The stability of belief: how rational belief coheres with probability
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
2017
|
| Ausgabe: | First edition |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Beschreibung: | x, 365 Seiten Illustrationen |
| ISBN: | 9780198732631 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804177464255053824 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
1. Introduction 1
1.1 The Nature of Belief 2
1.2 Concepts of Belief 8
1.3 Elimination, Reduction, Irreducibility 11
1.3.1 The Elimination (without Reduction) Option (i): At Least One of
the Two Concepts of Belief is Empty 13
1.3.2 The Reduction Option (ii): Both Concepts of Belief Refer, and
they Refer to the Same Phenomenon 16
1.3.3 The Irreducibility Option (iii): Both Concepts of Belief Refer,
But Not to the Same Phenomenon 20
1.4 Norms for Belief: How Should Beliefs Cohere? 27
1.5 The Route to an Answer 32
1.6 Bridge Principles for Rational Belief and Rational Degrees of Belief 41
1.6.1 The Certainty or Probability 1 Proposal 42
1.6.2 The Lockean Thesis 44
1.6.3 Decision-Theoretic Accounts 45
1.6.4 The Nihilistic Proposal 47
1.7 What is to Come 48
Appendix A. The Review Argument: On the Diachronic Costs of Not
Closing Rational Belief under Conjunction 54
A.l Closing Rational Belief under Conjunction 54
A.2 The Argument 55
A.3 A Variation 63
A.4 Conclusions 65
2. The Humean Thesis on Belief 69
2.1 Introduction 69
2.2 Explicating the Humean Thesis 73
2.3 The Consequences of the Humean Thesis 89
2.3.1 Consequence 1: Doxastic Logic 89
2.3.2 Consequence 2: The Lockean Thesis 96
2.3.3 Consequence 3: Decision Theory 100
2.4 Conclusions 104
Appendix B. Where Does Stability Come from? Stability through Repetition 106
3. Logical Closure and the Lockean Thesis 112
3.1 The Lockean Thesis and Closure of Belief under Conjunction 112
3.2 P-Stability 117
X CONTENTS
3.3 The Theory and its Costs 127
3.4 Application to the Lottery Paradox 148
3.5 A First Shot at the Preface Paradox 151
3.6 An Application in Formal Epistemology 153
3.7 Summary 157
4. Conditional Belief and Belief Dynamics 159
4.1 A Stability Theory of Conditional Belief and Belief Dynamics:
Introduction and Synopsis 160
4.1.1 Conditional Probability and Conditionalization 160
4.1.2 Conditional Belief and Belief Revision 162
4.1.3 Conditionalization vs Belief Revision: A Preview 171
4.1.4 Some Closely Related Theories 176
4.2 A Stability Theory of Conditional Belief and Belief Dynamics:
The Formal Details 179
4.2.1 Probabilistic Postulates 180
4.2.2 Restricted Conditional Belief and a Bridge Postulate 181
4.2.3 Conditional Belief in General 214
4.3 Some Examples with a Concrete Interpretation 225
Appendix C. Does Rational Belief Reduce to Subjective Probability?
Does it Supervene? 230
C.l The First Argument Against Supervenience 232
C. 2 The Second Argument Against Supervenience 234
5. Stability and Epistemic Decision Theory 237
5.1 Belief’s Aiming at the Truth 240
5.2 Belief’s Aiming at Subjective Probability 250
5.2.1 Probabilistic Order vs Doxastic Order over Worlds 250
5.2.2 Accuracy for Orders over Worlds 256
5.2.3 Error-Free Doxastic Orders of Worlds 260
5.2.4 Conclusions on Rational Belief 262
6. Action, Assertability, Acceptance 265
6.1 Action 267
6.2 Assertability 274
6.3 Acceptance 302
6.4 The Preface Paradox Reconsidered 313
Appendix D. On Counterfactuals and Chance 319
D. l A New Paradox 320
D.2 The Derivation 324
D.3 Related Arguments 325
D.4 Diagnosis 330
D.5 A New Way Out 335
D.6 Evaluation and Prospects 344
Bibliography 349
Index 361
In everyday life we normally express our beliefs in all-or-nothing terms:
I believe it is going to rain; I don t believe that my lottery ticket will win.
In other cases, if possible, we resort to numerical probabilities: my degree
of belief that it is going to rain is 80 per cent; the probability that I assign to
my ticket winning is one in a million. It is an open philosophical question how
all-or-nothing belief and numerical belief relate to each other, and how we
ought to reason with them simultaneously. The Stability of Belief develops
a theory of rational belief that aims to answer this question.
Hannes Leitgeb puts forward a joint normative theory of all-or-nothing belief
and numerical degrees of belief. While rational all-or-nothing belief is studied
in traditional epistemology and is usually assumed to obey logical norms,
rational degrees of belief constitute the subject matter of Bayesian epistemology
and are normally taken to conform to probabilistic norms. One of the central
open questions in formal epistemology is what beliefs and degrees of belief have
to be like in order for them to cohere with each other. The answer defended in
this book is a stability account of belief: a rational agent believes a proposition
just in case the agent assigns a stably high degree of belief to it. Leitgeb
determines this theory s consequences for, and applications to, learning,
suppositional reasoning, decision-making, assertion, acceptance, conditionals,
and chance. The volume builds new bridges between logic and probability
theory, traditional and formal epistemology, theoretical and practical
rationality, and synchronic and diachronic norms for reasoning.
HANNES LEITGE
completed PhDs in mathematics and
philosophy, both at the University of
Salzburg, where he also worked as
an Assistant Professor in philosophy. In
2003 he received an Erwin-Schrödinger
Fellowship from the Austrian Research
Fund on the basis of which he did research
at Stanford University. In 2005 he took up
a Readership at the University of Bristol,
where in 2007 he became Professor of
Mathematical Logic and Philosophy
of Mathematics. In 2010 he founded
the Munich Center for Mathematical
Philosophy at LMU Munich where he
holds the Chair of Logic and Philosophy
of Language. He was awarded a Philip
Leverhulme Prize by the Leverhulme Trust,
and a Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research
Award and an Alexander von Hum boldt
Professorship by the Alexander von
Humboldt Foundation. He is the
Editor-m-Chief of Erkenntnis.
|
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| spelling | Leitgeb, Hannes 1972- Verfasser (DE-588)1038450632 aut The stability of belief how rational belief coheres with probability Hannes Leitgeb First edition Oxford Oxford University Press 2017 x, 365 Seiten Illustrationen txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zweifel (DE-588)4124501-5 gnd rswk-swf Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 gnd rswk-swf Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 gnd rswk-swf Rationalität (DE-588)4048507-9 gnd rswk-swf Probabilities Epistemic logic Belief and doubt Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 s Zweifel (DE-588)4124501-5 s Rationalität (DE-588)4048507-9 s Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029681168&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Regensburg - ADAM Catalogue Enrichment application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=029681168&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Leitgeb, Hannes 1972- The stability of belief how rational belief coheres with probability Zweifel (DE-588)4124501-5 gnd Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 gnd Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 gnd Rationalität (DE-588)4048507-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4124501-5 (DE-588)4137007-7 (DE-588)4071867-0 (DE-588)4048507-9 |
| title | The stability of belief how rational belief coheres with probability |
| title_auth | The stability of belief how rational belief coheres with probability |
| title_exact_search | The stability of belief how rational belief coheres with probability |
| title_full | The stability of belief how rational belief coheres with probability Hannes Leitgeb |
| title_fullStr | The stability of belief how rational belief coheres with probability Hannes Leitgeb |
| title_full_unstemmed | The stability of belief how rational belief coheres with probability Hannes Leitgeb |
| title_short | The stability of belief |
| title_sort | the stability of belief how rational belief coheres with probability |
| title_sub | how rational belief coheres with probability |
| topic | Zweifel (DE-588)4124501-5 gnd Wahrscheinlichkeit (DE-588)4137007-7 gnd Glaube (DE-588)4071867-0 gnd Rationalität (DE-588)4048507-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Zweifel Wahrscheinlichkeit Glaube Rationalität |
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