Monetary policy and the onset of the Great Depression the myth of Benjamin Strong as decisive leader
Monetary policy and the onset of the Great Depression: the myth of Benjamin Strong as decisive leader

"Monetary Policy and the Onset of the Great Depression" challenges Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's now-consensus view that the high tide of the Federal Reserve System in the 1920s was due to the leadership skills of Benjamin Strong, head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Toma, Mark (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: New York, NY ; Basingstoke, Hampshire Palgrave Macmillan 2013
Schlagworte:
Strong, Benjamin > 1872-1928
Strong, Benjamind1872-1928
Federal Reserve System > Board of Governors
Federal Reserve banksxHistoryy20th century
Depressionsy1929zUnited States
Monetary policyzUnited StatesxHistoryy20th century
United StatesxEconomic conditionsy1918-1945
Weltwirtschaftskrise > 1929-1932
Geldpolitik
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)xHistoryy20th century
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Zusammenfassung:"Monetary Policy and the Onset of the Great Depression" challenges Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's now-consensus view that the high tide of the Federal Reserve System in the 1920s was due to the leadership skills of Benjamin Strong, head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In this new work, Toma develops a self-regulated model of the Federal Reserve, which stands in contrast to a conventional discretionary model. Given the easy redemption of dollars for gold and the competition among Reserve banks, the self-regulated model implies that the early Fed could control neither the money supply nor the price level. Exploiting an untapped data set, later chapters test the thesis of self-regulation by focusing on the monetary decisions of individual Reserve banks. The micro-based evidence indicates that "Reserve banks really did compete" and that Benjamin Strong as decisive leader during the 1920s is a myth. This finding, with its emphasis on monetary policy in the years leading up to the Great Depression, will be of interest to scholars, students, and sophisticated lay readers with an interest in macroeconomic and monetary economic policy issues, specifically to those with an interest in economic history."
Beschreibung:1 Online-Ressource (xix, 214 Seiten) Illustrationen
ISBN:9781137371621
DOI:10.1057/9781137371621

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