This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governmen...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Haber, Stephen H. 1957- (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2003
Schriftenreihe:	Political economy of institutions and decisions
Schlagworte:	Geschichte 1900-2000 Geschichte 1800-1900 Geschichte 1876-1929 Geschichte Politik Wirtschaftspolitik Right of property / Mexico / History Mexiko Mexico / Economic policy Mexico / Politics and government / 19th century Mexico / Politics and government / 20th century
Online-Zugang:	BSB01 UBG01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	This book addresses a puzzle in political economy: why is it that political instability does not necessarily translate into economic stagnation or collapse? In order to address this puzzle, it advances a theory about property rights systems in many less developed countries. In this theory, governments do not have to enforce property rights as a public good. Instead, they may enforce property rights selectively (as a private good), and share the resulting rents with the group of asset holders who are integrated into the government. Focusing on Mexico, this book explains how the property rights system was constructed during the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship (1876–1911) and then explores how this property rights system either survived, or was reconstructed. The result is an analytic economic history of Mexico under both stability and instability, and a generalizable framework about the interaction of political and economic institutions
Beschreibung:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Beschreibung:	1 online resource (xv, 382 pages)
ISBN:	9780511615610
DOI:	10.1017/CBO9780511615610