Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review:
In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2007
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511498749 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511498749 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043928918 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 161202s2007 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9780511498749 |c Online |9 978-0-511-49874-9 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1017/CBO9780511498749 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511498749 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)967420808 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043928918 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-473 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 347.73/12 |2 22 | |
| 084 | |a PL 731 |0 (DE-625)137267: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Zurn, Christopher F. |d 1966- |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review |c Christopher F. Zurn |
| 246 | 1 | 3 | |a Deliberative Democracy & the Institutions of Judicial Review |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge |b Cambridge University Press |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- | |
| 505 | 8 | |a pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora | |
| 520 | |a In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Judicial review / United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Constitutional courts / United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Legislative power / United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Executive power / United States | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Deliberative democracy / United States | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Normenkontrolle |0 (DE-588)4042623-3 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Konstitutionalismus |0 (DE-588)4165087-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Gesetzgebende Gewalt |0 (DE-588)4131717-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Rechtsprechende Gewalt |0 (DE-588)4177253-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Legitimität |0 (DE-588)4035043-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Deliberative Demokratie |0 (DE-588)4671998-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Demokratie |0 (DE-588)4011413-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit |0 (DE-588)4062793-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Verfassungsgericht |0 (DE-588)4565747-6 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 651 | 4 | |a USA | |
| 651 | 7 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a USA |0 (DE-588)4078704-7 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Verfassungsgericht |0 (DE-588)4565747-6 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Gesetzgebende Gewalt |0 (DE-588)4131717-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 3 | |a Normenkontrolle |0 (DE-588)4042623-3 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 4 | |a Deliberative Demokratie |0 (DE-588)4671998-2 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 1 | 0 | |a Rechtsprechende Gewalt |0 (DE-588)4177253-2 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 1 | |a Legitimität |0 (DE-588)4035043-5 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 2 | |a Demokratie |0 (DE-588)4011413-2 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | 3 | |a Konstitutionalismus |0 (DE-588)4165087-6 |D s |
| 689 | 1 | |8 2\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 689 | 2 | 0 | |a Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit |0 (DE-588)4062793-7 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | 1 | |a Deliberative Demokratie |0 (DE-588)4671998-2 |D s |
| 689 | 2 | |8 3\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-11980-1 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-86734-4 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ZDB-20-CBO | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029337997 | ||
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 2\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 883 | 1 | |8 3\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749 |l BSB01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q BSB_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749 |l UBG01 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q UBG_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804176859128135680 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Zurn, Christopher F. 1966- |
| author_facet | Zurn, Christopher F. 1966- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Zurn, Christopher F. 1966- |
| author_variant | c f z cf cfz |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043928918 |
| classification_rvk | PL 731 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| contents | pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511498749 (OCoLC)967420808 (DE-599)BVBBV043928918 |
| dewey-full | 347.73/12 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 347 - Procedure and courts |
| dewey-raw | 347.73/12 |
| dewey-search | 347.73/12 |
| dewey-sort | 3347.73 212 |
| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511498749 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>06907nmm a2200841zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043928918</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">161202s2007 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780511498749</subfield><subfield code="c">Online</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-511-49874-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1017/CBO9780511498749</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511498749</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)967420808</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043928918</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">347.73/12</subfield><subfield code="2">22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">PL 731</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)137267:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zurn, Christopher F.</subfield><subfield code="d">1966-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review</subfield><subfield code="c">Christopher F. Zurn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="246" ind1="1" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Deliberative Democracy & the Institutions of Judicial Review</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (viii, 366 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Judicial review / United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Constitutional courts / United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Legislative power / United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Executive power / United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Deliberative democracy / United States</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Normenkontrolle</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4042623-3</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Konstitutionalismus</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4165087-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Gesetzgebende Gewalt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4131717-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Rechtsprechende Gewalt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4177253-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Legitimität</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4035043-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Deliberative Demokratie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4671998-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Demokratie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4011413-2</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4062793-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Verfassungsgericht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4565747-6</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">USA</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4078704-7</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Verfassungsgericht</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4565747-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Gesetzgebende Gewalt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4131717-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Normenkontrolle</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4042623-3</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Deliberative Demokratie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4671998-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Rechtsprechende Gewalt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4177253-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Legitimität</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4035043-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Demokratie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4011413-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="3"><subfield code="a">Konstitutionalismus</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4165087-6</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4062793-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Deliberative Demokratie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4671998-2</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">3\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-11980-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-86734-4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029337997</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">3\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749</subfield><subfield code="l">BSB01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">BSB_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749</subfield><subfield code="l">UBG01</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | USA |
| id | DE-604.BV043928918 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:52Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511498749 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029337997 |
| oclc_num | 967420808 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| physical | 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Zurn, Christopher F. 1966- Verfasser aut Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review Christopher F. Zurn Deliberative Democracy & the Institutions of Judicial Review Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2007 1 online resource (viii, 366 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora In this book, Christopher F. Zurn shows why a normative theory of deliberative democratic constitutionalism yields the best understanding of the legitimacy of constitutional review. He further argues that this function should be institutionalized in a complex, multi-location structure including not only independent constitutional courts but also legislative and executive self-review that would enable interbranch constitutional dialogue and constitutional amendment through deliberative civic constitutional forums. Drawing on sustained critical analyses of diverse pluralist and deliberative democratic arguments concerning the legitimacy of judicial review, Zurn concludes that constitutional review is necessary to ensure the procedural requirements for legitimate democratic self-rule through deliberative cooperation. Claiming that pure normative theory is not sufficient to settle issues of institutional design, Zurn draws on empirical and comparative research to propose reformed institutions of constitutional review that encourage the development of fundamental law as an ongoing project of democratic deliberation and decision Judicial review / United States Constitutional courts / United States Legislative power / United States Executive power / United States Deliberative democracy / United States Normenkontrolle (DE-588)4042623-3 gnd rswk-swf Konstitutionalismus (DE-588)4165087-6 gnd rswk-swf Gesetzgebende Gewalt (DE-588)4131717-8 gnd rswk-swf Rechtsprechende Gewalt (DE-588)4177253-2 gnd rswk-swf Legitimität (DE-588)4035043-5 gnd rswk-swf Deliberative Demokratie (DE-588)4671998-2 gnd rswk-swf Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd rswk-swf Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (DE-588)4062793-7 gnd rswk-swf Verfassungsgericht (DE-588)4565747-6 gnd rswk-swf USA USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Verfassungsgericht (DE-588)4565747-6 s Gesetzgebende Gewalt (DE-588)4131717-8 s Normenkontrolle (DE-588)4042623-3 s Deliberative Demokratie (DE-588)4671998-2 s 1\p DE-604 Rechtsprechende Gewalt (DE-588)4177253-2 s Legitimität (DE-588)4035043-5 s Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 s Konstitutionalismus (DE-588)4165087-6 s 2\p DE-604 Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (DE-588)4062793-7 s 3\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-11980-1 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-86734-4 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Zurn, Christopher F. 1966- Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review pt. I. Introduction. An old chestnut is actually two ; Pathologies of ad hoc triangulation ; Functions and institutions -- pt. II. Majoritarian democracy and minoritarian constitutionalism. Judicial review as substantially legitimate protection of minority rights ; Judicial review as procedurally legitimate protection of democracy ; Moving beyond aggregative majoritarianism and minoritarian constitutionalism -- pt. III. From majoritarian to deliberative theories of constitutional democracy. Deliberative democracy: four axes of analysis ; Constitutionalism: four central elements ; Constitutional democracy? -- pt. IV. Deliberative democracy and substantive constitutionalism. Keepers of the substantive flame of American exceptionalism ; Guardians of the moral law in the forum of principle ; Are substantialist defenses of judicial review self-defeating? -- pt. V. Disagreement and the constitution of democracy. Democratic precommitment to judicial review: Freeman ; Deliberative majoritarianism and the paternalism of judicial review: Waldron ; Upshot: we need a theory of democratic constitutionalism -- pt. VI. The seducements of juristic discourse as democratic deliberation. A division of labor between juristic deliberation and populist aggregation? ; Actual juristic discourse in the United States system of constitutional adjudication ; Legal principles and moral-political reasoning -- pt. VII. Constitutionalism as the procedural structuring of deliberative democracy. A provisional summary: criteria for an adequate theory of constitutional review ; Guardians of the conditions of procedural legitimacy: Habermas -- pt. VIII. The institutions of constitutional review I: design problems and judicial review. The problems of designing institutions of constitutional review ; Independent constitutional courts in a concentrated review system -- pt. IX. The Institutions of constitutional review II: horizontal dispersal and vertical empowerment. Self-review panels in the legislature and regulatory agencies ; Mechanisms for inter-branch debate and decisional dispersal ; Easing formal amendability requirements ; Establishing civic constitutional fora Judicial review / United States Constitutional courts / United States Legislative power / United States Executive power / United States Deliberative democracy / United States Normenkontrolle (DE-588)4042623-3 gnd Konstitutionalismus (DE-588)4165087-6 gnd Gesetzgebende Gewalt (DE-588)4131717-8 gnd Rechtsprechende Gewalt (DE-588)4177253-2 gnd Legitimität (DE-588)4035043-5 gnd Deliberative Demokratie (DE-588)4671998-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (DE-588)4062793-7 gnd Verfassungsgericht (DE-588)4565747-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4042623-3 (DE-588)4165087-6 (DE-588)4131717-8 (DE-588)4177253-2 (DE-588)4035043-5 (DE-588)4671998-2 (DE-588)4011413-2 (DE-588)4062793-7 (DE-588)4565747-6 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review |
| title_alt | Deliberative Democracy & the Institutions of Judicial Review |
| title_auth | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review |
| title_exact_search | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review |
| title_full | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review Christopher F. Zurn |
| title_fullStr | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review Christopher F. Zurn |
| title_full_unstemmed | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review Christopher F. Zurn |
| title_short | Deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review |
| title_sort | deliberative democracy and the institutions of judicial review |
| topic | Judicial review / United States Constitutional courts / United States Legislative power / United States Executive power / United States Deliberative democracy / United States Normenkontrolle (DE-588)4042623-3 gnd Konstitutionalismus (DE-588)4165087-6 gnd Gesetzgebende Gewalt (DE-588)4131717-8 gnd Rechtsprechende Gewalt (DE-588)4177253-2 gnd Legitimität (DE-588)4035043-5 gnd Deliberative Demokratie (DE-588)4671998-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit (DE-588)4062793-7 gnd Verfassungsgericht (DE-588)4565747-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Judicial review / United States Constitutional courts / United States Legislative power / United States Executive power / United States Deliberative democracy / United States Normenkontrolle Konstitutionalismus Gesetzgebende Gewalt Rechtsprechende Gewalt Legitimität Deliberative Demokratie Demokratie Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit Verfassungsgericht USA |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511498749 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT zurnchristopherf deliberativedemocracyandtheinstitutionsofjudicialreview AT zurnchristopherf deliberativedemocracytheinstitutionsofjudicialreview |