As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it fund...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Rodden, Jonathan (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Elektronisch E-Book
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2006
Schriftenreihe:	Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Schlagworte:	Intergovernmental fiscal relations Central-local government relations Revenue sharing Fiskalföderalismus Föderalismus Fiskalpolitik
Online-Zugang:	BSB01 UBG01 Volltext
Zusammenfassung:	As new federations take shape and old ones are revived around the world, a difficult challenge is to create incentives for fiscal discipline. A key question is whether a politically-motivated central government can credibly commit not to bail out subnational governments in times of crisis if it funds most of their expenditures. The center can commit when subnational governments retain significant tax autonomy, as in the United States. Or if the center dominates taxation, it can tightly regulate borrowing, as in many unitary systems. In a third group of countries including Brazil and Germany, the center can neither commit to a system of market-based discipline nor gain a monopoly over borrowing. By combining theory, quantitative analysis, and historical and contemporary case studies, this book explains why different countries have had dramatically different experiences with subnational fiscal discipline
Beschreibung:	Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015)
Beschreibung:	1 online resource (xvi, 313 pages)
ISBN:	9780511616075
DOI:	10.1017/CBO9780511616075