Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile:
The 1980s and 1990s have seen several authoritarian governments voluntarily cede power to constitutionally elected democratic governments. John Londregan uses Chile as a case study of this phenomenon, exploring what sorts of guarantees are required for those who are ceding power and how those guaran...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2000
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Schriftenreihe: | Political economy of institutions and decisions
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | The 1980s and 1990s have seen several authoritarian governments voluntarily cede power to constitutionally elected democratic governments. John Londregan uses Chile as a case study of this phenomenon, exploring what sorts of guarantees are required for those who are ceding power and how those guarantees later work out in practice. He constructs an analytical model of a democratic transition and provides a new statistical technique for analysing legislative votes, based upon a detailed empirical analysis of Chile's legislative politics. Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile extends existing spatial models of policy preferences by incorporating a valence component to policy choices. The valence component enables an agenda setter, in Chile the democratically elected president, to overcome veto players' objections to reform. Londregan specifically also uses Senate committee voting records to study the impact of human rights concessions on the political debate |
Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (x, 280 pages) |
ISBN: | 9780511571565 |
DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511571565 |
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520 | |a The 1980s and 1990s have seen several authoritarian governments voluntarily cede power to constitutionally elected democratic governments. John Londregan uses Chile as a case study of this phenomenon, exploring what sorts of guarantees are required for those who are ceding power and how those guarantees later work out in practice. He constructs an analytical model of a democratic transition and provides a new statistical technique for analysing legislative votes, based upon a detailed empirical analysis of Chile's legislative politics. Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile extends existing spatial models of policy preferences by incorporating a valence component to policy choices. The valence component enables an agenda setter, in Chile the democratically elected president, to overcome veto players' objections to reform. Londregan specifically also uses Senate committee voting records to study the impact of human rights concessions on the political debate | ||
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650 | 4 | |a Politik | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Londregan, John Benedict |
author_facet | Londregan, John Benedict |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Londregan, John Benedict |
author_variant | j b l jb jbl |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV043921664 |
classification_rvk | MG 85080 MI 85000 |
collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
contents | Ideology and Valence A Simple Model of Public Policy Legislative Competence and Agenda Control Accident and Force The Ideological Legacies of Allende and Pinochet The Military Government's Search for Legitimacy and the Constitution of 1980 Constitutional Powersharing: Blunder or Calculated Risk? The Tide Turns Legislative Institutions in the Constitution of 1980 Selecting the Legislature The Legislative Process in the 1980 Constitution Roll-Call Votes and Senate Committees Preferences and Votes in Senate Committees Estimating Preferences from Committee Roll Calls Voting Data from Senate Committees The Labor Committee Parameter Estimates |
ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511571565 (OCoLC)967406066 (DE-599)BVBBV043921664 |
dewey-full | 328.83 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 328 - The legislative process |
dewey-raw | 328.83 |
dewey-search | 328.83 |
dewey-sort | 3328.83 |
dewey-tens | 320 - Political science (Politics and government) |
discipline | Politologie |
doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511571565 |
format | Electronic eBook |
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id | DE-604.BV043921664 |
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indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:38Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780511571565 |
language | English |
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publisher | Cambridge University Press |
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spelling | Londregan, John Benedict Verfasser aut Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile John B. Londregan Legislative Institutions & Ideology in Chile Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2000 1 online resource (x, 280 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Political economy of institutions and decisions Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) 1 1.1 1.2 Ideology and Valence A Simple Model of Public Policy Legislative Competence and Agenda Control 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 Accident and Force The Ideological Legacies of Allende and Pinochet The Military Government's Search for Legitimacy and the Constitution of 1980 Constitutional Powersharing: Blunder or Calculated Risk? The Tide Turns 3 3.1 3.2 Legislative Institutions in the Constitution of 1980 Selecting the Legislature The Legislative Process in the 1980 Constitution 4 4.1 4.2 4.3 Roll-Call Votes and Senate Committees Preferences and Votes in Senate Committees Estimating Preferences from Committee Roll Calls Voting Data from Senate Committees 5 5.1 The Labor Committee Parameter Estimates The 1980s and 1990s have seen several authoritarian governments voluntarily cede power to constitutionally elected democratic governments. John Londregan uses Chile as a case study of this phenomenon, exploring what sorts of guarantees are required for those who are ceding power and how those guarantees later work out in practice. He constructs an analytical model of a democratic transition and provides a new statistical technique for analysing legislative votes, based upon a detailed empirical analysis of Chile's legislative politics. Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile extends existing spatial models of policy preferences by incorporating a valence component to policy choices. The valence component enables an agenda setter, in Chile the democratically elected president, to overcome veto players' objections to reform. Londregan specifically also uses Senate committee voting records to study the impact of human rights concessions on the political debate Demokratisierung Politik Legislative bodies / Chile Democratization / Chile Constitutional history / Chile Separation of powers / Chile Demokratisierung (DE-588)4124941-0 gnd rswk-swf Gesetzgebende Gewalt (DE-588)4131717-8 gnd rswk-swf Verfassunggebung (DE-588)4121846-2 gnd rswk-swf Chile / Politics and government / 1988- / Decision making Chile (DE-588)4009929-5 gnd rswk-swf Chile (DE-588)4009929-5 g Demokratisierung (DE-588)4124941-0 s Verfassunggebung (DE-588)4121846-2 s 1\p DE-604 Gesetzgebende Gewalt (DE-588)4131717-8 s 2\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-03726-6 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-77084-2 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511571565 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Londregan, John Benedict Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile Ideology and Valence A Simple Model of Public Policy Legislative Competence and Agenda Control Accident and Force The Ideological Legacies of Allende and Pinochet The Military Government's Search for Legitimacy and the Constitution of 1980 Constitutional Powersharing: Blunder or Calculated Risk? The Tide Turns Legislative Institutions in the Constitution of 1980 Selecting the Legislature The Legislative Process in the 1980 Constitution Roll-Call Votes and Senate Committees Preferences and Votes in Senate Committees Estimating Preferences from Committee Roll Calls Voting Data from Senate Committees The Labor Committee Parameter Estimates Demokratisierung Politik Legislative bodies / Chile Democratization / Chile Constitutional history / Chile Separation of powers / Chile Demokratisierung (DE-588)4124941-0 gnd Gesetzgebende Gewalt (DE-588)4131717-8 gnd Verfassunggebung (DE-588)4121846-2 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4124941-0 (DE-588)4131717-8 (DE-588)4121846-2 (DE-588)4009929-5 |
title | Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile |
title_alt | Legislative Institutions & Ideology in Chile Ideology and Valence A Simple Model of Public Policy Legislative Competence and Agenda Control Accident and Force The Ideological Legacies of Allende and Pinochet The Military Government's Search for Legitimacy and the Constitution of 1980 Constitutional Powersharing: Blunder or Calculated Risk? The Tide Turns Legislative Institutions in the Constitution of 1980 Selecting the Legislature The Legislative Process in the 1980 Constitution Roll-Call Votes and Senate Committees Preferences and Votes in Senate Committees Estimating Preferences from Committee Roll Calls Voting Data from Senate Committees The Labor Committee Parameter Estimates |
title_auth | Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile |
title_exact_search | Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile |
title_full | Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile John B. Londregan |
title_fullStr | Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile John B. Londregan |
title_full_unstemmed | Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile John B. Londregan |
title_short | Legislative institutions and ideology in Chile |
title_sort | legislative institutions and ideology in chile |
topic | Demokratisierung Politik Legislative bodies / Chile Democratization / Chile Constitutional history / Chile Separation of powers / Chile Demokratisierung (DE-588)4124941-0 gnd Gesetzgebende Gewalt (DE-588)4131717-8 gnd Verfassunggebung (DE-588)4121846-2 gnd |
topic_facet | Demokratisierung Politik Legislative bodies / Chile Democratization / Chile Constitutional history / Chile Separation of powers / Chile Gesetzgebende Gewalt Verfassunggebung Chile / Politics and government / 1988- / Decision making Chile |
url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511571565 |
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