Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy:
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also co...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2017
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 UBY01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 28 Feb 2017) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (344 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781316227305 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/9781316227305 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV044244065 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20230220 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 170327s2017 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781316227305 |9 978-1-316-22730-5 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1017/9781316227305 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781316227305 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)992455290 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV044244065 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-473 |a DE-706 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 327.1/747 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Sechser, Todd S. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1143990005 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy |c Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge |b Cambridge University Press |c 2017 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (344 pages) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 28 Feb 2017) | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a Nuclear blackmail in international politics -- Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism -- Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining -- Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics -- Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails -- Think again: reassessing nuclear victories -- Nuclear coercion in myth and reality | |
| 520 | |a Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Internationale Politik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Nuclear arms control | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Nuclear nonproliferation | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Diplomacy | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International relations | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Kernwaffe |0 (DE-588)4003434-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Abschreckung |0 (DE-588)4000230-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Internationale Politik |0 (DE-588)4072885-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Kernwaffe |0 (DE-588)4003434-3 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Abschreckung |0 (DE-588)4000230-5 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Internationale Politik |0 (DE-588)4072885-7 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Fuhrmann, Matthew |d 1980- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1027041000 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe, hardback |z 978-1-107-10694-9 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druck-Ausgabe, paperback |z 978-1-107-51451-5 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-20-CBO | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029649321 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q BSB_PDA_CBO_Kauf |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305 |l UBG01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q UBG_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305 |l UBY01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q UBY_PDA_CBO_Kauf22 |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804177407494586368 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Sechser, Todd S. Fuhrmann, Matthew 1980- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1143990005 (DE-588)1027041000 |
| author_facet | Sechser, Todd S. Fuhrmann, Matthew 1980- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Sechser, Todd S. |
| author_variant | t s s ts tss m f mf |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV044244065 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| contents | Nuclear blackmail in international politics -- Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism -- Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining -- Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics -- Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails -- Think again: reassessing nuclear victories -- Nuclear coercion in myth and reality |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781316227305 (OCoLC)992455290 (DE-599)BVBBV044244065 |
| dewey-full | 327.1/747 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 327 - International relations |
| dewey-raw | 327.1/747 |
| dewey-search | 327.1/747 |
| dewey-sort | 3327.1 3747 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/9781316227305 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03687nmm a2200577zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV044244065</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230220 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">170327s2017 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781316227305</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-316-22730-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1017/9781316227305</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781316227305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)992455290</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV044244065</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-706</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">327.1/747</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sechser, Todd S.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1143990005</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy</subfield><subfield code="c">Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2017</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (344 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 28 Feb 2017)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nuclear blackmail in international politics -- Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism -- Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining -- Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics -- Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails -- Think again: reassessing nuclear victories -- Nuclear coercion in myth and reality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Internationale Politik</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear arms control</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Nuclear nonproliferation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Diplomacy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">International relations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Kernwaffe</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4003434-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Abschreckung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4000230-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Internationale Politik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4072885-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Kernwaffe</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4003434-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Abschreckung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4000230-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Internationale Politik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4072885-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fuhrmann, Matthew</subfield><subfield code="d">1980-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1027041000</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe, hardback</subfield><subfield code="z">978-1-107-10694-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druck-Ausgabe, paperback</subfield><subfield code="z">978-1-107-51451-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029649321</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">BSB_PDA_CBO_Kauf</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305</subfield><subfield code="l">UBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305</subfield><subfield code="l">UBY01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">UBY_PDA_CBO_Kauf22</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV044244065 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:47:35Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781316227305 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029649321 |
| oclc_num | 992455290 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-706 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-706 |
| physical | 1 online resource (344 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO_Kauf ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBY_PDA_CBO_Kauf22 |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publishDateSearch | 2017 |
| publishDateSort | 2017 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Sechser, Todd S. Verfasser (DE-588)1143990005 aut Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2017 1 online resource (344 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 28 Feb 2017) Nuclear blackmail in international politics -- Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism -- Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining -- Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics -- Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails -- Think again: reassessing nuclear victories -- Nuclear coercion in myth and reality Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive Internationale Politik Nuclear arms control Nuclear nonproliferation Diplomacy International relations Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd rswk-swf Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd rswk-swf Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 gnd rswk-swf Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 s Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 s Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 s 1\p DE-604 Fuhrmann, Matthew 1980- Verfasser (DE-588)1027041000 aut Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, hardback 978-1-107-10694-9 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, paperback 978-1-107-51451-5 https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Sechser, Todd S. Fuhrmann, Matthew 1980- Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy Nuclear blackmail in international politics -- Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism -- Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining -- Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics -- Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails -- Think again: reassessing nuclear victories -- Nuclear coercion in myth and reality Internationale Politik Nuclear arms control Nuclear nonproliferation Diplomacy International relations Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4003434-3 (DE-588)4000230-5 (DE-588)4072885-7 |
| title | Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy |
| title_auth | Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy |
| title_exact_search | Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy |
| title_full | Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann |
| title_fullStr | Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann |
| title_full_unstemmed | Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann |
| title_short | Nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy |
| title_sort | nuclear weapons and coercive diplomacy |
| topic | Internationale Politik Nuclear arms control Nuclear nonproliferation Diplomacy International relations Kernwaffe (DE-588)4003434-3 gnd Abschreckung (DE-588)4000230-5 gnd Internationale Politik (DE-588)4072885-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Internationale Politik Nuclear arms control Nuclear nonproliferation Diplomacy International relations Kernwaffe Abschreckung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316227305 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT sechsertodds nuclearweaponsandcoercivediplomacy AT fuhrmannmatthew nuclearweaponsandcoercivediplomacy |