Goal-independent central banks: why politicians decide to delegate
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
[Washington, D.C.]
International Monetary Fund
2006
|
| Schriftenreihe: | IMF working paper
WP/06/256 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Beschreibung: | "November 2006." Includes bibliographical references |
| Beschreibung: | 41 p |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| any_adam_object | |
| author | Crowe, Christopher |
| author_facet | Crowe, Christopher |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Crowe, Christopher |
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| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV044086149 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:43:13Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029492994 |
| oclc_num | 698585545 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| physical | 41 p |
| psigel | ZDB-30-PAD ZDB-30-PBE |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | International Monetary Fund |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | IMF working paper |
| spelling | Crowe, Christopher Verfasser aut Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate prepared by Christopher Crowe [Washington, D.C.] International Monetary Fund 2006 41 p txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier IMF working paper WP/06/256 "November 2006." Includes bibliographical references Banks and banking, Central Monetary policy |
| spellingShingle | Crowe, Christopher Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate Banks and banking, Central Monetary policy |
| title | Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate |
| title_auth | Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate |
| title_exact_search | Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate |
| title_full | Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate prepared by Christopher Crowe |
| title_fullStr | Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate prepared by Christopher Crowe |
| title_full_unstemmed | Goal-independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate prepared by Christopher Crowe |
| title_short | Goal-independent central banks |
| title_sort | goal independent central banks why politicians decide to delegate |
| title_sub | why politicians decide to delegate |
| topic | Banks and banking, Central Monetary policy |
| topic_facet | Banks and banking, Central Monetary policy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT crowechristopher goalindependentcentralbankswhypoliticiansdecidetodelegate |