Evolving enactivism: basic minds meet content
Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be form...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England
The MIT Press
© 2017
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others - the most elementary ones - do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless - fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (xxvi, 3328 Seiten) |
| ISBN: | 9780262339773 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others - the most elementary ones - do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless - fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix | |
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| id | DE-604.BV044475115 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:53:58Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780262339773 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Hutto, Daniel D. 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)12971464X aut Evolving enactivism basic minds meet content Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England The MIT Press © 2017 1 Online-Ressource (xxvi, 3328 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantages of recognizing that only some forms of cognition have content while others - the most elementary ones - do not. They offer an account of the mind in duplex terms, proposing a complex vision of mentality in which these basic contentless forms of cognition interact with content-involving ones. Hutto and Myin argue that the most basic forms of cognition do not, contrary to a currently popular account of cognition, involve picking up and processing information that is then used, reused, stored, and represented in the brain. Rather, basic cognition is contentless - fundamentally interactive, dynamic, and relational. In advancing the case for a radically enactive account of cognition, Hutto and Myin propose crucial adjustments to our concept of cognition and offer theoretical support for their revolutionary rethinking, emphasizing its capacity to explain basic minds in naturalistic terms. They demonstrate the explanatory power of the duplex vision of cognition, showing how it offers powerful means for understanding quintessential cognitive phenomena without introducing scientifically intractable mysteries into the mix Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd rswk-swf Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 gnd rswk-swf Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd rswk-swf Philosophy of mind Cognitive science Act (Philosophy) Intentionalism Mental representation Intentionality (Philosophy) Phenomenology Content (Psychology) Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 s Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 s Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 s DE-604 Myin, Erik Sonstige (DE-588)1033922641 oth Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe 978-0-262-03611-5 |
| spellingShingle | Hutto, Daniel D. 1965- Evolving enactivism basic minds meet content Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 gnd Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4248301-3 (DE-588)4193780-6 (DE-588)4049534-6 |
| title | Evolving enactivism basic minds meet content |
| title_auth | Evolving enactivism basic minds meet content |
| title_exact_search | Evolving enactivism basic minds meet content |
| title_full | Evolving enactivism basic minds meet content Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin |
| title_fullStr | Evolving enactivism basic minds meet content Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolving enactivism basic minds meet content Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin |
| title_short | Evolving enactivism |
| title_sort | evolving enactivism basic minds meet content |
| title_sub | basic minds meet content |
| topic | Philosophy of Mind (DE-588)4248301-3 gnd Kognitionswissenschaft (DE-588)4193780-6 gnd Wissensrepräsentation (DE-588)4049534-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Philosophy of Mind Kognitionswissenschaft Wissensrepräsentation |
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