The ethics of deference: learning from law's morals
Do citizens have an obligation to obey the law? This book differs from standard approaches by shifting from the language of obedience (orders) to that of deference (normative judgments). The popular view that law claims authority but does not have it is here reversed on both counts: law does not cla...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
2002
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Schriftenreihe: | Cambridge studies in philosophy and law
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 URL des Erstveröffentlichers |
Zusammenfassung: | Do citizens have an obligation to obey the law? This book differs from standard approaches by shifting from the language of obedience (orders) to that of deference (normative judgments). The popular view that law claims authority but does not have it is here reversed on both counts: law does not claim authority but has it. Though the focus is on political obligation, the author approaches that issue indirectly by first developing a more general account of when deference is due to the view of others. Two standard practices that political theorists often consider in exploring the question of political obligation - fair-play and promise-keeping - can themselves be seen as examples of a duty of deference. In this respect the book defends a more general theory of ethics whose scope extends beyond the question of political obligation to questions of duty in the case of law, promises, fair play and friendship |
Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xvi, 189 pages) |
ISBN: | 9780511613890 |
DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511613890 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Soper, Philip |
author_facet | Soper, Philip |
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indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:32Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780511613890 |
language | English |
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physical | 1 online resource (xvi, 189 pages) |
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publishDate | 2002 |
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series2 | Cambridge studies in philosophy and law |
spelling | Soper, Philip Verfasser aut The ethics of deference learning from law's morals Philip Soper Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2002 1 online resource (xvi, 189 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Cambridge studies in philosophy and law Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) Do citizens have an obligation to obey the law? This book differs from standard approaches by shifting from the language of obedience (orders) to that of deference (normative judgments). The popular view that law claims authority but does not have it is here reversed on both counts: law does not claim authority but has it. Though the focus is on political obligation, the author approaches that issue indirectly by first developing a more general account of when deference is due to the view of others. Two standard practices that political theorists often consider in exploring the question of political obligation - fair-play and promise-keeping - can themselves be seen as examples of a duty of deference. In this respect the book defends a more general theory of ethics whose scope extends beyond the question of political obligation to questions of duty in the case of law, promises, fair play and friendship Obedience (Law) Law and ethics Rule of law Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-00872-3 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-81047-0 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613890 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext |
spellingShingle | Soper, Philip The ethics of deference learning from law's morals Obedience (Law) Law and ethics Rule of law |
title | The ethics of deference learning from law's morals |
title_auth | The ethics of deference learning from law's morals |
title_exact_search | The ethics of deference learning from law's morals |
title_full | The ethics of deference learning from law's morals Philip Soper |
title_fullStr | The ethics of deference learning from law's morals Philip Soper |
title_full_unstemmed | The ethics of deference learning from law's morals Philip Soper |
title_short | The ethics of deference |
title_sort | the ethics of deference learning from law s morals |
title_sub | learning from law's morals |
topic | Obedience (Law) Law and ethics Rule of law |
topic_facet | Obedience (Law) Law and ethics Rule of law |
url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511613890 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT soperphilip theethicsofdeferencelearningfromlawsmorals |