Brute rationality: normativity and human action
This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction b...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2004
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in philosophy
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | DE-12 DE-473 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9780511487088 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511487088 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nmm a2200000zc 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV043921576 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 007 | cr|uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 161202s2004 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d | ||
| 020 | |a 9780511487088 |c Online |9 978-0-511-48708-8 | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1017/CBO9780511487088 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511487088 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)704550375 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV043921576 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rda | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 |a DE-473 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 128/.4 |2 22 | |
| 084 | |a CC 7200 |0 (DE-625)17672: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Gert, Joshua |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Brute rationality |b normativity and human action |c Joshua Gert |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge |b Cambridge University Press |c 2004 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 0 | |a Cambridge studies in philosophy | |
| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) | ||
| 505 | 8 | |a What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality | |
| 520 | |a This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Ethik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Normativity (Ethics) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Decision making / Moral and ethical aspects | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Entscheidungsfindung |0 (DE-588)4113446-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Normativität |0 (DE-588)4790832-4 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Normativität |0 (DE-588)4790832-4 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Entscheidungsfindung |0 (DE-588)4113446-1 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |8 1\p |5 DE-604 | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-03953-6 |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Druckausgabe |z 978-0-521-83318-9 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088 |x Verlag |z URL des Erstveröffentlichers |3 Volltext |
| 883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
| 912 | |a ZDB-20-CBO | ||
| 943 | 1 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029330659 | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088 |l DE-12 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q BSB_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
| 966 | e | |u https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088 |l DE-473 |p ZDB-20-CBO |q UBG_PDA_CBO |x Verlag |3 Volltext | |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1811004106706255872 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | |
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Gert, Joshua |
| author_facet | Gert, Joshua |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Gert, Joshua |
| author_variant | j g jg |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043921576 |
| classification_rvk | CC 7200 |
| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| contents | What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511487088 (OCoLC)704550375 (DE-599)BVBBV043921576 |
| dewey-full | 128/.4 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
| dewey-raw | 128/.4 |
| dewey-search | 128/.4 |
| dewey-sort | 3128 14 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9780511487088 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>00000nmm a2200000zc 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV043921576</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr|uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">161202s2004 |||| o||u| ||||||eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780511487088</subfield><subfield code="c">Online</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-511-48708-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1017/CBO9780511487088</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ZDB-20-CBO)CR9780511487088</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)704550375</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV043921576</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-473</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">128/.4</subfield><subfield code="2">22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">CC 7200</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)17672:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Gert, Joshua</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Brute rationality</subfield><subfield code="b">normativity and human action</subfield><subfield code="c">Joshua Gert</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge University Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2004</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Cambridge studies in philosophy</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Ethik</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Normativity (Ethics)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Decision making / Moral and ethical aspects</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungsfindung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113446-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Normativität</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4790832-4</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Normativität</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4790832-4</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Entscheidungsfindung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4113446-1</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-03953-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Druckausgabe</subfield><subfield code="z">978-0-521-83318-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">URL des Erstveröffentlichers</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="943" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029330659</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088</subfield><subfield code="l">DE-12</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">BSB_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="966" ind1="e" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088</subfield><subfield code="l">DE-473</subfield><subfield code="p">ZDB-20-CBO</subfield><subfield code="q">UBG_PDA_CBO</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV043921576 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-09-23T16:15:03Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780511487088 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029330659 |
| oclc_num | 704550375 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG |
| physical | 1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) |
| psigel | ZDB-20-CBO ZDB-20-CBO BSB_PDA_CBO ZDB-20-CBO UBG_PDA_CBO |
| publishDate | 2004 |
| publishDateSearch | 2004 |
| publishDateSort | 2004 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Cambridge studies in philosophy |
| spelling | Gert, Joshua Verfasser aut Brute rationality normativity and human action Joshua Gert Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2004 1 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in philosophy Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally Ethik Normativity (Ethics) Decision making / Moral and ethical aspects Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd rswk-swf Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd rswk-swf Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 s Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-03953-6 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-83318-9 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Gert, Joshua Brute rationality normativity and human action What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality Ethik Normativity (Ethics) Decision making / Moral and ethical aspects Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4113446-1 (DE-588)4790832-4 |
| title | Brute rationality normativity and human action |
| title_auth | Brute rationality normativity and human action |
| title_exact_search | Brute rationality normativity and human action |
| title_full | Brute rationality normativity and human action Joshua Gert |
| title_fullStr | Brute rationality normativity and human action Joshua Gert |
| title_full_unstemmed | Brute rationality normativity and human action Joshua Gert |
| title_short | Brute rationality |
| title_sort | brute rationality normativity and human action |
| title_sub | normativity and human action |
| topic | Ethik Normativity (Ethics) Decision making / Moral and ethical aspects Entscheidungsfindung (DE-588)4113446-1 gnd Normativität (DE-588)4790832-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ethik Normativity (Ethics) Decision making / Moral and ethical aspects Entscheidungsfindung Normativität |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487088 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gertjoshua bruterationalitynormativityandhumanaction |