The logic of bureaucratic conduct: an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations
In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two cent...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1982
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xi, 195 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511896033 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511896033 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043929633 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 161202s1982 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9780511896033 |c Online |9 978-0-511-89603-3 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1017/CBO9780511896033 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511896033 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)967487494 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043929633 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-473 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 302.3/5 |2 19eng | |
| 084 | |a PN 220 |0 (DE-625)137299: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a QL 300 |0 (DE-625)141712: |2 rvk | ||
| 084 | |a QP 343 |0 (DE-625)141864: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Breton, Albert |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The logic of bureaucratic conduct |b an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations |c Albert Breton, Ronald Wintrobe |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge |b Cambridge University Press |c 1982 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xi, 195 pages) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) | ||
| 520 | |a In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Bureaucracy | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Neoklassische Theorie |0 (DE-588)4115360-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Theorie |0 (DE-588)4059787-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Bürokratie |0 (DE-588)4008822-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Bürokratie |0 (DE-588)4008822-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Neoklassische Theorie |0 (DE-588)4115360-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Theorie |0 (DE-588)4059787-8 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |8 2\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Wintrobe, Ronald |e Sonstige |4 oth | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-07172-7 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-24589-0 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-20-CBO | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029338712 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 2\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q BSB_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033 |l UBG01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q UBG_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804176860490235904 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Breton, Albert |
| author_facet | Breton, Albert |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Breton, Albert |
| author_variant | a b ab |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043929633 |
| classification_rvk | PN 220 QL 300 QP 343 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511896033 (OCoLC)967487494 (DE-599)BVBBV043929633 |
| dewey-full | 302.3/5 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 302 - Social interaction |
| dewey-raw | 302.3/5 |
| dewey-search | 302.3/5 |
| dewey-sort | 3302.3 15 |
| dewey-tens | 300 - Social sciences |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft Soziologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511896033 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03286nmm a2200565zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043929633</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">161202s1982 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780511896033</subfield><subfield code="c">Online</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-511-89603-3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1017/CBO9780511896033</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511896033</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)967487494</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043929633</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">302.3/5</subfield><subfield code="2">19eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PN 220</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)137299:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QL 300</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141712:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QP 343</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141864:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Breton, Albert</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The logic of bureaucratic conduct</subfield><subfield code="b">an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations</subfield><subfield code="c">Albert Breton, Ronald Wintrobe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">1982</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (xi, 195 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Bureaucracy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Neoklassische Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4115360-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4059787-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Bürokratie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4008822-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Bürokratie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4008822-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Neoklassische Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4115360-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4059787-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wintrobe, Ronald</subfield><subfield code="e">Sonstige</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-07172-7</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-24589-0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029338712</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">BSB_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033</subfield><subfield code="l">UBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV043929633 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:54Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511896033 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029338712 |
| oclc_num | 967487494 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| physical | 1 online resource (xi, 195 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO |
| publishDate | 1982 |
| publishDateSearch | 1982 |
| publishDateSort | 1982 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Breton, Albert Verfasser aut The logic of bureaucratic conduct an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations Albert Breton, Ronald Wintrobe Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1982 1 online resource (xi, 195 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) In this work the authors present a general theory of bureaucracy and use it to explain behaviour in large organizations and to explain what determines efficiency in both governments and business corporations. The theory uses the methods of standard neoclassical economic theory. It relies on two central principles: that members of an organization trade with one another and that they compete with one another. Authority, which is the basis for conventional theories of bureaucracy, is given a role, despite reliance on the idea of trade between bureaucracies. It is argued, however, that bureaucracies cannot operate efficiently on the basis of authority alone. Exchange between bureaucrats is hampered because promises are not enforceable. So trust and loyalty between members of bureaucratic networks play an important part. The authors find that vertical networks promote efficiency while horizontal ones impede it Bureaucracy Neoklassische Theorie (DE-588)4115360-1 gnd rswk-swf Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd rswk-swf Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 gnd rswk-swf Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 s Neoklassische Theorie (DE-588)4115360-1 s 1\p DE-604 Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 s 2\p DE-604 Wintrobe, Ronald Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-07172-7 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-24589-0 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Breton, Albert The logic of bureaucratic conduct an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations Bureaucracy Neoklassische Theorie (DE-588)4115360-1 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4115360-1 (DE-588)4059787-8 (DE-588)4008822-4 |
| title | The logic of bureaucratic conduct an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations |
| title_auth | The logic of bureaucratic conduct an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations |
| title_exact_search | The logic of bureaucratic conduct an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations |
| title_full | The logic of bureaucratic conduct an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations Albert Breton, Ronald Wintrobe |
| title_fullStr | The logic of bureaucratic conduct an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations Albert Breton, Ronald Wintrobe |
| title_full_unstemmed | The logic of bureaucratic conduct an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations Albert Breton, Ronald Wintrobe |
| title_short | The logic of bureaucratic conduct |
| title_sort | the logic of bureaucratic conduct an economic analysis of competition exchange and efficiency in private and public organizations |
| title_sub | an economic analysis of competition, exchange, and efficiency in private and public organizations |
| topic | Bureaucracy Neoklassische Theorie (DE-588)4115360-1 gnd Theorie (DE-588)4059787-8 gnd Bürokratie (DE-588)4008822-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Bureaucracy Neoklassische Theorie Theorie Bürokratie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511896033 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bretonalbert thelogicofbureaucraticconductaneconomicanalysisofcompetitionexchangeandefficiencyinprivateandpublicorganizations AT wintroberonald thelogicofbureaucraticconductaneconomicanalysisofcompetitionexchangeandefficiencyinprivateandpublicorganizations |