Minority rights, majority rule: partisanship and the development of Congress
Minority Rights, Majority Rule seeks to explain a phenomenon evident to most observers of the US Congress. In the House of Representatives, majority parties rule and minorities are seldom able to influence national policy making. In the Senate, minorities quite often call the shots, empowered by the...
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1997
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Minority Rights, Majority Rule seeks to explain a phenomenon evident to most observers of the US Congress. In the House of Representatives, majority parties rule and minorities are seldom able to influence national policy making. In the Senate, minorities quite often call the shots, empowered by the filibuster to frustrate the majority. Why did the two chambers develop such distinctive legislative styles? Conventional wisdom suggests that differences in the size and workload of the House and Senate led the two chambers to develop very different rules of procedure. Sarah Binder offers an alternative, partisan theory to explain the creation and suppression of minority rights, showing that contests between partisan coalitions have throughout congressional history altered the distribution of procedural rights. Most importantly, new majorities inherit procedural choices made in the past. This institutional dynamic has fuelled the power of partisan majorities in the House but stopped them in their tracks in the Senate |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xiii, 236 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511625541 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511625541 |
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| 520 | |a Minority Rights, Majority Rule seeks to explain a phenomenon evident to most observers of the US Congress. In the House of Representatives, majority parties rule and minorities are seldom able to influence national policy making. In the Senate, minorities quite often call the shots, empowered by the filibuster to frustrate the majority. Why did the two chambers develop such distinctive legislative styles? Conventional wisdom suggests that differences in the size and workload of the House and Senate led the two chambers to develop very different rules of procedure. Sarah Binder offers an alternative, partisan theory to explain the creation and suppression of minority rights, showing that contests between partisan coalitions have throughout congressional history altered the distribution of procedural rights. Most importantly, new majorities inherit procedural choices made in the past. This institutional dynamic has fuelled the power of partisan majorities in the House but stopped them in their tracks in the Senate | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Binder, Sarah A. |
| author_facet | Binder, Sarah A. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Binder, Sarah A. |
| author_variant | s a b sa sab |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043928750 |
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| contents | 1. The partisan basis of procedural choice -- 2. The evolving concepts of House and Senate minority rights -- 3. Procedural choice in the early Congress: The case of the "previous question" -- 4. Allocating minority rights in the House, 1789-1990 -- 5. Institutionalizing party in the nineteenth-century House -- 6. Stacking the partisan deck in the twentieth-century House -- 7. Inherited rules and procedural choice in the Senate -- 8. Assessing the partisan theory -- App. 1. Summary of changes in minority rights -- App. 2. Measuring congressional workload -- App. 3. Measuring party behavior |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511625541 (OCoLC)967421053 (DE-599)BVBBV043928750 |
| dewey-full | 328.73 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 328 - The legislative process |
| dewey-raw | 328.73 |
| dewey-search | 328.73 |
| dewey-sort | 3328.73 |
| dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
| discipline | Politologie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511625541 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:52Z |
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| isbn | 9780511625541 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Binder, Sarah A. Verfasser aut Minority rights, majority rule partisanship and the development of Congress Sarah A. Binder Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1997 1 online resource (xiii, 236 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) 1. The partisan basis of procedural choice -- 2. The evolving concepts of House and Senate minority rights -- 3. Procedural choice in the early Congress: The case of the "previous question" -- 4. Allocating minority rights in the House, 1789-1990 -- 5. Institutionalizing party in the nineteenth-century House -- 6. Stacking the partisan deck in the twentieth-century House -- 7. Inherited rules and procedural choice in the Senate -- 8. Assessing the partisan theory -- App. 1. Summary of changes in minority rights -- App. 2. Measuring congressional workload -- App. 3. Measuring party behavior Minority Rights, Majority Rule seeks to explain a phenomenon evident to most observers of the US Congress. In the House of Representatives, majority parties rule and minorities are seldom able to influence national policy making. In the Senate, minorities quite often call the shots, empowered by the filibuster to frustrate the majority. Why did the two chambers develop such distinctive legislative styles? Conventional wisdom suggests that differences in the size and workload of the House and Senate led the two chambers to develop very different rules of procedure. Sarah Binder offers an alternative, partisan theory to explain the creation and suppression of minority rights, showing that contests between partisan coalitions have throughout congressional history altered the distribution of procedural rights. Most importantly, new majorities inherit procedural choices made in the past. This institutional dynamic has fuelled the power of partisan majorities in the House but stopped them in their tracks in the Senate United States / Congress USA Congress (DE-588)35622-0 gnd rswk-swf Politik Legislation / United States Geschichte (DE-588)4020517-4 gnd rswk-swf Mehrheitsprinzip (DE-588)4038382-9 gnd rswk-swf Politische Entscheidung (DE-588)4046531-7 gnd rswk-swf USA United States / Politics and government / Decision making USA Congress (DE-588)35622-0 b Mehrheitsprinzip (DE-588)4038382-9 s Politische Entscheidung (DE-588)4046531-7 s Geschichte (DE-588)4020517-4 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-58239-1 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-58792-1 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625541 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Binder, Sarah A. Minority rights, majority rule partisanship and the development of Congress 1. The partisan basis of procedural choice -- 2. The evolving concepts of House and Senate minority rights -- 3. Procedural choice in the early Congress: The case of the "previous question" -- 4. Allocating minority rights in the House, 1789-1990 -- 5. Institutionalizing party in the nineteenth-century House -- 6. Stacking the partisan deck in the twentieth-century House -- 7. Inherited rules and procedural choice in the Senate -- 8. Assessing the partisan theory -- App. 1. Summary of changes in minority rights -- App. 2. Measuring congressional workload -- App. 3. Measuring party behavior United States / Congress USA Congress (DE-588)35622-0 gnd Politik Legislation / United States Geschichte (DE-588)4020517-4 gnd Mehrheitsprinzip (DE-588)4038382-9 gnd Politische Entscheidung (DE-588)4046531-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)35622-0 (DE-588)4020517-4 (DE-588)4038382-9 (DE-588)4046531-7 |
| title | Minority rights, majority rule partisanship and the development of Congress |
| title_auth | Minority rights, majority rule partisanship and the development of Congress |
| title_exact_search | Minority rights, majority rule partisanship and the development of Congress |
| title_full | Minority rights, majority rule partisanship and the development of Congress Sarah A. Binder |
| title_fullStr | Minority rights, majority rule partisanship and the development of Congress Sarah A. Binder |
| title_full_unstemmed | Minority rights, majority rule partisanship and the development of Congress Sarah A. Binder |
| title_short | Minority rights, majority rule |
| title_sort | minority rights majority rule partisanship and the development of congress |
| title_sub | partisanship and the development of Congress |
| topic | United States / Congress USA Congress (DE-588)35622-0 gnd Politik Legislation / United States Geschichte (DE-588)4020517-4 gnd Mehrheitsprinzip (DE-588)4038382-9 gnd Politische Entscheidung (DE-588)4046531-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | United States / Congress USA Congress Politik Legislation / United States Geschichte Mehrheitsprinzip Politische Entscheidung USA United States / Politics and government / Decision making |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625541 |
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