Evolutionary games and population dynamics:
Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1998
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 FHN01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xxvii, 323 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781139173179 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9781139173179 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043943986 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 161206s1998 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9781139173179 |c Online |9 978-1-139-17317-9 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1017/CBO9781139173179 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781139173179 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)859644593 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043943986 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-92 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 576.8/01/5118 |2 21 | |
| 084 | |a QH 430 |0 (DE-625)141581: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a QU 000 |0 (DE-625)142128: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a SK 810 |0 (DE-625)143257: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a SK 860 |0 (DE-625)143264: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a SK 880 |0 (DE-625)143266: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a WC 7000 |0 (DE-625)148142: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Hofbauer, Josef |d 1956- |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Evolutionary games and population dynamics |c Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund |
| 246 | 1 | 3 | |a Evolutionary Games & Population Dynamics |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge |b Cambridge University Press |c 1998 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xxvii, 323 pages) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) | ||
| 520 | |a Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematisches Modell | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Evolution (Biology) / Mathematical models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Population biology / Mathematical models | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Volterra equations | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Mathematisches Modell |0 (DE-588)4114528-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Evolutionäre Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4732282-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Evolution |0 (DE-588)4071050-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Populationsdynamik |0 (DE-588)4046803-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Populationsdynamik |0 (DE-588)4046803-3 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Evolution |0 (DE-588)4071050-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Mathematisches Modell |0 (DE-588)4114528-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Evolutionäre Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4732282-2 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Populationsdynamik |0 (DE-588)4046803-3 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |8 2\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Sigmund, Karl |d 1945- |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-62365-0 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-62570-8 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-20-CBO | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029352957 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 2\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q BSB_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179 |l FHN01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q FHN_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804176888401231872 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Hofbauer, Josef 1956- |
| author_facet | Hofbauer, Josef 1956- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Hofbauer, Josef 1956- |
| author_variant | j h jh |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043943986 |
| classification_rvk | QH 430 QU 000 SK 810 SK 860 SK 880 WC 7000 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781139173179 (OCoLC)859644593 (DE-599)BVBBV043943986 |
| dewey-full | 576.8/01/5118 |
| dewey-hundreds | 500 - Natural sciences and mathematics |
| dewey-ones | 576 - Genetics and evolution |
| dewey-raw | 576.8/01/5118 |
| dewey-search | 576.8/01/5118 |
| dewey-sort | 3576.8 11 45118 |
| dewey-tens | 570 - Biology |
| discipline | Biologie Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9781139173179 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>04064nmm a2200697zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043943986</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">161206s1998 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781139173179</subfield><subfield code="c">Online</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-139-17317-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1017/CBO9781139173179</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781139173179</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)859644593</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043943986</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-92</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">576.8/01/5118</subfield><subfield code="2">21</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QH 430</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141581:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QU 000</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)142128:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SK 810</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)143257:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SK 860</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)143264:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SK 880</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)143266:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">WC 7000</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)148142:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Hofbauer, Josef</subfield><subfield code="d">1956-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Evolutionary games and population dynamics</subfield><subfield code="c">Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="246" ind1="1" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Evolutionary Games & Population Dynamics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">1998</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (xxvii, 323 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Mathematisches Modell</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Evolution (Biology) / Mathematical models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Population biology / Mathematical models</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Game theory</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Volterra equations</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Mathematisches Modell</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4114528-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Evolutionäre Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4732282-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Evolution</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4071050-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Populationsdynamik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4046803-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Populationsdynamik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4046803-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Evolution</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4071050-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Mathematisches Modell</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4114528-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Evolutionäre Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4732282-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Populationsdynamik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4046803-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sigmund, Karl</subfield><subfield code="d">1945-</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-62365-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-62570-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029352957</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">BSB_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179</subfield><subfield code="l">FHN01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">FHN_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV043943986 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:39:20Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781139173179 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029352957 |
| oclc_num | 859644593 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-92 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-92 |
| physical | 1 online resource (xxvii, 323 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO FHN_PDA_CBO |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| publishDateSearch | 1998 |
| publishDateSort | 1998 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Hofbauer, Josef 1956- Verfasser aut Evolutionary games and population dynamics Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund Evolutionary Games & Population Dynamics Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1998 1 online resource (xxvii, 323 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realised how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centred not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioural programmes. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behaviour, and of the closely related interactions between species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions which can alter the basis of their success, i.e. to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms Mathematisches Modell Evolution (Biology) / Mathematical models Population biology / Mathematical models Game theory Volterra equations Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd rswk-swf Evolutionäre Spieltheorie (DE-588)4732282-2 gnd rswk-swf Evolution (DE-588)4071050-6 gnd rswk-swf Populationsdynamik (DE-588)4046803-3 gnd rswk-swf Populationsdynamik (DE-588)4046803-3 s Evolution (DE-588)4071050-6 s Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 s 1\p DE-604 Evolutionäre Spieltheorie (DE-588)4732282-2 s 2\p DE-604 Sigmund, Karl 1945- Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-62365-0 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-62570-8 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Hofbauer, Josef 1956- Evolutionary games and population dynamics Mathematisches Modell Evolution (Biology) / Mathematical models Population biology / Mathematical models Game theory Volterra equations Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Evolutionäre Spieltheorie (DE-588)4732282-2 gnd Evolution (DE-588)4071050-6 gnd Populationsdynamik (DE-588)4046803-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4114528-8 (DE-588)4732282-2 (DE-588)4071050-6 (DE-588)4046803-3 |
| title | Evolutionary games and population dynamics |
| title_alt | Evolutionary Games & Population Dynamics |
| title_auth | Evolutionary games and population dynamics |
| title_exact_search | Evolutionary games and population dynamics |
| title_full | Evolutionary games and population dynamics Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund |
| title_fullStr | Evolutionary games and population dynamics Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evolutionary games and population dynamics Josef Hofbauer, Karl Sigmund |
| title_short | Evolutionary games and population dynamics |
| title_sort | evolutionary games and population dynamics |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Evolution (Biology) / Mathematical models Population biology / Mathematical models Game theory Volterra equations Mathematisches Modell (DE-588)4114528-8 gnd Evolutionäre Spieltheorie (DE-588)4732282-2 gnd Evolution (DE-588)4071050-6 gnd Populationsdynamik (DE-588)4046803-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Evolution (Biology) / Mathematical models Population biology / Mathematical models Game theory Volterra equations Evolutionäre Spieltheorie Evolution Populationsdynamik |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173179 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hofbauerjosef evolutionarygamesandpopulationdynamics AT sigmundkarl evolutionarygamesandpopulationdynamics AT hofbauerjosef evolutionarygamespopulationdynamics AT sigmundkarl evolutionarygamespopulationdynamics |