The world without, the mind within: an essay on first-person authority

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosop...

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1. Verfasser: Gallois, André (VerfasserIn)
Format: Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1996
Schriftenreihe:Cambridge studies in philosophy
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Zusammenfassung:In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge
Beschreibung:Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 17 Feb 2016)
Beschreibung:1 online resource (xii, 213 pages)
ISBN:9780511627880
DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511627880

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