The origins of dominant parties: building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia
"In many autocracies, regime leaders share power with a ruling party, which can help generate popular support and reduce conflict among key elites. Such ruling parties are often called dominant parties. In other regimes, leaders prefer to rule solely through some combination of charisma, patron...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2017
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Literaturverzeichnis Register // Gemischte Register |
| Zusammenfassung: | "In many autocracies, regime leaders share power with a ruling party, which can help generate popular support and reduce conflict among key elites. Such ruling parties are often called dominant parties. In other regimes, leaders prefer to rule solely through some combination of charisma, patronage, and coercion, rather than sharing power with a dominant party. This book explains why dominant parties emerge in some nondemocratic regimes, but not in others. It offers a novel theory of dominant party emergence that centers on the balance of power between rulers and other elites. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Russia, original data on Russian political elites, and cross-national statistical analysis, the book's findings shed new light on how modern autocracies work and why they break down. The book also provides new insights about the foundations of Vladimir Putin's regime and challenges several myths about the personalization of power under Putin"... |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Beschreibung: | xiii, 316 Seiten Diagramme, Karten |
| ISBN: | 9781107171763 |
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| 520 | |a "In many autocracies, regime leaders share power with a ruling party, which can help generate popular support and reduce conflict among key elites. Such ruling parties are often called dominant parties. In other regimes, leaders prefer to rule solely through some combination of charisma, patronage, and coercion, rather than sharing power with a dominant party. This book explains why dominant parties emerge in some nondemocratic regimes, but not in others. It offers a novel theory of dominant party emergence that centers on the balance of power between rulers and other elites. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Russia, original data on Russian political elites, and cross-national statistical analysis, the book's findings shed new light on how modern autocracies work and why they break down. The book also provides new insights about the foundations of Vladimir Putin's regime and challenges several myths about the personalization of power under Putin"... | ||
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| adam_text | THE ORIGINS OF DOMINANT PARTIES
/ REUTER, ORA JOHNYYEAUTHOR
: 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS / INHALTSVERZEICHNIS
1. INTRODUCTION; 2. A THEORY OF DOMINANT PARTY FORMATION; 3. FALSE
STARTS: THE FAILURE OF PRO-PRESIDENTIAL PARTIES UNDER YELTSIN; 4. THE
EMERGENCE OF A DOMINANT PARTY IN RUSSIA; 5. UNITED RUSSIA AS THE
DOMINANT PARTY; 6. UNITED RUSSIA AND RUSSIA S GOVERNORS; 7. ECONOMIC
ELITES AND DOMINANT PARTY AFFILIATION; 8. DOMINANT PARTY EMERGENCE
AROUND THE WORLD; 9. CONCLUSION
DIESES SCHRIFTSTUECK WURDE MASCHINELL ERZEUGT.
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Index
Abramovich, Roman, 110n3, 129-31
Aburamoto, Mari, 154-55
administrative resources
of gubernatorial elites, 213-14,
215-20
political decentralization and strength
of, 249-56
of Russian regional elites, 87, 99-101,
102-4, 198-99
Africa
dominant party emergence in, 257—65
election outcomes in, 52
elite party structures in, 45
ethnic diversity and elite strength
in, 253-54
financial liberalization and regime
opposition in, 222-24
postcolonial dominant parties
in, 14, 34
African National Congress (ANC), 5
Agrarian Party (Russia), 90-91
Aldrich, John, 35-37, 47, 51-52
All-Russian Coordinating Council (OKS),
93-95, 112-14
All Russian Party “Unity and Fatherland.”
See United Russia Party
All Russia (Vsya Rossii) movement, 109,
110, 112-14, 123-24
All-Russian Peoples Front (ONF),
emergence of, 271-77
anti-colonial liberation movements,
dominant party origins in, 46
“Apatit” company, 154-55
Arab Socialist Union, 277
ARENA party (Brazil), 45
Arriola, Leonardo Rafael, 222-24
Artyukh, Evgenii, 182n44
Assad regime, 7-8
asset-mobile sectors, party affiliation
in, 238
audience costs for leaders, 62n8
authoritarian regimes
agreements with elites,
monitoring of, 63
benefits of United Russia Party
dominance for, 159-60
breakdown of, 277-79
commitment credibility and, 49
democratic characteristics of, 1-4
democratization and, 37-39
dominant party as stabilizers of, 4-9,
10-13, 37-39, 277-79
future in Russia for, 279-81
Geddes5 typology of, 247-48
global patterns in party organization
by, 245-49
liberal non-democracies, lack of
dominant parties in, 257-65
limits of dominant parties in, 1-4
parties established by, 46
in post-Soviet Russia, 32-35
presidential succession in Mexico, 186
rent distribution (rent-seeking)
in, 257-65
United Russia Party as commitment
device for, 185-96
autonomous resources
of business elites, 222-24, 229-33
credible commitments and, 60
in dominant party regimes, 187,
242-43, 265-66, 267-71
elite commitment problems
and,67-70
extent of leaders and elites control
of, 249-56
of gubernatorial elites in Russia,
204-5,211-15
of Russian regional elites, 83-89,
99-104, 116-21, 137-46,
148
Ayatskov, Dmitry, 104-5
Azarov, Nikolai, 280
301
302
Index
Ba’ath party, 7-8
Baburkin, Sergei, 166-67
balance of power and resources
dominant party emergence and, 23-24,
202,256-57, 265-66
individual and gubernatorial elite party
affiliation and, 203-5
institutional solutions to commitment
and, 65-66
maximization of dominant party
likelihood and, 70-73
probability of dominant party emergence
and, 262-65
bandwagon process, gubernatorial elite
party affiliation and, 214
banking institutions
business elites control of, 100n30
Our Home is Russia party and, 92-93
Barisian National alliance, 277
Belarus, authoritarian regime in, 2
Berozovsky,Boris, 103, Il0n3, 111
Bespalov, Alexander, 124-25, 126, 195-96
Bienen, Henry, 11, 45
Bogatyreva, Lyudmila, 166-67
Bogomolov, Valerii, 126, 133-34, 140-41
Bolshevism
intraparty conflicts in, 46n6
power seizure by, 13
Botswana, dominant party in, 5
Botswanan Democratic Party (BDP),
5, 17
Brazil
authoritarian regime in, 2
elite control of resources in, 69-70
elite influence on election
outcomes in, 52
factionalism in parties of, 270
Brownlee, Jason, 6,12-13, 17-18
Brudny, Yitzhak, 102
Bulychev, Sergei, 198
Burbulis, Gennady, 77, 79, 82
business elites
dominant party affiliation of, 222-43
economic conditions and power
of, 99-101
in Egypt, parliamentary clashes with,
162n7
executive branch influence on, 164-66
gubernatorial economic control and,
211-13,215-20
models of party affiliation of, 233-^42
Our Home is Russia party and,
92-93, 95
penetration of Russian parliaments
by, 163-64
in regional legislatures, 101n31,
224-29, 237-38
resource ownership and membership in
United Russia Party, 229-33
United Russia Party and, 129-31, 150,
153-55, 267-71
Yeltsin’s reelection campaign and role
of, 102-4
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), 89fl.2
capitalist class, emergence in post-Soviet
countries of, 223nl
Castaneda, Jorge G., 32
causality
dominant party research and, 39-41
endogeneity in neo-institutionalist
research and, 37-39
global patterns in dominant party
emergence and, 265-66
proliferation of dominant parties and, 14
quantitative analyses of, 41
Center for the Study of Business-State
Interactions, 160-68
center-periphery, strength of elites and
leaders and outcomes of, 249-56
Chaisty, Paul, 163
Chavez, Hugo, 277
Chechnya conflict, Russian political
division over, 92-93
Chemezov, Viktor, 12 9-31
Chernetsky, Arkady, 94n 18
Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 89-90,
94-95, 104-5
Chiang Kai-Shek, 187
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 46, 277
Chirikova, Alia, 153-54
Christian Democratic Party (Italy), 4-5
Chubais, Anatoly, 79, 234-37
Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), 7-8
civil war, dominant party emergence in,
255,257-65
clientelist networks
of business elites, 234-37
commitment credibility and, 49
democratic regimes, dominant
parties and, 5
dominant party emergence in
Russia and, 4
as gubernatorial resource, 211
Putin’s regime and, 34-35
of Russian regional elites, 83-89,
99-101
strength of elites and leaders over, 249-56
United Russia Party and, 135,136,
143-46, 151-52
Index
303
collective action problems
dominant parties and, 21
of elites, 44n3, 62
gubernatorial economic control
and, 211-13
political parties and, 35-37
United Russia Party management
of, 192-93
Colorado Party, 7-8
Colton, Timothy, 82-83
commitment framework
balanced resources and maximization of
dominant party likelihood, 70-73
dominant party emergence and, 17-18,
58-65, 271
elite commitment problems, 47-48,
55-58, 63-64,67-70,105-6, 196-98
institutional constraints on dominant
party emergence and, 65-66
leader’s commitment problems, 50-55,
60-63, 66-67, 105-6, 185-96
political parties and, 47^18
problems of, 17-18, 19-24
of Russian gubernatorial elites to United
Russia Party, 206-10
severity of problems with, 66-67
solutions to problems in, 58-73
two-sided commitment problem,
dominant party formation
and, 48-58
United Russia Party and, 30-32,
154-58, 185-98
commodity prices
in post-Soviet growth of, 137-39,
142-43, 224
Russian central economy and role of, 99
common pool resource issues,
commitment credibility and, 49
Communist Party of the Russian
Federation (KPRF), 93-95, 111
cooptation and rent distribution by
regional legislatures and, 163
gubernatorial membership in, 209,
214,215-20
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU), 9
constitutional support for, 60
demise of, 24-26
evolution of, 13
legacy of, 40-41, 83-89, 96-99
origins of, 46
United Russia Party compared
with, 159-60
communist systems
dominant parties in, 10-13
Comparative Constitutions Project,
250-51
Congress Party (India), 5
cost-benefit exchange, leadership and elite
commitment and, 107-8
court systems, in autocratic regimes, 1-4
credibility
balanced resources and increase
of, 70-73
for dominant parties, 21, 63-64, 267-71
of elite commitments, 63-64
leader’s credible commitments, 60-63
repeated play for enhancement
of, 58-65
two-sided commitment problem
and, 48-58
for United Russia party, 30-32
crisis conditions, dominant party
emergence in, 255, 257-65
Cuba, single party regime in, 9
Cuban Communist Party, 46
cultural institutions, United Russia Party
dominance in, 131-32
decentralized political institutions
probability of dominant party emergence
and,262-65
strength of elites and leaders
and,249-56
decree-making presidential powers, limits
in Russia on, 176-79
delegation of decision-making, leader’s
credible commitments and, 60-63
democracies, dominant party formation
in, 270-71
Democratic Party (DP) (Turkey), 7-8
Democratic Party of Russia, 77-78, 80-81
Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, 9
democratic regimes, dominant party
characteristics in, 5
Democratic Russia movement, 74-79
elections of 1993 and, 79
democratization
dominant parties and, 37-39
economic liberalization and, 242—43
failure in First Russian Republic
of, 74-79
failure of Third Wave democracies,
dominant party emergence
and,248^49
regime breakdown and, 248-49, 277-79
Department for Internal Politics
(DIP) (Russia), 132-34, 164-65,
186n50, 191-92
Deripaska, Oleg, 129-31
304
Index
Desalegnhas, Hailemariam, 89fl.2
developing countries
dominant parties in, 10-13
political decentralization assessment
in, 249-56
dispersion per capita measurements
(DPC), population dispersion
and,251-53
distance indicator, geographic resources of
gubernatorial elites, 213-14, 215-20
distributional theories of
institutions, 65-66
dominant parties. See also political parties
actors in formation of, overview, 42-58
authoritarian survival and formation
of, 10-13
autocratic regime structure and, 1-4
barriers to formation of, 2-3
business elites affiliation with, 222-43
characteristics of, 4-9
commitment problems of, 58-65
democratization and, 37-39
determinants in emergence of, 257-65
elite commitment credibility and, 63-64
elite role in creation of, 44n3, 242-43
EliteStrengthXLeaderStrength
coefficient and emergence of, 257-65
emergence of, 13-16, 65-73
global patterns in emergence of,
89fl.2, 244
independent authority of, 61-62
independent funding for, 60
individual and gubernatorial elite
affiliation and, 203-5
institutional evolution in nascent
systems, 72-73
institutions of, 58-65
international comparisons of, 200-1
leader’s credible commitments
and, 60-63
logit models of affiliation, 234
modeling emergence of, 256-57
modeling existence of, 256n 11
mutual investment in, 2-3
new institutionalism and, 35-37
predicted probability of emergence
of, 262-65
proportion of regimes with, 1-4, 248-49
qualitative studies of outcomes
for, 12-13
regime breakdown and, 277-79
replacement of leader with candidate
from, 61
research methodology
concerning, 39^1
revolutionary organizations and
origins of, 46
rules and norms of, 64-65
society-based explanations for, 44-47
stabilization of regimes by, 4-9, 10-13,
37-39, 277-79
summary of research on, 267-71
terminology used for, 9
theories on formation of, 42-73
two-sided commitment problem and
formation of, 48-58
United Russia Party as example of,
159-201
Unity Party case study and, 108-23
Duma
business elite penetration of,
163-64, 224-29
cooptation and rent distribution
and, 163
declining United Russia Party majority
in, 272, 274
in First Russian Republic, 74-79
legislation passed from 2007-2010
by, 164-66
logrolling procedures in, 160-68
loyalty to United Russia Party in,
incentives for, 170-71
party lists for elections to, United Russia
Party control of, 188
presidential monitoring of, 186
proportional electoral system
for, 193-95
Putin’s bargains with, 176-77
Putin’s cooptation of, 1-4, 145
regional elite autonomy and,
58-59, 149-50
United Russia Party influence on,
30-32, 127-29, 152-53, 187
durability of dominant parties, 7-8,
247, 248-49
global patterns in, 265-66
Dyachenko, Tatyana, 110n3
Earth Institute of Columbia
University, 252
Eastern Europe, dominant party
emergence in, 257^65
EBRD-World Bank Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS), 232-33
economic conditions
autonomous resources of regional elites
and, 116-21
democratization and liberalization
of, 242-43
Index
305
gubernatorial control over, 211-13,
215-20
Kremlin power linked to, 129-31,
141-12
large public economies and
authoritarian rule, 222-24
leadership strength and, 254-56
political institutions and, 49
privatization initiatives in Russia
and, 87
regional elites and impact of, 83-89,
99-101, 148-49
United Russia Party rise linked
to, 142-43
economic elites. See business elites
Edinstvo (Unity) bloc, 109, 110-11, 122
Egypt
dominant party-leadership commitment
problems in, 187
NDP influence in, 6
parliamentary clashes with business
elites in, 162n7
electoral authoritarian regimes, emergence
of, 277-79
Eliseev, Evgenii, 171-72
elites. See also regional elites
agency of, 67-70
autonomous resources of,
67-70, 267-71
balance of resources and cooperation
with leaders, 70-73, 256-57, 265-66
career advancement of, 55
cohesion of, 5, 11-12, 16-19, 44n3, 203
collective action problems of, 44n3,
62,192-93
commitment problems for,
55-58, 66-67
costs of cooperation and incentives to
renege by, 54-55, 56-57, 198-99
definition of, 16, 42-43
democratization and endogenization
of, 37-39
dominant parties and role of, 19-24, 41,
42-58, 242 -43, 267-71
duration of authoritarian regimes and
cohesion of, 277-79
electoral politics and, 52
incentives for party affiliation, 44
independent authority of, 61-62
individual elites, Russia’s governors
and, 203-5
leaders’ cooperation with, 2-3, 45-46,
50-53, 55-56, 63
leadership strength separate from
strength of, 254-56
maximization of gains and cooperation
of, 70-73
measurements of strength of, 41
modeling of strength of, 256-57
policy influence of, 56
political parties and commitment
of, 47-48
population dispersion and strength
of, 251-53
reduction of transaction costs through
cooperation of, 56
regime breakdown and cohesion
of, 37-39
routinzed political appointment of, 53
schisms among, as threat to
leaders, 50-51
society-based theories of dominant party
origins and, 44—47
spoils distribution and, 12, 56
strength of, 249-65
support for regimes and role of, 47
United Russia Party cooptation
of, 176-85
United Russia Party example of,
28, 32-35
endogeneity
global patterns in dominant party
emergence and, 265-66
in leader-elite relationships, 37-39,
138n50
of resources strength of elites and
leaders linked to, 249-56
Ethiopia, Haile Selassie’s regime
in, 280-81
Ethiopian People’s Democratic
Revolutionary Front (EPRDF),
89fl .2
ethnic minorities
elite strength and concentration of, 253
gubernatorial ethnic resources and,
213,215-20
Russian regional elites and, 85, 101-2
event history model, of gubernatorial party
affiliation, 214-20
Executive Branch, United Russia
party influence over appointments
in, 171-72
exogenous factors, in leader-elite power
distribution, 43n2, I38n50
Fatherland (Nur-OTAN) (Kazakhstan),
7-8, 17, 45
Fatherland-AU Russia (OVR) party
formation of, 110
Kremlin relations with, 112-14, 122
306
Index
Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) party (cont)
Putin and, 110-11
Unity Party merger with, 112, 123-24,
139, 146^7
Fearon, James, 62n8, 253
federal government in Russia (Kremlin)
autonomous resources of regional elites
vs., 116-21
gubernatorial elites and, 209, 215-20
lack of support for Our Home party
from, 95-99, 104-5, 108, 121-23
limits on United Russian Party
by, 185-96
non-partisan structure of, 132-34
regional elites and, 85-87, 108-9,
112-14, 188-92
transfers of wealth and, 212-13,215-20
United Russia Party and, 137-^6,
176-85, 198-99
Unity Party and, 112-14
federal transfers, gubernatorial economic
resources and, 212-13
Federation Council (Russia), 90-91, 166-67
elections to, United Russia Party control
of, 188
legislative activity of, 164-66
loyalty to United Russia Party and
appointments to, 171-72
political independence of, 93-95
Putin s restructuring of, 137-46
regional elite power and, 101-2
United Russia Party membership
and,126-27
Federation Treaty (Russia), 86
Feith, Herbert, 52
Fifth Republic Movement
(Venezuela), 277
Filatov, Sergei, 93-95, 97-99
financial industrial groups, 99-101, 103
First Russian Republic (1990-1993),
absence of ruling party in, 74-79
500 days program (Russia), 80-81
“For Our Native Ural” party, 148n73
fraudulent vote totals, United Russia Party
results and, 272
free-riding, commitment credibility and, 49
Front of National Unity (Poland), 277
Frye,Timothy, 52, 229-33
Gabuniya, Georgii, 104-5
Gadaffi, Muammar, 2, 280-81
Gaidar,Yegor, 79, 82-83, 87, 92-93
game theory, commitment credibility
and,50
Gandhi, Jennifer, 12, 15-16,45,
179-83, 255
Gattarov, Ruslan, 171-72
Gazprom, 92-93
Geddes, Barbara, 37-39, 247-48
Geertz, Clifford, 52
Gehlbach, Scott, 62, 192-93
General People s Congress (GPC)
(Yemen), 89f 1,2
Georgia, ‘colored’ revolution in, 34-35
Glorious Revolution, 66
GOLKAR party (Indonesia), 187
Golosov, GrigoriiV., 87, 103, 226
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 85-87, 198-99
Goskomstat registries, 233
governors
appointment of, United Russia Party
influence in, 172-73
autonomous resources of,
204-5,211-15
business elites and, 237-38
coercion of, to join United Russia,
150-53,209-10
collective action problems of, 192-93
controls as resource for, 214
defections from United Russia
Party, 179-83
economic resources of, 211-13, 215-20
election outcomes for, 101-2,
139-40,172-73,188-92,196-98,
211.215- 20
ethnic resources of, 213, 215-20
federal government relations with,
188-92, 204-5
geographic and administrative resources
of, 213-14, 215-20
Higher Council (Vyshii Soviet)
membership for, 206-10
individual elites in Russia and, 203-5
inherited political resources of,
211.215- 20
legislative clashes with, 162
membership status in United Russia
Party of, 206-10
party affiliations of, 114-15, 204-5,
209
peer pressure among, concerning United
Russia party membership, 210
political machines of, 183-85
Putin s electoral reforms concerning,
204-5,209-10
statistical analysis of party affiliation and
resource endowment, 214-20
tenure of, 211
United Russia Party and, 127-29,
136-37, 172-73, 196-98,
206-10, 267-71
Govorun, Oleg, 132n39
Index
307
Greene, Kenneth E., 222-24, 247
Gridded Population of the World
Project, 252
Grief, Avner, 58-59
Gromov, Boris, 90-91
GRP per capita variable, gubernatorial
economic resources and,
212-13, 215-20
Gryzlov, Boris, 126, 127, 133-34
Gusinsky, Vladimir, 103
Guyana, dominant party regime in, 5
Guzhvin, Anatolii, 115n8
Haber-Menaldo data, 254n8
Hagopian, Frances, 52
Haile Selassie, 280-81
Hale, Henry, 48, 65-66, 103-4, 211-13,
229-33, 237
hazard rate, statistical analysis of
gubernatorial party affiliation
and,214-20
hegemonic parties, dominant parties vs.,
89fl .2
Herfindahl index, 212, 251-53
Higher Council (Vyshii Soviet), 206-10
Hough, Jerry, 84
Huntington, Samuel P., 14-15, 64
Igummov, Gennady, 104
immobile assets
business elites with, 222-24, 229-33, 238
in economic resources of gubernatorial
elites, 211-13
imperative mandate laws, introduction in
Russia of, 193-95
India, dominant party regime in, 5
Indonesia
dominant party-leadership commitment
problems in, 187
election outcomes in, 52
industrial concentration, gubernatorial
economic resources and, 212,
215-20
infrastructure projects, United
Russia Party spoils distribution
through,167-68
institutional nesting, leader’s credible
commitments and, 60
Iran Novin party, 45
Isayev, Andrei, 170-71, 192-93
Italy, dominant parties in, 4-5
Ivan Rybkin Bloc, 90-91, 95-99
Ivlev, Leonid, 132n39
Japan, dominant parties in, 4-5
Jatiya Party (Bangladesh), 45
Jordan, parliamentary clashes with
business elites in, 162n7
judicial independence, commitment
credibility problems and role
of, 58-59
Just Russia party, 191-92
Kalmykov, Yurii, 81
Kazakov, Aleksandr, 93-95
Keefer, Philip, 62, 192-93
Kenya African National Union (KANU),
7-8, 9, 246-47
Kenyatta, Uhuru, 7-8
Kerimov, Suleiman, 129-31
Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 75-76
Kochanovskii, Eduard, 184n49
Kokov, Valery, 104-5
Kolsk Metallurgical Company, 154-55
Kostin, Andrei, 129-31
Kostin, Konstantin, 164-65, 187
Kozak, Dmitrii, 146n71, 172n24
Kozyrev, Andrei, 79
KPRF. See Communist Party of the
Russian Federation (KPRF)
Krashennikov, Pavel, 152-53
Kuchma, Leonid, 2, 176, 280
Kudrin, Alexei, 179n41, 192-93
Kuomintang (KMT), 7-8, 187
Laos, single party regime in, 9
Lapina, Natalya, 153-54
large companies, party affiliation of,
222-24, 232-33
Latin America
dominant party emergence in, 257-65
elite influence on voting behavior in, 52
Law on Political Parties (Russia), 193-95
Law on Voters’ Rights (Russia), 193-95
leadership in authoritarian regimes. See
also regime leaders
balance of resources and cooperation
with elites, 70-73, 256-57, 265-66
benefits for elites from, 50-53, 55-56
breakdown of, 277-79
commitment problems for,
50-55,66-67
costs of cooperation and incentives to
renege in, 54-55, 56-57, 198-99
credible commitments in, 60-63
dominant parties and, 12-13,
19-24, 267-71
dominant party affiliation of, 42-58, 247
elites commitment to, 2-3, 67-70
elite strength independent from, 254-56
equilibrium constraints on, 18
future in Russia for, 279-81
308
Index
leadership in authoritarian regimes (com.)
global patterns of party dominance and
characteristics of, 245^19
modeling of strength of, 256-57
parallel party organizations and, 59-60
population dispersion and strength
of, 251-53
PRI in Mexico and, 32
pro-regime candidates, election
outcomes and coordination of, 53
regime typology and, 255
relinquishing authority to parties
by, 61-62
rent distribution (rent-seeking)
by, 257-65
replacement of, 61
reputation mechanisms for credibility
enhancement, 62
routinization of political
appointments by, 53
strength of, 249-57
United Russia Party and, 26-32
legislative branch. See also Duma;
parliamentary institutions
career advancement opportunities in,
United Party influence and, 168-73
collective action problems in, 36nl4
cooptation and rent distribution in
Russia by, 163
cross-national measures strength of, 163
defections from United Russia Party in,
179-83, 224-29
economic elites in regional
legislatures, 222-29
in First Russian Republic, 74-79
global patterns of party dominance and
presence of, 245-49
governors’ power concerning, 188-92
leader’s control of, 51-52
logrolling procedures in Russian
Duma, 160-68
political parries, 47
Putin’s cooptation of, 1-4, 145
regional legislative autonomy,
58-59, 149-50
United Russia Party influence on,
30-32, 127-29, 152-53, 176-79,
187,196-98
voting discipline of United Russia in
regional legislatures, 177-78
Levitsky, Steven, 12-13
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
(Japan), 4-5
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
(LDPR), 79-80
liberal non-democracies, lack of dominant
parries in, 257-65
Libya, authoritarian regime in, 2
lobbying efforts of United Russia
Party, 166-67
local governments
coordination of elections for, 184n49
defections from United Russia Party
and, 179-83
influence on elites of, 152-53
legislative-governor clashes and, 162
logrolling in local and regional
parliaments, United Russia Party role
in, 161-62
political decentralization and strength
of, 249-56
political machines of, 183-85
United Russia Party dominance in,
131-32, 135,274-75
LogoVaz group, 103
Lukashenko, Aleksandr, 2
Luzhkov, Yurii
business elites and, 140-41
commitment problems for, 198
political machines and, 109,
110,146-47
post-Soviet politics and, 94-95
Russia’s Choice Party and, 81
United Russia Party and, 25, 124-25,
179n41,205-6, 208-9
Lysytsin, Anatoly, 114-15, 148, 166-67
Maddison, Angus, 255
Magaloni, Beatriz, 18, 59-60
Makarenko, Boris, 94
Malaysia, dominant party rule in, 187, 277
Markov, Sergei, 115n8
mayors
coordination of elections of, 184n49
defections from United Russia Party
and, 179-83
dominant party influence on, 152-53
legislative-governor clashes and, 162
logrolling in local parliaments, United
Russia Party role in, 161-62
political machines of, 183-85
United Russia Party influence over,
131-32, 135, 196-98
McFaul, Michael, 115n8
McMann, Kelly M., 222-24
media
business elites control of, 100n30
Russian regional elites control of, 87
United Russia Party dominance in,
131-32, 153-54
Index
309
Medinsky, Vladimir, 171-72
Medvedev, Dmitry
candidates list selections and, 188
Federation Council and, 171-72
Presidential Administration and, 136-37
Putin and, 26-32, 271-77
United Russia Party and,
89Í1.2, 185-86
Melik’yan, Gennadii, 81
Mexico
opposition parties in, 246^47
patron-client ties in, 32
policy brokerage in, 186
“presidencialismo” period in, 176-77
Mezhregionalnnoy Dvizheniye
(“Edinstvo”) (Interregional Movement
“Unity”). See Unity Party (Russia)
Migdal, Joel, 16, 34
Milgrom, Paul, 58-59
Miller, Alexei, 129-31
Milosevic, Slobodan, 7-8
modernization
dominant party origins and, 14-15
postcolonial proliferation of dominant
parties in Africa and, 14
Mohammed, Mahathir, 187
Moiseev, Boris, 153-54
Molodaya Gvardia (Youth Guard), 170-71
monetization of social benefits
business elites role in, 140-41
government-United Russia Party
conflict over, 192-93
United Russia Party cohesion
over, 176-77
Morozov, Oleg, 136-37, 171-72, 273n5
Most Group, 103
Motherland party (Russia), 142-43
Movement for Democratic Reforms
(Russia), 77-78
Mozambique Liberation Front
(FRELIMO), 46
Mubarak, Gemal, 6
multiparty elections, lack of dominant
parties in years with, 257-65
Murashev, Arkadii, 79
Muslim indicator, gubernatorial ethnic
resources and, 213, 215-20
Namibia, dominant party regime in, 5
national agenda, dominant parties’
influence on, 6
National Democratic Party (NDP)
(Egypt), 1, 6, 89fl.2, 187, 277
National Liberation Front (FLN)
(Algeria), 9
National Projects of United Russia Party,
136, 142-43, 167-68, 192-93
National Resistance Movement (NRM)
(Uganda), 1
natural resources
dominant party emergence and role
of, 270
leadership strength and revenues
from, 254-56
party affiliation of business elites
in, 229-33
political impact of, 222-24, 242-43
Navalny, Alexei, 272, 275-76
Neverov, Sergei, 170-71
new institutionalism
dominant party analysis in, 11-12,
35-37, 277-79
endogeneity in research of, 37-39
on post-Soviet Russia, 32-35
Nigeria, absence of dominant parties in, 1,
7-8, 17,45,200-1, 270
nomenklatura system in Soviet Union, 5,
10-13, 53
nomination procedures
Russian electoral coordination and,
184n46
Russian legislation concerning,
193-95
North, Doublas C., 58-59, 66
North Korea, single party regime in, 9
oil prices
decline in, 17
Kremlin-elite relations and, 2-3, 107-8,
116-23
lack of Our Home party support
and,96-99
leader’s commitment, 54-55
Putin’s ascendancy and, 17, 40-41
United Russia party and, 24-26,
129-31, 141-^42
Orlovsky, Daniel, 279-80
OTAN. See Fatherland (Nur-OTAN)
(Kazakhstan)
Otechestvo (Fatherland) movement
(Russia), 109, 110
“Our Home is Our City” movement
(Russia), 94nl8
Our Home is Russia (NDR) party,
24-26, 74
commitment problems and failure
of, 105-6
electoral losses of, 90-91
failure of, 89-105
formation of, 89-90
310
Index
Our Home is Russia (NDR) party {cont.)
Kremlin lack of support for, 95-99,
104-5, 121-23
national elites and, 92-93, 104-5
presidential and regional neglect of, 92
regional elites lack of support for, 92,
93-95, 99-105
rump status of, 108
parliamentary institutions
commitment problems and, 66
cross-national measures strength of, 163
independence of, 58-59
regional parliaments, business elites
in, 224-29
United Russia Party control of, 169-70
Parliamentary Powers Index, 163
Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI), 1, 7-8
as dominant party, 200-1
elite circulation and, 10-13
factors in dominance of, 13
hegemony of, 89fl.2
opposition to, 246-47
patron-client ties and, 32
policy direction controlled by, 186
“presidencialismo” period and discipline
of, 176-77
Party for Russian Unity and Accord
(PRES), 80-81, 88, 92-93
Party of Life (Russia), 142-43
Party Projects of United Russia Party,
167-68, 170-71
party-state model in communist
regimes, 186
party substitutes, in electoral campaigns, 48
patron-client ties
Mexican PRI and, 10-13, 32
proliferation of dominant parties and, 14
Putin s development of, 112-14
in Russia, 30-32
United Russia Party influence on, 135,
136-37, 160-68, 183-85
Pempel, T. J., 4-5
Penn World Tables, 255
People s Democratic party (PDP)
(Nigeria), 1, 7-8, 17, 45, 200-1
People s National Congress (PNC)
(Guyana), 5
People s Party (Russia), 142^3
People s Republic of China
dominant party rule in, 277
parliamentary clashes with business
elites in, 162n7
single party regime in, 9
Percent Russian indicator, gubernatorial
ethnic resources and, 213, 215-20
personalism, future of authoritarian
regimes and role of, 279-81
Philippines
elite control of resources in, 69-70
political bosses in, 52
Platov, Vladimir, 114
Pligin, Vladimir, 165
Poland, dominant party rule in, 277
Polish United Worker s Party, 277
political appointments
avoidance of term limits
through, 150-53
costs of cooperation and incentives to
renege, 54-55
delegation of elite control over, 63-64
elected officials as, 146n70
routinzation of, 53
political decentralization
probability of dominant party emergence
and, 262-65
strength of elites and leaders
and,249-56
political machines
autonomous resources of, 116-21
in collectivized agriculture, 237
economic resources controlled
by, 211-13
elite dismantling of, 63-64
in ethnic regions, 85, 99
ethnic resources of, 213, 253
geographic and administrative resources
for, 213-14
as gubernatorial inherited political
resources, 211
Our Home Party neglected by, 92
in post-Soviet Russian politics,
80-81, 84-85
Putin s cooptation of, 143-^16
of regional elites, 87, 108-9, 115-16,
141-42,155-58
strength of elites and leaders
over, 249-56
United Russian Party cooptation of,
183-85, 196-98
political parties. See also dominant parties
in autocratic regimes, 1-4
commitment problem and formation
of, 65-66
elite commitment and formation
of, 47-48
First Russian Republic and absence
of, 76-78
new institutionalist theory and, 35-37
Index
311
Our Home is Russia party, 89-105
in post-Soviet Russia, 48
Russian legislative reforms
concerning, 193-95
Russian regional parties, 115n8
Russia’s Choice party, failure of, 79-89
Yeltsin’s initiatives for creation of, 89-90
politsovet (political councils),
business elites and, 131-32
conflicts within, 183-85
delegation of authority to, by United
Russia Party, 188-92
gubernatorial membership in, 208
local elites and, 135
mobility and turnover in, 170-71
regional governors in, 95
regional politsovets, 166-67
United Russia Party organization and
role of, 133-34
Popov, Gavril, 77-78, 80-81
Popov, Sergei, 122, 139-40
popularity of regime leaders
dominant party investment and, 45n5
Putin’s popularity decline and, 271-77
Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA), 46
population dispersion, strength of elites
and leaders and, 251-53
power-sharing
balance of resources and, 23-24, 70-73
by elites and leaders, 23-24,
42-43,45-46
First Russian Republic manipulation
of, 75-76
regime survival and, 7-8
regional elites and, 84-85
strength of elites and leaders linked
to, 249-56
by United Russia party, 25
Presidential Administration (Russia)
absence of party affiliation in, 185-86
declining United Russia Party influence
in, 273n5
dominance of legislative process
by, 162
Duma list of candidates and, 188
regional elite relations with, 188-92
United Russia Party and, 132-34,
136—46, 172-73, 182-83, 187
Primakov,Yevgenii, 25, 110, 111
primary party organization (PPOs), 185
prisoner’s dilemma, commitment
credibility and, 49-50
private sector, party affiliation of business
elites in, 229-33, 234
privatization
business elites and, 222-24
demise of dominant parties and, 13-16
Russian regional elites’ power over,
87,99-101
proportional electoral system, Russian shift
to, 145, 193-95
Przeworski, Adam, 12, 245-46, 277-79
public sector
party affiliation of business elites in,
229-33, 234-37
patronage resources in, 222-24
Putin, Vladimir
declining popularity of, 271-77
defections from regime of,
179-83, 195-96
dominant parties and, 40^ 1
Duma negotiations of, 176-77
economic conditions and rise of, 137-46
election as president, 111
gubernatorial elites and electoral
reforms of, 204-5, 209-10
limits on United Russia imposed
by, 185-96
party coalition building and, 112-14
public approval of, 142-43
regional elites and, 4, 17, 24-26, 34,
107-8, 116-23
United Russia Party and, 89f1.2, 26-32,
124-25, 127, 136, 152, 192-93, 195,
199-200
Yeltsin and, 110-11
qualitative analysis
dominant parties and democratization
outcomes, 12-13
dominant party emergence and, 41
Rakhimov, Murtaza
commitment problems of, 198
federal government and,
112-14,146-47
Russia’s Choice Party and, 81
United Russia Party and, 124-25,
205-6, 208-9
Rally of the Togolese People, 277
RAO-Unified Energy Systems, 234-37
rational choice theory
dominant party analysis and, 35-37
political party formation and, 47
regime leaders
agreements with elites,
monitoring of, 63
balance of resources and cooperation
with elites, 70-73
312
Index
regime leaders (corn.)
benefits for elites from, 50-53, 55-56
commitment problems for,
50-55, 66-67
costs of cooperation and incentives to
renege, 54-55, 56-57, 198-99
credible commitments of, 49, 60-63
defined, 42
dominant party emergence and, 42-58,
247,267-71
failure of, 277-79
generating support and winning
elections, 52
global patterns of party dominance and
characteristics of, 245^19
modeling of strength of, 256-57
parallel party organizations for, 59-60
population dispersion and strength
of, 251-53
preexisting party constraints on, 46
presidential succession in Mexico, 186
regional elites and, 43-44
relinquishing authority to parties
by, 61-62
rent distribution (rent-seeking)
by, 257-65
replacement of, 61
reputation mechanisms for credibility
enhancement, 62
routinzation of political
appointments by, 53
strength of, 249-65
United Russia Party benefits for,
176-96
regional elites. See also business elites;
elites; ethnic regions; gubernatorial
elites; national elites
access to policy and spoils through
United Russia Party, 160-68
autonomy of, 83-89, 108-9, 149-50
benefits of United Russia Party
for, 160-75
business elites and, 101n31, 237-38
career advancement through United
Russia Party for, 168-73
coercion of, to join United
Russia, 150-53
collective action problems of, 192-93
commitment problems in Russia
of, 105-6
definition of, 42^3
discipline of, under United Russia
Party, 154-55
dominant party emergence and, 4,
40-41,74, 123,267-71
in early post-Soviet Russia,
24-26, 40-41
economic conditions in Russia and,
83-89, 99-101
electoral politics and, 102-4, 109-10,
183-85, 188-92
ethnic minorities and strength of, 253
federal government in Russia and,
85-87, 108-9, 112-14, 123, 137^6
in First Russian Republic, 74-79
lack of party affiliation in Russia
of, 89-90
leaders’ ties with, 37, 43-44
legislative-governor relations,
162,188-92
lobbying activities of, 166-67
logrolling in local and regional
parliaments by, 161-62
multiple political affiliations of, 114-15
Our Home Party and, 92,
93-95, 99-105
political decentralization and strength
of, 249-56
political machines of, 109, 183-85
population dispersion and strength
of, 251-53
professions of regional deputies, 231
purges by United Russia Party of,
170-71, 177-78
Putin and, 111, 137-46
regional legislatures, economic elites
in, 222-29
regional parties and movements and,
115n8, 115-16
Russia’s Choice party failure and, 80-81
uncertainty reduced by United Russian
Party for, 168-73
United Russia Party and, 26-32,123-37,
139-40, 146-55, 188-92, 196-98
Unity Party of Russia and,
111-12, 114-21
voting discipline in regional
legislatures, 177-78
Yeltsin and, 83-89, 102-4, 108-9
Remington, Thomas, 161-62, 163
rent distribution (rent-seeking)
costs of cooperation and incentives to
renege, 54-55
democratization and, 222-24, 242-43
dominant parties and, 17, 257-65
leadership strength and, 254-56
Our Home is Russia party and lack
of, 96-99
by Russian regional elites, 89, 163
United Russia Party role in, 161-62
Index
313
Reuter, Ora John, 52, 163, 172, 179-83
revolutionary organizations
dominant party emergence and role
of, 270
dominant party origins in, 46
Reznik, Vladislav, 151
Robertson, Graeme, 163, 172
Rodina party, 191 -92
Roizman, Hvgenii, 182n44
roll-call voting, institution of compulsory
voting, 177-78
Rossel, Eduard, 93-95, 148n73, 151
ruling parties, in autocratic regimes, 14:
Russian Congress of People’s Deputies,
74-79, 85-87
Russian Federation, Russia regional elites
and legacy of, 85-87
Russian Movement for Democratic
Reforms, 80-81
Russian Union of Industrialists and
Entrepreneurs, 129-31
Russia’s Choice party
Chechnya conflict and, 92-93
failure of, 79-89, 105-6
formation of, 79
loss of power by, 89-90
Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR), 7-8
Ryabov, Andrei, 115n8
Rybkin, Ivan, 89-90
Sadat, Anwar, 277
Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, 22, 49
Scott, James, 52
Shabdurasulov, Igor, 110n3
Shaimiev, Mintimer, 205—6
Kremlin and, 146-47
political machines and, 109, 141
post-Soviet politics and, 94nl7, 94-95
United Russia Party and, 124-25,
208-9
Shakhrai, Sergei, 80-81, 83-90, 92-93
Shevardnadze, Eduard, 7-8
Shoigu, Sergei, 110-11
Shokhin, Alexander, 81, 104-5, 108
Shvetsova, Olga, 109-10, 111
Sidel,John, 52
single member districts (SMDs)
business elites in, 150
challenges to United Russia Party
from, 276nl8
election of legislators from, 224-29
Our Home is Russia party and,
90-91, 95-99
political machines in, 87
Putin’s coalitions with, 112-14
Russian party coalitions in, 123-24
Russia’s Choice Party and, 79-80, 81
United Russian party influence on,
127-29, 14041, 145, 149, 154-55
Unity Party presence in, 115, 115nl0
single parties
as dominant parties, 9
modernization and evolution
of, 14-15
regimes characterized as, 247-48
Sizov, Aleksander, 166-67
SKRIN Ltd., 233
Slider, Darrell, 103
Sluzhu Kuzbassu (I Serve the Kuzbass)
movement, 148, 207-8
Smith, Benjamin, 15-16, 45
Smyth, Regina, 37, 48, 65-66,
145, 229-33
Sobchak, Anatolii, 80-81
Sobyanin, Sergei, 124-25, 136-37,
146-47, 172n25, 186n51
social benefits, monetization of
business elites role in, 140-41
government-United Russia Party
conflict over, 192-93
United Russia Party cohesion
over, 176-77
Social Democrats (Sweden), 4-5
Socialist party ofYugoslavia, 7-8
social opposition
defections from United Russia Party as,
179-83,224-29
dominant parties’ influence on
division of, 6
inherited political resources and
emergence of, 257-65
strength of leaders in relation to, 255
society-based variables in dominant party
origins, 44-47
South Africa, dominant party in, 5
Southwest Africa People’s Organization
(SWAPO), 5
Soviet Congress of People’s Deputies,
competitive elections for, 74-79
Soviet Union
collapse of, 24-26, 75
party-state structure in, 187
Russia regional elites and institutional
legacy of, 85-87
“Soyuz Pravykh Sil” (Union of Right
Forces) party, 112-14
Special Purpose Programs, 167-68
spoils distribution
costs of cooperation and incentives to
renege, 54-55
314
Index
spoils distribution (corn.)
delegation of elite control over,
63-64, 191-92
elite commitment and, 12, 18, 61-62
independence of dominant parties
concerning, 59-60
logrolling of legislation and, 51-52
loyalty to leaders and, 50-51
routinzed political appointments and, 53
security of elite access to, 56, 191-92
United Russia Party role in, 28-32,
160-68, 186, 191-92
Stable Russia group, 92-93
Stalin, Joseph, 187
Stankevich, Sergei, 81
state-affiliated businesses
economic elites from, 222-24
party affiliation in, 229-33, 234-37
Stroev, Egor, 88, 94-95, 207n3
Strossner, Alfredo, 7-8
subnational elites. See regional elites
Sumin, Petr, 94nl7
Surkov, Vladislav, 110n3, 124-25, 136-37,
139, 144-45, 186
Svolik, Milan W., 23n6
Sweden, dominant parties in, 4-5
Szakonyi, David, 52
Taiwan, dominant party-leadership
commitment problems in, 187
Tanganyika Africa National Union
(TANU), 11,46
tax avoidance, in post-Soviet
Russia, 232-33
tax policy
commitment problems and
establishment of, 66
immobile assets and, 222-24
temperature per capita metric, 252n5
The World Economy: Historical
Statistics, 255
third-party institutions
absence in dictatorships of, 2-3
commitment of political parties and, 47
commitment problems of dominant
parties and, 58-59
dominant parties and role of, 267-71
Russian party development and, 103-4
Third Wave regimes, democratization
and dominant party emergence in,
248-49, 277-79
Tishanin, Alexander, 190
Titov, Konstantin, 109, 112-14, 150-53
Tkhakushnov, Aslan, 146n71, 172n24
Togo, dominant party emergence in, 277
transaction costs in politics
elite cooperation and reduction of, 56
pro-regime candidates, coordination of
linked to, 53
United Russia Party reduction of, 30-32
Transformation of the Urals Party, 94nl7
Travkin, Nikolai, 77-78, 80-81
Trofimov, Evgenii, 187, 197
True Whig Party (Liberia), 45
Tuleev, Aman, 109, 148, 207-8
Turchak, Andrei, 172
Turkmenistan, single party regime in, 9
Turovsky, Rostislav, 169-70
two-sided commitment problem
dominant party formation
and,48-58
independence of dominant parties
and,59-60
summary of, 58
Ukraine
authoritarian regime in, 2
‘colored’ revolution in, 34-35
dominant party influence in, 176
Russian dominant party cohesion and
crisis in, 276
uncertainty, United Russia Party
dominance and reduction of,
154-55, 168-73
uncommon democracies, 4-5
Union for the Republic (Togo), 277
“United Election Days” (Russia), 145-46
United Front (China), 277
United Malays National Organization
(UMNO), 1, 89fl,2, 187, 200-1, 277
United Russia Party, 1
access to policy and spoils and, 160-68
accommodative arrangements and
membership rules in, 168-73
approval ratings for, 135-36
autonomous resources of, 183-85, 186
benefit to authoritarian regime
of, 159-60
benefits of membership in,
150-53,160-75
business elites and, 129-31,
150, 153-54
career advancement opportunities
and, 168-73
cell organizations in, 135
coalition building by, 123-24
coercion to join, for regional and
gubernatoral elites, 150-53, 209-10
collective action problems managed
by, 192-93
Index
315
commitment problems and, 30-32,
154-58, 185-98
current organizational structure
of, 133-34
declining popularity of, 271-77
defections from, 179-83, 193-96,
224-29, 276-77
as dominant party, 89fl .2, 26-32,
39-40, 198-201,267-71
Duma coalition, 176-77
electoral benefits of membership
in, 173-75
electoral reforms and strengthening
of, 146
electoral success and mobilization of
popular support by, 183-85
evolution from 2001-2010 of, 123-55
executive branch influence on, 164—66
future challenges after 2011-2012
elections, 271-77
grassroots organization by, 185
gubernatorial elites and, 127-29,
136-37, 172-73, 196-98,
206-10,214-15
Kremlin and, 137-46, 176-85
leadership commitment and role
of, 185-96
lobbying activities of, 166-67
logit models of party affilation, 234
membership statistics for, 126-27
natural resources affect on loyalty
to, 222-24
origins of, 4, 24-26
party brand of, 150-53
popularity of, 173-75
purges in regional branches by, 170-71
Putin’s association with, 107-8, 195
‘‘Putin’s Plan” platform of, 136
regime stability and, 32-35
regional elites and, 26-32, 45, 123-37,
139—40, 146-55, 196-98
regional legislative dominance of,
125-26, 127-29, 139-40, 224-29
resource ownership and membership
in, 229-33
Russian governors’ support for,
127-29, 136-37
statistical analysis of gubernatorial
affiliation with, 214-20
uncertainty reduction by,
154-55, 168-73
vote mobilization in support of, 47
United Socialist Party of Venezuela, 277
United States, political party
formation in, 47
Unity and Progress movement,
94nl7, 107-8
Unity Party (Russia)
decline in regional elections of,
123-24
electoral success of, 111
evolution in 1999-2001 of,
24-26,108-12
founding of, 110-11
Kremlin relations with, 112-14,
116-21
OVR merger with, 112, 123-24,
139, 146-47
regional elites and, 111-12,
114-21, 214
United Russia party and, 123
universities, United Russia Party
dominance in, 131-32
Ural Rebirth party, 94n 17
Urlashov, Evgenii, 182n44
Vargas, Getulio, 2
Vekselberg, Viktor, 129-31
Venezuela, dominant party rule in, 277
Vietnam, single party regime in, 9
Volodin, Vyacheslav
Executive branch and, 171-72
in Presidential Administration, 136-37,
186n51
Putin and, 152
regional elites and, 170-71
United Russia Party and, 133-34, 141,
273n5
Voloshin, Alexander, 110n3
Vorob’ev, Andrei, 154-55
Vorobyov, Andrei, 172
vote mobilization
candidates’ personal vote resources
and,48
elite role in, 47, 214
registration procedures for elections
and, 173-75
United Russia Party role in,
183-85, 205-6
voter expectations
dominant parties’ influence on, 6
leaders’ strength and, 254-56
Vozrozhdeniye (Revival) movement, 109
Way, Lucan, 12-13
wealthy countries, lack of dominant parties
in, 257-65
Weibull test, statistical analysis of
gubernatorial party affiliation
and, 214-20
316
Index
Weingast, Barry, 58-59, 66
Weldon, Jeffrey, 176-77
within-case analyses, dominant party
emergence and, 40-41
World Bank Development Indicators,
254n8
Yakovlev, Vladimir, 109
Yakunin, Vladimir, 129-31
Yanukovych, Viktor, 280
Yarovaya, Irina, 170-71
Yavlinsky, Grigory, 80-81, 83-89
Yeltsin, Boris, 17
failing health of, 108-9
failure of Russia’s Choice party and, 79-89
Fatherland-Ail Russia (OVR) party
and,110
as First Russian Republic leader, 74-79
leadership weaknesses of, 83-89
Our Home is Russia party and, 92,
95-99, 104-5, 121-23
political motivations of, 82-83
reelection campaign of, 102-4
regional elites and, 74, 85-87
Russia’s Choice opposition to, 89-90
undermining of parties by, 4, 105-6
United Russia Party and, 24-26
Yumashev, Valentin, 110n3
Zelawi, Menes, 89fl .2
‘zero-reading’ logrolling policy, 160-68
Zheleznyak, Sergei, 170-71
Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 79-80
Zyuganov, Gennady, 102
Bayerische
Staatsbibliothek
München
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Reuter, Ora John |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1136395733 |
| author_facet | Reuter, Ora John |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Reuter, Ora John |
| author_variant | o j r oj ojr |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV044350375 |
| callnumber-first | J - Political Science |
| callnumber-label | JN6699 |
| callnumber-raw | JN6699.A795 |
| callnumber-search | JN6699.A795 |
| callnumber-sort | JN 46699 A795 |
| classification_rvk | MS 4600 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)989064236 (DE-599)BVBBV044350375 |
| dewey-full | 324.247 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 324 - The political process |
| dewey-raw | 324.247 |
| dewey-search | 324.247 |
| dewey-sort | 3324.247 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie Soziologie |
| era | Geschichte 2000-2012 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 2000-2012 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Russia (Federation) Politics and goverment 1991- Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Russia (Federation) Politics and goverment 1991- Russland |
| id | DE-604.BV044350375 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:50:30Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781107171763 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 016051824 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029753186 |
| oclc_num | 989064236 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-12 |
| physical | xiii, 316 Seiten Diagramme, Karten |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publishDateSearch | 2017 |
| publishDateSort | 2017 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Reuter, Ora John Verfasser (DE-588)1136395733 aut The origins of dominant parties building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia Ora John Reuter, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2017 xiii, 316 Seiten Diagramme, Karten txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index "In many autocracies, regime leaders share power with a ruling party, which can help generate popular support and reduce conflict among key elites. Such ruling parties are often called dominant parties. In other regimes, leaders prefer to rule solely through some combination of charisma, patronage, and coercion, rather than sharing power with a dominant party. This book explains why dominant parties emerge in some nondemocratic regimes, but not in others. It offers a novel theory of dominant party emergence that centers on the balance of power between rulers and other elites. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Russia, original data on Russian political elites, and cross-national statistical analysis, the book's findings shed new light on how modern autocracies work and why they break down. The book also provides new insights about the foundations of Vladimir Putin's regime and challenges several myths about the personalization of power under Putin"... Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovič 1952- (DE-588)122188926 gnd rswk-swf Einiges Russland (DE-588)7620650-6 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 2000-2012 gnd rswk-swf POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International / bisacsh Political parties Russia (Federation) Authoritarianism Russia (Federation) Post-communism Russia (Federation) POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International Elite (DE-588)4014457-4 gnd rswk-swf Regierungspartei (DE-588)4214711-6 gnd rswk-swf Autokratie (DE-588)4206090-4 gnd rswk-swf Russia (Federation) Politics and goverment 1991- Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovič 1952- (DE-588)122188926 p Elite (DE-588)4014457-4 s Einiges Russland (DE-588)7620650-6 b Geschichte 2000-2012 z DE-604 Autokratie (DE-588)4206090-4 s Regierungspartei (DE-588)4214711-6 s LoC Fremddatenuebernahme application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029753186&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029753186&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Literaturverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029753186&sequence=000004&line_number=0003&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Register // Gemischte Register |
| spellingShingle | Reuter, Ora John The origins of dominant parties building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovič 1952- (DE-588)122188926 gnd Einiges Russland (DE-588)7620650-6 gnd POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International / bisacsh Political parties Russia (Federation) Authoritarianism Russia (Federation) Post-communism Russia (Federation) POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International Elite (DE-588)4014457-4 gnd Regierungspartei (DE-588)4214711-6 gnd Autokratie (DE-588)4206090-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)122188926 (DE-588)7620650-6 (DE-588)4014457-4 (DE-588)4214711-6 (DE-588)4206090-4 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | The origins of dominant parties building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia |
| title_auth | The origins of dominant parties building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia |
| title_exact_search | The origins of dominant parties building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia |
| title_full | The origins of dominant parties building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia Ora John Reuter, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee |
| title_fullStr | The origins of dominant parties building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia Ora John Reuter, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee |
| title_full_unstemmed | The origins of dominant parties building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia Ora John Reuter, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee |
| title_short | The origins of dominant parties |
| title_sort | the origins of dominant parties building authoritarian institutions in post soviet russia |
| title_sub | building authoritarian institutions in post-soviet Russia |
| topic | Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovič 1952- (DE-588)122188926 gnd Einiges Russland (DE-588)7620650-6 gnd POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International / bisacsh Political parties Russia (Federation) Authoritarianism Russia (Federation) Post-communism Russia (Federation) POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International Elite (DE-588)4014457-4 gnd Regierungspartei (DE-588)4214711-6 gnd Autokratie (DE-588)4206090-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovič 1952- Einiges Russland POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International / bisacsh Political parties Russia (Federation) Authoritarianism Russia (Federation) Post-communism Russia (Federation) POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / International Elite Regierungspartei Autokratie Russia (Federation) Politics and goverment 1991- Russland |
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