Managerial dilemmas: the political economy of hierarchy
In organisation theory a schism has developed between the traditional organisational behaviour literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organisational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and coope...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Elektronisch E-Book |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge
Cambridge University Press
1991
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| Schriftenreihe: | Political economy of institutions and decisions
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | BSB01 UBG01 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | In organisation theory a schism has developed between the traditional organisational behaviour literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organisational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design an incentive system based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates and superiors and obviate or overcome the roles of political conflict, collective action, and leadership in an organisation. Applying game theory to the analysis of the roles of cooperation and political leadership in organisational hierarchies, he concludes that the organisation whose managers can inspire cooperation and the transcendence of short-term interest in its employees enjoys a competitive advantage |
| Beschreibung: | Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) |
| Beschreibung: | 1 online resource (xv, 254 pages) |
| ISBN: | 9781139173742 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9781139173742 |
Internformat
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| 500 | |a Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) | ||
| 520 | |a In organisation theory a schism has developed between the traditional organisational behaviour literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organisational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design an incentive system based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates and superiors and obviate or overcome the roles of political conflict, collective action, and leadership in an organisation. Applying game theory to the analysis of the roles of cooperation and political leadership in organisational hierarchies, he concludes that the organisation whose managers can inspire cooperation and the transcendence of short-term interest in its employees enjoys a competitive advantage | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Industrial management | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Organizational behavior | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Psychology, Industrial | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Miller, Gary J. |
| author_facet | Miller, Gary J. |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Miller, Gary J. |
| author_variant | g j m gj gjm |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV043919080 |
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| collection | ZDB-20-CBO |
| ctrlnum | (ZDB-20-CBO)CR9781139173742 (OCoLC)967397487 (DE-599)BVBBV043919080 |
| dewey-full | 658.4/02 |
| dewey-hundreds | 600 - Technology (Applied sciences) |
| dewey-ones | 658 - General management |
| dewey-raw | 658.4/02 |
| dewey-search | 658.4/02 |
| dewey-sort | 3658.4 12 |
| dewey-tens | 650 - Management and auxiliary services |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/CBO9781139173742 |
| format | Electronic eBook |
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| id | DE-604.BV043919080 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T07:38:32Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9781139173742 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-029328161 |
| oclc_num | 967397487 |
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| physical | 1 online resource (xv, 254 pages) |
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| publishDate | 1991 |
| publishDateSearch | 1991 |
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| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Political economy of institutions and decisions |
| spelling | Miller, Gary J. Verfasser aut Managerial dilemmas the political economy of hierarchy Gary J. Miller Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1991 1 online resource (xv, 254 pages) txt rdacontent c rdamedia cr rdacarrier Political economy of institutions and decisions Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015) In organisation theory a schism has developed between the traditional organisational behaviour literature, based in psychology, sociology and political science, and the more analytically rigorous field of organisational economics. The former stresses the importance of managerial leadership and cooperation among employees, while the latter focuses on the engineering of incentive systems that will induce efficiency and profitability, by rewarding worker self-interest. In this innovative book, Gary Miller bridges the gap between these literatures. He demonstrates that it is impossible to design an incentive system based on self-interest that will effectively discipline all subordinates and superiors and obviate or overcome the roles of political conflict, collective action, and leadership in an organisation. Applying game theory to the analysis of the roles of cooperation and political leadership in organisational hierarchies, he concludes that the organisation whose managers can inspire cooperation and the transcendence of short-term interest in its employees enjoys a competitive advantage Industrial management Organizational behavior Psychology, Industrial Employee motivation Incentives in industry Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd rswk-swf Kooperation (DE-588)4032386-9 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Hierarchie (DE-588)4024842-2 gnd rswk-swf Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 s Hierarchie (DE-588)4024842-2 s Kooperation (DE-588)4032386-9 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-37281-7 Erscheint auch als Druckausgabe 978-0-521-45769-9 https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173742 Verlag URL des Erstveröffentlichers Volltext 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Miller, Gary J. Managerial dilemmas the political economy of hierarchy Industrial management Organizational behavior Psychology, Industrial Employee motivation Incentives in industry Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Kooperation (DE-588)4032386-9 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Hierarchie (DE-588)4024842-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4043774-7 (DE-588)4032386-9 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4024842-2 |
| title | Managerial dilemmas the political economy of hierarchy |
| title_auth | Managerial dilemmas the political economy of hierarchy |
| title_exact_search | Managerial dilemmas the political economy of hierarchy |
| title_full | Managerial dilemmas the political economy of hierarchy Gary J. Miller |
| title_fullStr | Managerial dilemmas the political economy of hierarchy Gary J. Miller |
| title_full_unstemmed | Managerial dilemmas the political economy of hierarchy Gary J. Miller |
| title_short | Managerial dilemmas |
| title_sort | managerial dilemmas the political economy of hierarchy |
| title_sub | the political economy of hierarchy |
| topic | Industrial management Organizational behavior Psychology, Industrial Employee motivation Incentives in industry Organisation (DE-588)4043774-7 gnd Kooperation (DE-588)4032386-9 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Hierarchie (DE-588)4024842-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Industrial management Organizational behavior Psychology, Industrial Employee motivation Incentives in industry Organisation Kooperation Spieltheorie Hierarchie |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173742 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT millergaryj managerialdilemmasthepoliticaleconomyofhierarchy |