Strategic complements in international environmental agreements: a new island of stability
International environmental agreements have had varying success in the past; the theoretical literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) explains why freeriding is so common. This paper allows for two strategically different types of countries. Damage functions are concave for some c...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oldenburg
Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg
August 2016
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Oldenburg discussion papers in economics
V-393-16 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | International environmental agreements have had varying success in the past; the theoretical literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) explains why freeriding is so common. This paper allows for two strategically different types of countries. Damage functions are concave for some countries (contrary to the standard convexity assumption). This leads to strategic substitutes and complements in emissions reduction within the same model. The interaction of both country types can lead to a stable agreement that is larger than in the standard case, and to more global abatement. Such a stable agreement constitutes an island of stability in addition to the small standard agreement. |
| Beschreibung: | 1 Online-Ressource (27 Seiten) |
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| spelling | Kähler, Leonhard Verfasser aut Strategic complements in international environmental agreements a new island of stability Leonhard Kähler, Klaus Eisenack Oldenburg Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg August 2016 1 Online-Ressource (27 Seiten) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Oldenburg discussion papers in economics V-393-16 International environmental agreements have had varying success in the past; the theoretical literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) explains why freeriding is so common. This paper allows for two strategically different types of countries. Damage functions are concave for some countries (contrary to the standard convexity assumption). This leads to strategic substitutes and complements in emissions reduction within the same model. The interaction of both country types can lead to a stable agreement that is larger than in the standard case, and to more global abatement. Such a stable agreement constitutes an island of stability in addition to the small standard agreement. Eisenack, Klaus Verfasser (DE-588)140774912 aut Oldenburg discussion papers in economics V-393-16 (DE-604)BV039810434 393 http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-393-16.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Kähler, Leonhard Eisenack, Klaus Strategic complements in international environmental agreements a new island of stability Oldenburg discussion papers in economics |
| title | Strategic complements in international environmental agreements a new island of stability |
| title_auth | Strategic complements in international environmental agreements a new island of stability |
| title_exact_search | Strategic complements in international environmental agreements a new island of stability |
| title_full | Strategic complements in international environmental agreements a new island of stability Leonhard Kähler, Klaus Eisenack |
| title_fullStr | Strategic complements in international environmental agreements a new island of stability Leonhard Kähler, Klaus Eisenack |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic complements in international environmental agreements a new island of stability Leonhard Kähler, Klaus Eisenack |
| title_short | Strategic complements in international environmental agreements |
| title_sort | strategic complements in international environmental agreements a new island of stability |
| title_sub | a new island of stability |
| url | http://www.uni-oldenburg.de/fileadmin/user_upload/wire/fachgebiete/vwl/V-393-16.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV039810434 |
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