The economics of contracts: theories and applications
A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract the...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2002
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this 2002 book provides an overview of developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xvi, 584 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511613807 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511613807 |
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| 505 | 8 | 0 | |t The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics |r Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant |t Appendix : Canonical models of theories of contract |r M'Hand Fares |t The new institutional economics |r Ronald Coase |t Contract and economic organization |r Oliver E. Williamson |t The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships |r Benjamin Klein |t Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts |r Eirik G. Furubotn |t The contract as economic trade |r Jacques Ghestin |t Contract theory and theories of contract regulation |r Alan Schwartz |t Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law : sale of an asset of uncertain value |r Victor P. Goldberg |t A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights |r Gary D. Libecap |t Transaction costs and incentive theory |r Eric Malin and David Martimort |t Norms and the theory of the firm |r Oliver Hart |t Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints |t Complexity and contract |t Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts |t Positive agency theory : place and contributions |t Econometrics of contracts : an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting |t Experiments on moral hazard and incentives : reciprocity and surplus-sharing |t Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts : substitutes or complements? |t The quasi-judicial role of large retailers : an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers |r Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey -- |r W. Bentley Macleod -- |r Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser -- |r Gérard Charreaux -- |r Scott E. Masten and Stéphane Saussier -- |r Claudia Keser and Marc Willinger -- |r Francine LaFontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud -- |r Benito Arruñada -- |9 |
| 505 | 8 | 0 | |t Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks : from strategic behaviors to property rights |t Licensing in the chemical industry |t Inter-company agreements and EC competition law |t Incentive contracts in utility regulation |t Contractual choice and performance : the case of water supply in France |t Institutional or structural : lessons from international electricity sector reforms -- |t Electricity sector restructuring and competition : a transactions-cost perspective |r Godefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Pénard -- |r Ashish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri -- |r Michel Glais -- |r Matthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price -- |r Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier -- |r Guy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller -- |r Paul L. Joskow |9 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author2 | Brousseau, Eric Glachant, Jean-Michel |
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| author_additional | Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant M'Hand Fares Ronald Coase Oliver E. Williamson Benjamin Klein Eirik G. Furubotn Jacques Ghestin Alan Schwartz Victor P. Goldberg Gary D. Libecap Eric Malin and David Martimort Oliver Hart Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey -- W. Bentley Macleod -- Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser -- Gérard Charreaux -- Scott E. Masten and Stéphane Saussier -- Claudia Keser and Marc Willinger -- Francine LaFontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud -- Benito Arruñada -- Godefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Pénard -- Ashish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri -- Michel Glais -- Matthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price -- Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier -- Guy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller -- Paul L. Joskow |
| author_facet | Brousseau, Eric Glachant, Jean-Michel |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043925599 |
| classification_rvk | PI 4130 QC 131 QD 050 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| contents | The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics Appendix : Canonical models of theories of contract The new institutional economics Contract and economic organization The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts The contract as economic trade Contract theory and theories of contract regulation Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law : sale of an asset of uncertain value A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights Transaction costs and incentive theory Norms and the theory of the firm Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints Complexity and contract Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts Positive agency theory : place and contributions Econometrics of contracts : an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting Experiments on moral hazard and incentives : reciprocity and surplus-sharing Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts : substitutes or complements? The quasi-judicial role of large retailers : an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks : from strategic behaviors to property rights Licensing in the chemical industry Inter-company agreements and EC competition law Incentive contracts in utility regulation Contractual choice and performance : the case of water supply in France Institutional or structural : lessons from international electricity sector reforms -- Electricity sector restructuring and competition : a transactions-cost perspective |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511613807 (OCoLC)971460581 (DE-599)BVBBV043925599 |
| dewey-full | 338 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
| dewey-raw | 338 |
| dewey-search | 338 |
| dewey-sort | 3338 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511613807 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | The economics of contracts theories and applications edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2002 1 online resource (xvi, 584 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant Appendix : Canonical models of theories of contract M'Hand Fares The new institutional economics Ronald Coase Contract and economic organization Oliver E. Williamson The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships Benjamin Klein Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts Eirik G. Furubotn The contract as economic trade Jacques Ghestin Contract theory and theories of contract regulation Alan Schwartz Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law : sale of an asset of uncertain value Victor P. Goldberg A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights Gary D. Libecap Transaction costs and incentive theory Eric Malin and David Martimort Norms and the theory of the firm Oliver Hart Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints Complexity and contract Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts Positive agency theory : place and contributions Econometrics of contracts : an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting Experiments on moral hazard and incentives : reciprocity and surplus-sharing Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts : substitutes or complements? The quasi-judicial role of large retailers : an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey -- W. Bentley Macleod -- Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser -- Gérard Charreaux -- Scott E. Masten and Stéphane Saussier -- Claudia Keser and Marc Willinger -- Francine LaFontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud -- Benito Arruñada -- Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks : from strategic behaviors to property rights Licensing in the chemical industry Inter-company agreements and EC competition law Incentive contracts in utility regulation Contractual choice and performance : the case of water supply in France Institutional or structural : lessons from international electricity sector reforms -- Electricity sector restructuring and competition : a transactions-cost perspective Godefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Pénard -- Ashish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri -- Michel Glais -- Matthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price -- Claude Ménard and Stéphane Saussier -- Guy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller -- Paul L. Joskow A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this 2002 book provides an overview of developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners Contracts / Economic aspects Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 gnd rswk-swf Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4143413-4 Aufsatzsammlung gnd-content Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 s Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 s 2\p DE-604 Brousseau, Eric edt Glachant, Jean-Michel edt Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-81490-4 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-89313-8 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613807 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | The economics of contracts theories and applications The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics Appendix : Canonical models of theories of contract The new institutional economics Contract and economic organization The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts The contract as economic trade Contract theory and theories of contract regulation Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law : sale of an asset of uncertain value A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights Transaction costs and incentive theory Norms and the theory of the firm Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints Complexity and contract Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts Positive agency theory : place and contributions Econometrics of contracts : an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting Experiments on moral hazard and incentives : reciprocity and surplus-sharing Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts : substitutes or complements? The quasi-judicial role of large retailers : an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks : from strategic behaviors to property rights Licensing in the chemical industry Inter-company agreements and EC competition law Incentive contracts in utility regulation Contractual choice and performance : the case of water supply in France Institutional or structural : lessons from international electricity sector reforms -- Electricity sector restructuring and competition : a transactions-cost perspective Contracts / Economic aspects Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4066528-8 (DE-588)4128260-7 (DE-588)4143413-4 |
| title | The economics of contracts theories and applications |
| title_alt | The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics Appendix : Canonical models of theories of contract The new institutional economics Contract and economic organization The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts The contract as economic trade Contract theory and theories of contract regulation Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law : sale of an asset of uncertain value A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights Transaction costs and incentive theory Norms and the theory of the firm Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints Complexity and contract Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts Positive agency theory : place and contributions Econometrics of contracts : an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting Experiments on moral hazard and incentives : reciprocity and surplus-sharing Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts : substitutes or complements? The quasi-judicial role of large retailers : an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks : from strategic behaviors to property rights Licensing in the chemical industry Inter-company agreements and EC competition law Incentive contracts in utility regulation Contractual choice and performance : the case of water supply in France Institutional or structural : lessons from international electricity sector reforms -- Electricity sector restructuring and competition : a transactions-cost perspective |
| title_auth | The economics of contracts theories and applications |
| title_exact_search | The economics of contracts theories and applications |
| title_full | The economics of contracts theories and applications edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant |
| title_fullStr | The economics of contracts theories and applications edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant |
| title_full_unstemmed | The economics of contracts theories and applications edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant |
| title_short | The economics of contracts |
| title_sort | the economics of contracts theories and applications |
| title_sub | theories and applications |
| topic | Contracts / Economic aspects Wirtschaftswissenschaften (DE-588)4066528-8 gnd Kontrakttheorie (DE-588)4128260-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Contracts / Economic aspects Wirtschaftswissenschaften Kontrakttheorie Aufsatzsammlung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613807 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT brousseaueric theeconomicsofcontractstheoriesandapplications AT glachantjeanmichel theeconomicsofcontractstheoriesandapplications |