In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, though...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Lowe, E. J. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1996
Schriftenreihe:	Cambridge studies in philosophy
Schlagworte:	Agent (Philosophy) Self (Philosophy) Subject (Philosophy) Kritik Physikalismus Leib-Seele-Problem Identität Selbst Subjekt > Philosophie
Online-Zugang:	BSB01 UBG01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge to any robust form of psychophysical interactionism, he shows how an attribution of independent causal powers to the mental states of human subjects is perfectly consistent with a thoroughly naturalistic world view. He concludes his study by examining in detail the role which conscious mental states play in the human subject's exercise of its most central capacities for perception, action, thought and self-knowledge
Beschreibung:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Beschreibung:	1 online resource (x, 209 pages)
ISBN:	9780511598005
DOI:	10.1017/CBO9780511598005