How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding o...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Helm, Bennett W. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2001
Schriftenreihe:	Cambridge studies in philosophy
Schlagworte:	Emotions (Philosophy) Reasoning Free will and determinism Ethics Gefühl Willensfreiheit Determinismus Vernunft
Online-Zugang:	DE-12 DE-473 URL des Erstveröffentlichers
Zusammenfassung:	How can we motivate ourselves to do what we think we ought? How can we deliberate about personal values and priorities? Bennett Helm argues that standard philosophical answers to these questions presuppose a sharp distinction between cognition and conation that undermines an adequate understanding of values and their connection to motivation and deliberation. Rejecting this distinction, Helm argues that emotions are fundamental to any account of value and motivation, and he develops a detailed alternative theory both of emotions, desires and evaluative judgements and of their rational interconnections. The result is an innovative theory of practical rationality and of how we can control not only what we do but also what we value and who we are as persons
Beschreibung:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Beschreibung:	1 online resource (x, 261 pages)
ISBN:	9780511520044
DOI:	10.1017/CBO9780511520044