The limits of Leviathan: contract theory and the enforcement of International Law
Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of...
Gespeichert in:
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2006
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (viii, 255 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511511370 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511511370 |
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| 505 | 8 | |a States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement | |
| 520 | |a Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Scott, Robert E. 1944- |
| author_facet | Scott, Robert E. 1944- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Scott, Robert E. 1944- |
| author_variant | r e s re res |
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| bvnumber | BV043927729 |
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| contents | States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511511370 (OCoLC)967418372 (DE-599)BVBBV043927729 |
| dewey-full | 341 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 341 - Law of nations |
| dewey-raw | 341 |
| dewey-search | 341 |
| dewey-sort | 3341 |
| dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511511370 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043927729 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:50Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511511370 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029336807 |
| oclc_num | 967418372 |
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| physical | 1 online resource (viii, 255 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2006 |
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| spelling | Scott, Robert E. 1944- Verfasser aut The limits of Leviathan contract theory and the enforcement of International Law Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006 1 online resource (viii, 255 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments Executions (Law) International and municipal law Treaties Breach of contract Internationales Vertragsrecht (DE-588)4027458-5 gnd rswk-swf Internationales Vertragsrecht (DE-588)4027458-5 s 1\p DE-604 Stephan, Paul B. Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-36797-4 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-85846-5 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511370 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Scott, Robert E. 1944- The limits of Leviathan contract theory and the enforcement of International Law States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement Executions (Law) International and municipal law Treaties Breach of contract Internationales Vertragsrecht (DE-588)4027458-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4027458-5 |
| title | The limits of Leviathan contract theory and the enforcement of International Law |
| title_auth | The limits of Leviathan contract theory and the enforcement of International Law |
| title_exact_search | The limits of Leviathan contract theory and the enforcement of International Law |
| title_full | The limits of Leviathan contract theory and the enforcement of International Law Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan |
| title_fullStr | The limits of Leviathan contract theory and the enforcement of International Law Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan |
| title_full_unstemmed | The limits of Leviathan contract theory and the enforcement of International Law Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan |
| title_short | The limits of Leviathan |
| title_sort | the limits of leviathan contract theory and the enforcement of international law |
| title_sub | contract theory and the enforcement of International Law |
| topic | Executions (Law) International and municipal law Treaties Breach of contract Internationales Vertragsrecht (DE-588)4027458-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Executions (Law) International and municipal law Treaties Breach of contract Internationales Vertragsrecht |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511511370 |
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