 137, 138
international economy, integration into, 126,
128,149, 182
International Financial Action Task Force
(FTAF), 83
IPO (Initial Public Offering), 143, 144t, 147,
148
Japan, property security strategies, 1, 28, 37,
185
joint stock companies
legislation, 59, 74, 79, 190, 199, 202
property security strategies, 53, 57, 64
judicial qualifications commissions (JQCs),
77, 83
Kaufmann, Daniel, 14
KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security)
personnel, 2, 10,47
Khodorkovsky, Mikhail (Yukos), 3, 39, 44, 86,
89
kryshas (protection rackets), 10, 47, 51, 52, 56,
58
Law on Bankruptcy, 66, 74, 79
Law on Competition (2006), 79, 84
Law on Cooperatives (1988), 46
law enforcement agencies
corrupt coercion by, 3, 9,11, 39, 58, 79
extent of corrupt coercion, 22, 83, 90
financial resources and competence of, 75,
76,81,83, 100
and property security strategies, 16, 19fig,
21, 58, 65t, 67t, 180, see perceptions,
firms’, of state legal capacity
Law on Individual Labor Activity (1987), 46
Law on Mandatory Pensions Insurance in the
Russian Federation (2002), 70
Law on Private Arbitration (2002), 63
Law on Private Detective and Protection
Activity (1992), 48
lawyers, use of, 2, 22, 63, 66, 67t, 146, 202
legal coercion
in China, 205
definition and use, 19/ig, 21, 180
increased use in post-Soviet Russia, 22, 34,
44, 69, 187
legal compliance, motivation for, 36
legal departments, internal, 62, 174
legal dualism, 194
legal institutions, formal
defined, 24, 72
firms’ impact on, 3, 7, 16, 27, 151, 184, 187
legislation passed, 46, 48, 63, 70, 90, 139, see
abo state legal capacity, defining and
measuring
Levada Center (Russian survey firm), 13, 94
licensing, see regulations, burden posed by
litigation
against state, 12, 61
initiated by government authorities, 70
Loans-for-Shares scheme, 39
296
INDEX
lobbying
by government officials, 90, 117
by private sector, 34, 39, 118, 184
McDonald’s (global fast food company), 143,
147
Madagascar, cultural norms, 29
mafia, see protection rackets
market size, and firms’ property security
strategies, 153, 160, 161
Mechel (mining and metals company), 86
Medvedev, Dmitry, 90
Ministry of Anti-Monopoly Policy and
Support of Entrepreneurship, 74
Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade, 83, 170
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), 9,43, 47,
55, 76, 83
multinational companies (MNCs), 127, 143,
146, 148, 149, 182
Russian, 145
Navalny, Alexey (anticorruption crusader), 192
normative transformation/cultural norms, and
property security strategies, 23fig, 29, 37,
66, 97
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, 146
oil/energy sector, 40, 45, 86, 145, 193
oligarchs, 35,40, 84, 131, 183
Ombudsmen for Entrepreneurs’ Rights, 90
open air markets, 46
operational capability, of legal institutions, 72,
75, 80,81
OPORA (Russian business association for
Small and Medium Business), 50, 51, 57,
118
organized crime
growth and decline in post-Soviet Russia,
10, 43, 45, 47,51,53
in Ukraine, 197, see also protection rackets
output, and firms’ property security strategies,
151, 158, 183
ownership of firms, and property security
strategies
consolidated, 127, 135, 182, 183
dispersed, 130
foreign, 146, 149
“parchment institutions”, 74, 78, 185, 189/ig,
190
perceptions, firms’
of illegal strategies, 116, 124, 127, 182
of others’ property security strategies, 7, 28,
33, 99, 124
of state legal capacity, 29, 37, 59, 73, 95,109
perestroika, 45, 46, 167
permits, see regulations, burden posed by
Peru, small apparel firms, 110
police, see law enforcement
political independence, of legal institutions,
77, 78, 84
Potanin, Vladimir (Russian business tycoon),
39, 131
predatory state
rise in post-Soviet Russia, 44, 72, 91, 181
and rule of law in post-Soviet Russia, 195
threat to property security, 25, 31,119, 195,
197
private arbitration, 59, 63, 64t, 185
private coercion
decline in post-Soviet Russia, 22, 43, 54, 58,
65t, 67t
as property security strategy, 19fig, 20, 31,
38, 180, 185
services provided through, 1, 10,47
in transition countries, 198, 201
“private ordering”, 21,30, 151, 185
private security agencies
evolution in post-Soviet Russia, 22, 45, 48,
54, 55
services provided by, 1, 10, 20
privatization, in Russia, 34, 47, 73, 127, 129
procuracy (Russian legal compliance
watchdog), 79, 81, 82
property rights
defined, 19
and human rights, 195
role of state, 6, 24, 25, 196
property security strategies
continuum, 13, 16, 19fig, 23
defined, 19, 79, 180
demand perspective, 29, 182, 196
evolution in Russia, 40, 69
and rule of law, 195
supply perspective, 27, 33, 181, 196
in transition countries, 206
protection rackets
evolution, 9, 38, 47, 51
INDEX
297
incidence, 2, 14, 22, 65t, 67t, 82
and property security, 19%, 20, 180, 190
services provided, 11, 34, 58
in transition countries, 198, 201
Putin, Vladimir, 34, 71, 86, 88, 90, 193
raiding (reiderstvo), illegal corporate, 9, 39, 54,
66, 68,87
RAN (Russian Academy of Sciences), 47
regulations, burden posed by, 88, 152, 172, 182
regulatory agencies, specialized, 24, 74, 167
“relational contracting”, 21, 30, 151,153,158
reputation of firms
building a durable brand, 131, 145, 146, 175
and foreign investment, 30, 126, 135, 143,
145,149
and short-term asset grabs, 127, 128
research methodology, 14, 106
Rosfinmonitoring (Federal Financial
Monitoring Service), 83
Rosneft (state-owned oil company), 86, 193
Royal Dutch Shell (oil company), 86
RSPP (Union of Russian Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs), 117, 118
RUBOPs, see GUBOP (State Directorate for
the Struggle with Organized Crime)
rule of law
comparative perspective, 206
in post-Soviet Russia, 189%, 195
state capacity and firms’ property security
strategies, 24, 173, 188, 189%
“rule of might”, 189%, 190
rulers, and property security, 6, 25, 128, 188,
190
Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN), 47
Russian Accounting System, 137
Russian Federal Customs Service, 170
Russian Federal Property Fund, 90
Russneft (oil company), 86
Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project, 86
sanctions, and property security strategies
consolidated ownership, 135
determining costs and risks, 5, 21, 23%, 128,
182,183
development of banking sector, 142
integration into global economy, 149
services firms, see output, and firms’ property
security strategies
shadow economy, see informal economy
“shadow justice”, 10, 47
“shadow of the law”, 20, 25,61, 180, 202
shell companies, 70, 127
size, of firms, see firm size, and property
security strategies
SOEs (state owned enterprises), 13, 47, 73,
162, 163%, 164
spillover effects, from economic rule of law,
119, 148, 195, 204
staff competence (in legal institutions), 76, 82
State Directorate for the Struggle with
Organized Crime (GUBOP), 55
state legal capacity
defining and measuring, 23%, 24, 25, 72
in industrialized countries, 205
and property security strategies, 4, 5, 23, 27,
31,35, 181
in transition countries, 201
state owned enterprises (SOEs), 13, 47, 73,
162, 164%
state-in-society, 7, 186
strategic/institutional complementarities, 187,
196
strategic state, 188
supplier/client base, and firms’ property
security strategies, 147, 166
supply (state) of legal institutions, see state
legal capacity
Supreme Commercial Court (VAS), 14, 192
tax authorities
corrupt coercion, 54, 68, 79, 86, 87, 90
legal coercion, 70
litigation against, 12, 61
tax compliance
as demand-side barrier, 28, 32, 110, 181, 188
tax reforms, 32, 70, 79, 98, 104, 139, 195
in transition countries, 200, 204
“Three Whales” case, 82
time horizons of firms, and property security
strategies
extended, 135
short-term, 130
tipping point dynamics, 33, 99, 111, 122%, 124
TNK-BP conflict, 40, 86
TPP (Chamber of Trade and Industry) ,119
transaction costs, and property security
strategies
consolidated ownership, 135
298
INDEX
determining costs and risks* 5* 2 L, 23/ig, 128,
182,183
development of banking sector, 142
integration into global economy, 149
Transparency International, Moscow, 45
transparency, initiatives promoting, 39, 81,
148,192
Uganda, property dispute resolution, 2
Ukraine, state legal capacity, 193, 200
Unified Social Tax, 102
Union of Russian Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs (RSPP), 117,118
VAS (Supreme Commercial Court), 14,192
vicious cycles, 32, 98, 111, 114, 120, 124
Vietnam, property rights legislation, 25
violence
and formal Legal institutions, 4,6, 16,178,
206
and formal legal institutions, 38
in post-Soviet Russia, 2,22,46,47, 50,66
state monopoly on, 19, 21,185
virtuous cycles, 32, 99,111, 123, 204
VO guards, see MVD (Ministry of Internal
Affairs)
World Bank-EBRD BEEPS Surveys, 13,35, 36,
91,103
Yakovleva, Yana (Biznes Solidarnost), 88
Yeltsin, Boris, 46,47, 74,100, 129
Yevtushenkov, Vladimir (Russian oligarch),
193
Yukos, see Khodorkovsky, Mikhail (Yukos)
^Bayerische ^
Staatsbibliothek
München
V - y
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Gans-Morse, Jordan |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1138715573 |
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| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)1002887310 (DE-599)BVBBV044525003 |
| dewey-full | 323.460947 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
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| dewey-sort | 3323.460947 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| edition | first published |
| era | Geschichte 1992- gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1992- |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Russia (Federation) Politics and government 1991- Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Russia (Federation) Politics and government 1991- Russland |
| id | DE-604.BV044525003 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:54:57Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781107153967 1107153964 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 016590920 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029924420 |
| oclc_num | 1002887310 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 |
| physical | xii, 298 Seiten Diagramme |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publishDateSearch | 2017 |
| publishDateSort | 2017 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Gans-Morse, Jordan Verfasser (DE-588)1138715573 aut Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia violence, corruption, and the demand for law Jordan Gans-Morse, Northwestern University, Illinois first published Cambridge, United Kingdom Cambridge University Press 2017 xii, 298 Seiten Diagramme txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references (pages 275-292) and index Geschichte 1992- gnd rswk-swf Politik Right of property Russia (Federation) Political corruption Russia (Federation) Post-communism Russia (Federation) Eigentum (DE-588)4013793-4 gnd rswk-swf Justiz (DE-588)4073136-4 gnd rswk-swf Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd rswk-swf Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd rswk-swf Gewalt (DE-588)4020832-1 gnd rswk-swf Russia (Federation) Politics and government 1991- Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 s Eigentum (DE-588)4013793-4 s Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 s Gewalt (DE-588)4020832-1 s Justiz (DE-588)4073136-4 s Geschichte 1992- z DE-604 LoC Fremddatenuebernahme application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029924420&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029924420&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029924420&sequence=000004&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Register // Gemischte Register |
| spellingShingle | Gans-Morse, Jordan Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia violence, corruption, and the demand for law Politik Right of property Russia (Federation) Political corruption Russia (Federation) Post-communism Russia (Federation) Eigentum (DE-588)4013793-4 gnd Justiz (DE-588)4073136-4 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Gewalt (DE-588)4020832-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4013793-4 (DE-588)4073136-4 (DE-588)4032524-6 (DE-588)4061963-1 (DE-588)4020832-1 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia violence, corruption, and the demand for law |
| title_auth | Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia violence, corruption, and the demand for law |
| title_exact_search | Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia violence, corruption, and the demand for law |
| title_full | Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia violence, corruption, and the demand for law Jordan Gans-Morse, Northwestern University, Illinois |
| title_fullStr | Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia violence, corruption, and the demand for law Jordan Gans-Morse, Northwestern University, Illinois |
| title_full_unstemmed | Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia violence, corruption, and the demand for law Jordan Gans-Morse, Northwestern University, Illinois |
| title_short | Property rights in Post-Soviet Russia |
| title_sort | property rights in post soviet russia violence corruption and the demand for law |
| title_sub | violence, corruption, and the demand for law |
| topic | Politik Right of property Russia (Federation) Political corruption Russia (Federation) Post-communism Russia (Federation) Eigentum (DE-588)4013793-4 gnd Justiz (DE-588)4073136-4 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Gewalt (DE-588)4020832-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Politik Right of property Russia (Federation) Political corruption Russia (Federation) Post-communism Russia (Federation) Eigentum Justiz Korruption Unternehmen Gewalt Russia (Federation) Politics and government 1991- Russland |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029924420&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029924420&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029924420&sequence=000004&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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