The institutional economics of corruption and reform: theory, evidence, and policy
Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the bes...
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| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2007
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 UPA01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xiv, 286 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511492617 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511492617 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The institutional economics of corruption and reform |b theory, evidence, and policy |c Johann Graf Lambsdorff |
| 246 | 1 | 3 | |a The Institutional Economics of Corruption & Reform |
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| 505 | 8 | |a Enemies of corruption -- What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach -- The dilemma of the kleptocrat: What is bad about political corruption? -- Corruption and transactions costs: the rent-seeking perspective -- Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law -- Exporters' ethics and the art of bribery -- How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: an empirical approach -- Corrupt relational contracting | |
| 520 | |a Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform | ||
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| 650 | 4 | |a Political corruption / Prevention | |
| 650 | 4 | |a International finance / Corrupt practices / Prevention | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804176847989112832 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Lambsdorff, Johann 1965- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)114197296 |
| author_facet | Lambsdorff, Johann 1965- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Lambsdorff, Johann 1965- |
| author_variant | j l jl |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043923548 |
| classification_rvk | QL 415 MD 7200 MS 6800 PH 8440 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| contents | Enemies of corruption -- What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach -- The dilemma of the kleptocrat: What is bad about political corruption? -- Corruption and transactions costs: the rent-seeking perspective -- Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law -- Exporters' ethics and the art of bribery -- How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: an empirical approach -- Corrupt relational contracting |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511492617 (OCoLC)967409412 (DE-599)BVBBV043923548 |
| dewey-full | 353.4/6 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 353 - Specific fields of public administration |
| dewey-raw | 353.4/6 |
| dewey-search | 353.4/6 |
| dewey-sort | 3353.4 16 |
| dewey-tens | 350 - Public administration and military science |
| discipline | Rechtswissenschaft Politologie Soziologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511492617 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043923548 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:42Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511492617 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029332627 |
| oclc_num | 967409412 |
| open_access_boolean | |
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| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-739 |
| physical | 1 online resource (xiv, 286 pages) |
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| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Lambsdorff, Johann 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)114197296 aut The institutional economics of corruption and reform theory, evidence, and policy Johann Graf Lambsdorff The Institutional Economics of Corruption & Reform Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2007 1 online resource (xiv, 286 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Enemies of corruption -- What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach -- The dilemma of the kleptocrat: What is bad about political corruption? -- Corruption and transactions costs: the rent-seeking perspective -- Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law -- Exporters' ethics and the art of bribery -- How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: an empirical approach -- Corrupt relational contracting Corruption has been a feature of public institutions for centuries yet only relatively recently has it been made the subject of sustained scientific analysis. Lambsdorff shows how insights from institutional economics can be used to develop a better understanding of why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. He argues that rather than being deterred by penalties, corrupt actors are more influenced by other factors such as the opportunism of their criminal counterparts and the danger of acquiring an unreliable reputation. This suggests a novel strategy for fighting corruption similar to the invisible hand that governs competitive markets. This strategy - the 'invisible foot' - shows that the unreliability of corrupt counterparts induces honesty and good governance even in the absence of good intentions. Combining theoretical research with state-of-the-art empirical investigations, this book will be an invaluable resource for researchers and policy-makers concerned with anti-corruption reform Administrative agencies / Corrupt practices / Prevention Political corruption / Prevention International finance / Corrupt practices / Prevention Institutional economics / Sociological aspects Gegenmaßnahme (DE-588)4445317-6 gnd rswk-swf Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 gnd rswk-swf Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 gnd rswk-swf Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd rswk-swf Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd rswk-swf Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd rswk-swf Prävention (DE-588)4076308-0 gnd rswk-swf Öffentliche Einrichtung (DE-588)4043143-5 gnd rswk-swf Öffentliche Einrichtung (DE-588)4043143-5 s Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 s Prävention (DE-588)4076308-0 s Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 s 1\p DE-604 Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 s Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 s Gegenmaßnahme (DE-588)4445317-6 s 2\p DE-604 Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 s 3\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Hardcover 978-0-521-87275-1 Erscheint auch als Druck-Ausgabe, Paperback 978-0-521-06867-3 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492617 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Lambsdorff, Johann 1965- The institutional economics of corruption and reform theory, evidence, and policy Enemies of corruption -- What is bad about bureaucratic corruption? An institutional economic approach -- The dilemma of the kleptocrat: What is bad about political corruption? -- Corruption and transactions costs: the rent-seeking perspective -- Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law -- Exporters' ethics and the art of bribery -- How confidence facilitates illegal transactions: an empirical approach -- Corrupt relational contracting Administrative agencies / Corrupt practices / Prevention Political corruption / Prevention International finance / Corrupt practices / Prevention Institutional economics / Sociological aspects Gegenmaßnahme (DE-588)4445317-6 gnd Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 gnd Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 gnd Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Prävention (DE-588)4076308-0 gnd Öffentliche Einrichtung (DE-588)4043143-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4445317-6 (DE-588)4063317-2 (DE-588)4057952-9 (DE-588)4027208-4 (DE-588)4032524-6 (DE-588)4046514-7 (DE-588)4076308-0 (DE-588)4043143-5 |
| title | The institutional economics of corruption and reform theory, evidence, and policy |
| title_alt | The Institutional Economics of Corruption & Reform |
| title_auth | The institutional economics of corruption and reform theory, evidence, and policy |
| title_exact_search | The institutional economics of corruption and reform theory, evidence, and policy |
| title_full | The institutional economics of corruption and reform theory, evidence, and policy Johann Graf Lambsdorff |
| title_fullStr | The institutional economics of corruption and reform theory, evidence, and policy Johann Graf Lambsdorff |
| title_full_unstemmed | The institutional economics of corruption and reform theory, evidence, and policy Johann Graf Lambsdorff |
| title_short | The institutional economics of corruption and reform |
| title_sort | the institutional economics of corruption and reform theory evidence and policy |
| title_sub | theory, evidence, and policy |
| topic | Administrative agencies / Corrupt practices / Prevention Political corruption / Prevention International finance / Corrupt practices / Prevention Institutional economics / Sociological aspects Gegenmaßnahme (DE-588)4445317-6 gnd Verwaltung (DE-588)4063317-2 gnd Strategie (DE-588)4057952-9 gnd Institutionenökonomie (DE-588)4027208-4 gnd Korruption (DE-588)4032524-6 gnd Politik (DE-588)4046514-7 gnd Prävention (DE-588)4076308-0 gnd Öffentliche Einrichtung (DE-588)4043143-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Administrative agencies / Corrupt practices / Prevention Political corruption / Prevention International finance / Corrupt practices / Prevention Institutional economics / Sociological aspects Gegenmaßnahme Verwaltung Strategie Institutionenökonomie Korruption Politik Prävention Öffentliche Einrichtung |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492617 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lambsdorffjohann theinstitutionaleconomicsofcorruptionandreformtheoryevidenceandpolicy AT lambsdorffjohann theinstitutionaleconomicsofcorruptionreform |