Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of pre...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Author:	Duxbury, Neil (Author)
Format:	Electronic eBook
Language:	English
Published:	Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2008
Subjects:	Stare decisis Judicial process Stare decisis / Great Brtiain Judicial process / Great Britain Angloamerikanisches Recht Präjudiz Präzedenzfall Großbritannien
Online Access:	BSB01 UBG01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Summary:	Neil Duxbury examines how precedents constrain legal decision-makers and how legal decision-makers relax and avoid those constraints. There is no single principle or theory which explains the authority of precedent but rather a number of arguments which raise rebuttable presumptions in favour of precedent-following. This book examines the force and the limitations of these arguments and shows that although the principal requirement of the doctrine of precedent is that courts respect earlier judicial decisions on materially identical facts, the doctrine also requires courts to depart from such decisions when following them would perpetuate legal error or injustice. Not only do judicial precedents not 'bind' judges in the classical-positivist sense, but, were they to do so, they would be ill suited to common-law decision-making. Combining historical inquiry and philosophical analysis, this book will assist anyone seeking to understand how precedent operates as a common-law doctrine
Item Description:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Physical Description:	1 online resource (xv, 189 pages)
ISBN:	9780511818684
DOI:	10.1017/CBO9780511818684