Democratic choice and taxation: a theoretical and empirical analysis
This work examines tax policies and tax systems as they arise from democratic choices, set against the background of a market economy. Professors Hettich and Winer find that democratic institutions yield complex tax systems with features that follow a varied but predictable pattern. In developing th...
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1999
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
| Zusammenfassung: | This work examines tax policies and tax systems as they arise from democratic choices, set against the background of a market economy. Professors Hettich and Winer find that democratic institutions yield complex tax systems with features that follow a varied but predictable pattern. In developing their analysis, the authors use formal modelling of voting behavior, emphasizing recent advances in the theory of probabilistic voting. This book differs from the available tax literature by relating fiscal choices directly to voting and by examining tax systems in democratic countries from a variety of perspectives. While the authors primarily focus on explaining observed features of tax systems, they also devote considerable space to the discussion of the welfare and efficiency effects of taxation in the presence of collective choice, and to a review of other models and of the related literature. In addition, they use computational general equilibrium analysis and statistical research on national and state governments in the US and Canada to link theory to empirical data |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xi, 331 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511572197 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511572197 |
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| 505 | 8 | 0 | |g 1 |t Introduction |g pt. 1 |g 2 |g 3 |g 4 |t Theoretical Framework |t Models of Political Economy and the Study of Taxation |t Foundations of Democratic Tax Systems |t Tax Structure in Equilibrium: A More Formal Model |g pt. 2 |g 5 |g 6 |t Collective Choice and the Normative Analysis of Taxation |t An Assessment of Normative Tax Theory |t Welfare, Politics, and Taxation |g pt. 3 |g 7 |t Applied General Equilibrium Analysis |t Tax Policy in a Computable Model of Economic and Political Equilibrium |g pt. 4 |g 8 |g 9 |g 10 |t Statistical Analysis of Tax Structure |t Introduction to Statistical Research |t Income Taxation and Special Provisions: Evidence from U.S. States |t Debt and Tariffs: The Evolution of the Canadian Revenue System |g pt. 5 |t Political Institutions and Taxation |
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| author | Hettich, Walter |
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| contents | Introduction Theoretical Framework Models of Political Economy and the Study of Taxation Foundations of Democratic Tax Systems Tax Structure in Equilibrium: A More Formal Model Collective Choice and the Normative Analysis of Taxation An Assessment of Normative Tax Theory Welfare, Politics, and Taxation Applied General Equilibrium Analysis Tax Policy in a Computable Model of Economic and Political Equilibrium Statistical Analysis of Tax Structure Introduction to Statistical Research Income Taxation and Special Provisions: Evidence from U.S. States Debt and Tariffs: The Evolution of the Canadian Revenue System Political Institutions and Taxation |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511572197 (OCoLC)967417945 (DE-599)BVBBV043927525 |
| dewey-full | 336.2 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 336 - Public finance |
| dewey-raw | 336.2 |
| dewey-search | 336.2 |
| dewey-sort | 3336.2 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511572197 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043927525 |
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| isbn | 9780511572197 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Hettich, Walter Verfasser aut Democratic choice and taxation a theoretical and empirical analysis Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer Democratic Choice & Taxation Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1999 1 online resource (xi, 331 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) 1 Introduction pt. 1 2 3 4 Theoretical Framework Models of Political Economy and the Study of Taxation Foundations of Democratic Tax Systems Tax Structure in Equilibrium: A More Formal Model pt. 2 5 6 Collective Choice and the Normative Analysis of Taxation An Assessment of Normative Tax Theory Welfare, Politics, and Taxation pt. 3 7 Applied General Equilibrium Analysis Tax Policy in a Computable Model of Economic and Political Equilibrium pt. 4 8 9 10 Statistical Analysis of Tax Structure Introduction to Statistical Research Income Taxation and Special Provisions: Evidence from U.S. States Debt and Tariffs: The Evolution of the Canadian Revenue System pt. 5 Political Institutions and Taxation This work examines tax policies and tax systems as they arise from democratic choices, set against the background of a market economy. Professors Hettich and Winer find that democratic institutions yield complex tax systems with features that follow a varied but predictable pattern. In developing their analysis, the authors use formal modelling of voting behavior, emphasizing recent advances in the theory of probabilistic voting. This book differs from the available tax literature by relating fiscal choices directly to voting and by examining tax systems in democratic countries from a variety of perspectives. While the authors primarily focus on explaining observed features of tax systems, they also devote considerable space to the discussion of the welfare and efficiency effects of taxation in the presence of collective choice, and to a review of other models and of the related literature. In addition, they use computational general equilibrium analysis and statistical research on national and state governments in the US and Canada to link theory to empirical data Steuer Taxation Taxing power Steuerpolitik (DE-588)4057447-7 gnd rswk-swf Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd rswk-swf Steuersystem (DE-588)4183215-2 gnd rswk-swf Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd rswk-swf Steuerpolitik (DE-588)4057447-7 s Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 s Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 s 1\p DE-604 Steuersystem (DE-588)4183215-2 s 2\p DE-604 Winer, Stanley L. 1947- Sonstige oth Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-02180-7 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-62291-2 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511572197 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Hettich, Walter Democratic choice and taxation a theoretical and empirical analysis Introduction Theoretical Framework Models of Political Economy and the Study of Taxation Foundations of Democratic Tax Systems Tax Structure in Equilibrium: A More Formal Model Collective Choice and the Normative Analysis of Taxation An Assessment of Normative Tax Theory Welfare, Politics, and Taxation Applied General Equilibrium Analysis Tax Policy in a Computable Model of Economic and Political Equilibrium Statistical Analysis of Tax Structure Introduction to Statistical Research Income Taxation and Special Provisions: Evidence from U.S. States Debt and Tariffs: The Evolution of the Canadian Revenue System Political Institutions and Taxation Steuer Taxation Taxing power Steuerpolitik (DE-588)4057447-7 gnd Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd Steuersystem (DE-588)4183215-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4057447-7 (DE-588)4079009-5 (DE-588)4183215-2 (DE-588)4011413-2 |
| title | Democratic choice and taxation a theoretical and empirical analysis |
| title_alt | Democratic Choice & Taxation Introduction Theoretical Framework Models of Political Economy and the Study of Taxation Foundations of Democratic Tax Systems Tax Structure in Equilibrium: A More Formal Model Collective Choice and the Normative Analysis of Taxation An Assessment of Normative Tax Theory Welfare, Politics, and Taxation Applied General Equilibrium Analysis Tax Policy in a Computable Model of Economic and Political Equilibrium Statistical Analysis of Tax Structure Introduction to Statistical Research Income Taxation and Special Provisions: Evidence from U.S. States Debt and Tariffs: The Evolution of the Canadian Revenue System Political Institutions and Taxation |
| title_auth | Democratic choice and taxation a theoretical and empirical analysis |
| title_exact_search | Democratic choice and taxation a theoretical and empirical analysis |
| title_full | Democratic choice and taxation a theoretical and empirical analysis Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer |
| title_fullStr | Democratic choice and taxation a theoretical and empirical analysis Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer |
| title_full_unstemmed | Democratic choice and taxation a theoretical and empirical analysis Walter Hettich and Stanley L. Winer |
| title_short | Democratic choice and taxation |
| title_sort | democratic choice and taxation a theoretical and empirical analysis |
| title_sub | a theoretical and empirical analysis |
| topic | Steuer Taxation Taxing power Steuerpolitik (DE-588)4057447-7 gnd Wahlverhalten (DE-588)4079009-5 gnd Steuersystem (DE-588)4183215-2 gnd Demokratie (DE-588)4011413-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Steuer Taxation Taxing power Steuerpolitik Wahlverhalten Steuersystem Demokratie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511572197 |
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